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ABSTRACT 
The Auditor's Evaluation 
Of Internal Accounting Control: 
A Systems View of Professional Judgment 
May 1981 
Alfred John Nanni, Jr. 
B.A., Syracuse University 
M.S.B.A., University of Massachusetts 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Dr. Morton Backer 
This study is an investigation into the judgment pro¬ 
cesses of experienced auditors during the evaluation of 
internal accounting control. The study has three objec¬ 
tives. The first objective is to assess the reliability of 
auditors as measurement instruments. Auditors' judgments 
are examined in terms of consistency, consensus, and freedom 
from bias. The second objective of this study is an evalua¬ 
tion of a systems model of accounting control based on fea¬ 
tures of cybernetics and contingency theory. This model is 
tested as a positive model of auditor evaluation behavior. 
The third objective is an exploration of the simple auditor 
background variables that might mediate internal accounting 
control judgments. 
The study involved a controlled experiment in which expe¬ 
rienced auditors were asked to make judgments on the quality 
of internal control in a series of hypothetical situations. 
vi 
These situations, or cases, resulted from the orthogonal 
manipulation of four independent variables identified by the 
systems model. The four variable classes are environmental 
constraints, system boundary constraints, feedback regula¬ 
tors, and programmatic regulators. Judgments were recorded 
as ratings for each case on three dependent variable dimen¬ 
sions, one corresponding to each of the three broad objec¬ 
tives of internal accounting control: authorization, 
accounting, and safeguarding of assets. 
The first research objective was pursued through three 
hypotheses whicn tested the assumption that auditors, acting 
independently, have the traits of ideal experts. None of 
the three hypotheses was supported. The auditors partici¬ 
pating in this study were found to have a mean test-retest 
reliability of .715, significantly less than the criterion 
of .8 employed in the test. The test for consensus indi¬ 
cated that tne cross-auditor reliaoility was significantly 
less than the obtained test-retest reliability. Finally, 
the auditors were found to have reacted differently to each 
of the manipulated indicators, suggesting tne presence of 
bias in tne judgments. 
The second research question was investigated through 
thirteen hypotheses derived from the systems model. All but 
two of these hypotheses were supported, indicating that, as 
a whole, the auditors acted as if their consensual judgment 
Vll 
model incorporated the cause-effect relationships identified 
by the systems model. 
No hypotheses were employed in the investigation support¬ 
ing the third research objective. The statistical tests 
were exploratory and completely £x post. Nonetheless, the 
differences found among ratings of auditors grouped by back¬ 
ground classes seem to be consistent with relatively 
straightforward explanations. 
The value of the study is seen in four areas. First, it 
may have immediate implications for the determination of 
auditing policy. SAS 30, issued during the course of this 
study, may place the auditor in an inherently risky situa¬ 
tion if the evidence from this study gives an accurate pic¬ 
ture of auditor control evaluation expertise. Second, the 
results here may have near-term applications in the improve¬ 
ment of evaluation methods, especially by identifying poten¬ 
tial sources of judgment bias. Third, the systems model and 
the information about it provided by the tests in this the¬ 
sis can provide a framework for a general model of internal 
accounting control. It is unlikely, however, that signifi¬ 
cant advances in this area will accrue in the short term. 
Finally, even in its current rudamentary form, the systems 
model developed in this thesis may nave value in terms of 
attention direction in the design and evaluation of control 
systems. 
vm 
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INTRODUCTION 
Internal accounting control and its evaluation have, in 
recent years, become major issues in accounting. The 
sources of this heightened concern include: 
1) Prominent cases of management fraud; 
2) Requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1977 and related activity of the SEC; 
3) Conclusions and recommendations of the AICPA's 
Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities ([1978]; 
hereafter, CAR report); and 
4) Pressure from within the profession for the 
development of more objective and/or precise 
approaches to the evaluation of internal account¬ 
ing control in order to allow more efficient 
audits. 
Despite the intensified interest, however, we still have 
little formalized knowledge about tne cause and effect rela¬ 
tionships oetween internal accounting control procedures and 
resulting information accuracy, asset safeguarding, and 
proper authorization of transactions. 
The problem has been brought to a head by the CAR 
report's recommendation that the auditor "... review and 
test the entire accounting control system" (p. 61) in order 
to: 
1) supply management with recommendations for the 
correction of material weaknesses, and, eventu¬ 
ally, 
1 
2 
2) publicly report on "... whether he agrees with 
management's [reported] description of the compa¬ 
ny's accounting controls." (p. 62) 
In 1979, the SEC proposed an amendment to Regulation S-K 
which would essentially require these activities. This pro¬ 
posed mandate was tabled in June, 1980, but the Commission 
strongly recommended such auditor reporting on a voluntary 
basis. In the following month, the AICPA released Statement 
on Auditing Standards Number 30, "Reporting on Internal 
Accounting Control." This statement established the guide¬ 
lines for such voluntary reports'. 
The normative accounting literature places considerable 
emphasis on the auditor's use of expert "professional judg¬ 
ment" in the evaluation of internal accounting control. At 
least one financial analyst (an advisor to CAR) seems to 
feel that auditors currently have sufficient expertise to 
provide useful and reliable information on the quality of 
their client's internal accounting control to external 
users.^ The results of empirical studies are mixed as to the 
existence of that expertise, however, and a number of 
authorities on the subject have called into question both 
2 
the usefulness and reliability of such auditor evaluation. 
^Brown, Marilyn V. "Auditors and Internal Controls: 
An Analyst's View," CPA Journal [September, 1977], pp. 
27-31. 
Morris and Anderson [1976] and Mautz and Sharaf [1961] 
are prime examples. 
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Thus, the first question this research is designed to 
address is: 
1) Can auditors be characterized as experts in the 
area* of internal accounting control evaluation as 
defined by the consistency, consensus, and lack 
of bias in their judgments? 
Regardless of the auditor's expertise, there is reason to 
believe that his performance can be improved through the 
identification of: 
a) the underlying cause-effect relationships in 
internal accounting control, and 
b) any sources of dysfunction in the auditor's judg¬ 
ment process. 
Thus, the other major research questions this study 
investigates are: 
2) Can a systems model of internal accounting con¬ 
trol capture the evaluation behavior of auditors 
in a carefuly varied set of hypothetical situa¬ 
tions? 
3) Which background and experience variables mediate 
auditors' internal accounting control judgments? 
The investigation of these two research questions is 
founded upon the basic premise that any general similarities 
across internal accounting control evaluations made indepen¬ 
dently by a group of auditors reflect an objective agreement 
on cause-effect relationships. A model that accounts for 
such "implicit consensus" then becomes a positive model of 
auditor internal accounting control evaluation and a 
4 
descriptive model of control cause-effect relationships. 
Conversely, the variability of auditor responses to a single 
control configuration reflects the level of uncertainty 
about such cause-effect relationships that exists within 
that auditor group. Thus, the identification of grouping 
factors that lead to large judgment variability is a first 
step in the search for sources of dysfunction in the evalua¬ 
tion process. 
This thesis presents the results of an experiment con¬ 
ducted to address the three research issues defined above. 
The experiment required practicing auditors to rate the 
effectiveness of the internal accounting control systems 
described in a series of hypothetical situations. 
The ratings produced by those auditors were examined from 
several perspectives in order to: 
1) test hypotheses concerning judgment 'expertise,' 
2) test hypotheses drawn from a systems theory model 
of control cause and effect, and 
3) explore the mediating effects of background 
traits in the internal accounting control evalua¬ 
tion process. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I outlines 
the recent history of the internal accounting control evalu¬ 
ation problem, discusses the motivation for this study, and 
identifies the major thrust of the research. 
Chapter II presents an outline of the process of internal 
5 
accounting control evaluation in the typical audit. 
Included in this chapter are facts taken from the relevant 
professional literature and facts gathered from a series of 
informal interviews. The interviewees in this series were 
auditors from a variety of responsibility levels and were 
employed by several of the largest national auditing firms. 
Chapter III reviews prior research on internal accounting 
control evaluation. Implications for the present investiga¬ 
tion are drawn from these studies. Also, several issues 
deserving examination (or re-examination) are identified. 
Chapter IV presents a systems theory-based model of 
internal accounting control cause-effect relationships. In 
contrast to the evaluation approaches used by auditing 
firms, this model is not concerned with prescribing actions 
for the auditor. Rather, it is aimed at identifying general 
classes of internal accounting controls and the likely 
effects of their individual and collective presence in an 
accounting system. 
Chapter V derives six propositions from normative audit¬ 
ing theory and the systems model. It then presents the 
hypotheses employed in the current study. 
Chapter VI describes the organization and methodology 
employed in the experiment. 
Chapter VII outlines the basic results of the experiment, 
including a screening of the data (for outliers, etc.) prior 
6 
to the actual testing of hypotheses. 
Chapter VIII presents the tests of hypotheses related to 
auditor judgment expertise. Those tests indicate that audi¬ 
tors do not give the same judgments 'to a single set of cir¬ 
cumstances and that, indeed, different auditors may perceive 
the same facts differently. 
Chapter IX examines the hypotheses drawn from the systems 
model of internal accounting control. In general, the audi¬ 
tor’s behavior was in congruence with the model's 
description of control cause-effect relationships. 
Chapter X covers the post hoc review of effects related 
to auditor background and expertise. The findings indicate 
that auditor responsibility and experience may affect inter¬ 
nal accounting control evaluation in predictable ways. 
Finally, Chapter XI summarizes the outcome of the 
research project and suggests some implications for future 
research and practice. 
CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
History of the Problem 
The last several years have witnessed a resurgence of 
interest in internal accounting control. As indicated in 
# 
the introduction, the sources of this renewed concern 
include a number of factors, especially: 
1) Prominent cases of management fraud; 
2) Requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1977 and related activity of the SEC; 
3) Conclusions and recommendations of the CAR 
report; and 
4) Pressure from within the profession for the 
development of more objective and/or precise 
approaches to the evaluation of internal account¬ 
ing control in order to allow more efficient 
audits. 
These four topics are addressed below. The implications 
of these discussions are then developed into the study's 
three major research questions. 
The public's attention has been captured by events such 
as the Equity Funding scandal, illegal corporate payments 
and influence buying, and control failures in the GAO. 
These cases have underscored the fact that there is a great 
potential for information- or accounting-system aouse in 
7 
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business and government. As a result, legislators, 
regulators, and accounting practitioners have felt it neces¬ 
sary to make increased demands for the establishment and 
monitoring of internal control systems. 
These demands were first institutionalized by Congress in 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). This act 
requires publicly held firms to "... devise and maintain a 
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurances that..." transactions are executed in 
an authorized manner, that they are recorded in such a way 
as to allow the preparation of financial statements, that 
only authorized individuals have access to assets, and 
that comparison of recorded assets to actual assets is 
made at reasonable intervals. 
Partially in response to that act, the AICPA founded the 
CAR. The CAR report contains reactions to the above act and 
to the SEC's corollary actions. It includes a recommenda¬ 
tion that management report on its "... assessment of the 
company's accounting system and controls over it..." (p. 
76). It also recommends that the auditor's role in evaluat¬ 
ing internal accounting control be expanded from the current 
practice of examining only those controls in the areas where 
reliance during the audit is intended to investigating the 
entire accounting control system. This extended study would 
be the source of the auditor's set of recommendations to 
9 
management for the correction of material weaknesses in the 
system as well as the source of his opinion on the represen¬ 
tativeness of management's description of the system. In 
summary, then, the CAR report recommends that management and 
the auditor each make extensive study of the internal 
accounting control system, discuss their conclusions with 
each other, and report them to the public. 
In the wake of the FCPA, the SEC required that management 
undertake a review of control systems in order to determine 
what actions should be taken to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of the act. 
In 1979, the SEC proposed an amendment to Regulation S-K 
that would have mandated management statements on the qual¬ 
ity of internal accounting control and independent auditor 
reports on those statements. This proposal was formally 
withdrawn through SEC Release No. 34-16877 in June of 1980. 
However, this release did not close the issue. Rather, it 
included three major statements: 
1) The SEC strongly advised voluntary compliance 
with the original proposal for management report¬ 
ing on internal control quality; 
2) The SEC re-emphasized the importance of indepen¬ 
dent auditor involvement in the review; and 
3) The SEC stated its intentions to monitor volun¬ 
tary activity as a prelude to formal reconsidera¬ 
tion of the entire issue in the Spring of 1982. 
Meanwhile, with the increasing sophistication of both the 
10 
techniques used by auditors and the accounting systems that 
they audit, the SEC and professional accounting advisory 
bodies have put pressure on practitioners and researchers to 
provide a more specific framework for the evaluation of 
internal accounting control. The second standard of audit 
fieldwork requires the auditor to evaluate internal account¬ 
ing control as a way of determining how much reliance can be 
placed on the accounting subsystem under study in planning 
the extent of substantive testing. Numerous articles have 
appeared describing and analyzing methodologies to relate 
internal accounting control evaluation to such extent-of- 
test decisions."*' Finally, in SAS 30 the AICPA has formalized 
the review of internal accounting control as a separate and 
acceptable activity in itself. Thus, guidelines now exist 
for the rendering of an auditor opinion on a client's inter¬ 
nal accounting control system as determined through the reg¬ 
ular audit work (for management, regulating bodies, or spe¬ 
cial third parties only) or through a separate engagement 
for such purposes (required to support a general opinion). 
If the auditor's internal accounting control evaluation 
This topic seems to have taken off in the early 
1970's. A skeletal chronology would include Aly & Duboff 
[1971], Corless [1972], Joyce [1976], Morris & Anderson 
[1976], and Mock & Turner [1978] on the empirical side and 
Sorensen [1969], Tracy [1969], Smith [1972], and Elliot & 
Rogers [1972] on the theoretical/methodological side. 
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is going to be relied upon in devising the audit plan, in 
advising management, or in publicly attesting to manage¬ 
ment's assessment of accounting control, it must first be 
demonstrated that these judgments are relatively stable 
across time and individuals. In this sense, the auditor 
must be regarded as a measurement instrument, and, like any 
such instrument, must be reliable. Our first major research 
question, then, is: 
1) Can auditors be characterized as experts in the 
area of internal accounting control evaluation as 
defined by the consistency, consensus, and lack 
of bias in their judgments? 
Certainly, if the auditor is not a reasonably expert 
judge according to these criteria, then an extension of the 
responsibilities placed on him in internal accounting con¬ 
trol evaluation must De deemed inappropriate. Whether or 
not the auditor is an internal accounting control evaluation 
expert, the events, pronouncements, and regulations cited 
earlier indicate that the pressures on auditors to improve 
the precision of internal accounting control evaluation and 
to set specific criteria for the evaluation task are likely 
to continue, if not increase. As a necessary prelude to 
reaching such goals, however, we need to learn more about 
the cause-effect relationships between the existence of cer¬ 
tain control-feature classes and the attainment of related 
control objectives. 
The most objective way of determining such relationships 
12 
would be direct study of actual control systems. However, 
accounting control systems are open systems. Their opera¬ 
tions are affected by a wide variety of variables that can- 
2 
not be controlled in a real-world environment. Thus, direct 
study of internal accounting control systems, besides 
requiring a massive and expensive effort, could easily 
result in uninterpretable data. In order to make such study 
more efficient, we should first try to find some indications 
of where significant interactions between control systems 
and their environments might occur. We would also have to 
develop a descriptive model to characterize, in a general 
manner, the critical features of both accounting control 
systems and their environments. 
Thus, prior to extensive direct study of internal 
accounting control systems, we must make some preliminary 
observation and analysis. Some of this work has already 
been done and is reflected in the descriptive literature on 
this subject. However, such discussions have been, of 
necessity, based only on introspection and anecdotal evi¬ 
dence. Psychological studies of self-insight in complex 
observation and judgment have found that man has a less- 
than-ideal awareness of the factors and information that 
2 
Konrath [1971] discusses this open systems view of 
control at some length. This notion is discussed in depth 
in this paper in Chapter IV. 
13 
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contribute to his final judgment. However, direct empirical 
study of such judgment allows the extraction, through sta¬ 
tistical techniques, of the implicit cues that guide the 
judgment process. Thus, positive models of internal 
accounting control evaluation judgments may provide further 
insight into the factors that affect the quality of internal 
accounting control systems. 
The best indications of how accounting control systems 
interact with their environments and how well control proce¬ 
dures combine to produce control effectiveness, therefore, 
are probably those captured in the control decisions of 
those people who are the most experienced in the field of 
internal accounting control evaluation. Since independent 
auditors make up the largest group of such individuals, it 
is logical that a study of their judgments may yield some 
insight into the cause-effect relationships in the area of 
internal control. Therefore, our second major research 
question is: 
2) Can a systems model of internal accounting con¬ 
trol capture the evaluation behavior of auditors 
in a carefully varied set of hypothetical situa¬ 
tions? 
If general areas of agreement can be found in auditor's 
judgments, then the scope of direct empirical study can be 
^Reviews of such work can be found in Slovic & Lichten¬ 
stein [1971] , Swieringa, et al. [1978] , and Joyce [1976] . 
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reduced to concentrate on the factors identified in those 
areas and the relationships among them. Such reduced scope 
will not only increase the efficiency of direct investiga¬ 
tion, but also it may eventually allow the study of internal 
control through simulation and modeling. 
Furthermore, since internal accounting control evaluation 
expertise has a direct effect on audit efficiency, the dis¬ 
covery of factors that mediate an auditor's evaluation is 
also of importance. Thus, the third research question for 
this study is: 
3) Which background and experience variables seem to 
mediate auditors' internal accounting control 
judgments? 
Before we proceed to a review of the state of the art in 
internal accounting control evaluation, it will be helpful 
to lay out some basic terminology and present a quick 
description of the internal accounting control evaluation 
process and how it fits into the typical audit. 
Audit Procedure and Terminology^ 
The objective of an ordinary independent audit is an 
evaluation of the fairness with which a set of financial 
statements represents the events, transactions, and balances 
on which the statements are based, given the criteria of 
4 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
4 This definition is a paraphrase of the one prepared by 
15 
The principal inputs to the auditor's final opinion deci¬ 
sion are the results of substantive testing. As the name 
implies, substantive testing is an examination of the sub¬ 
stance on which the financial statements are based: actual 
underlying transactions and balances. Substantive tests 
include verification of transaction or balance details from 
random samples and analytical review of significant ratios 
and trends for reasonableness. 
The auditor may, indeed should, adjust the extent of such 
substantive testing based on an assessment of the reliabil¬ 
ity of the accounting system.^ The system's reliability, 
which may be thought of in terms of an error prooability 
distribution, is mediated by the internal accounting control 
system. Hence, internal accounting control evaluation is a 
major input to the design of the substantive testing plan. 
Under current auditing procedures, the auditor only eval- 
the AICPA in section 110.01 of Volume I of its Professional 
Standards. See that section and the following paragraphs 
for a more technical description of audit objectives and 
evidence gathering. 
5 
This concept is embodied in the second standard of 
audit fieldwork, which states: 
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of 
the existing internal control as a basis for reli¬ 
ance thereon and for determination of the resul¬ 
tant extent of the tests to which auditing proce¬ 
dures are to be restricted. 
See section AU 150.02 of the AICPA's Professional Standards. 
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uates those controls on which he intends to rely.6 The 
presence of strong controls contributes to the auditor's 
pool of evidence in support of the client's financial state¬ 
ments. The more reliable, the accounting system is, the less 
additional evidence is required to support the conclusion 
that the financial statements are fair. Thus, when strong 
controls exist, smaller detail samples can be taKen. 
This process may be viewed in Bayesian terms.' The audi¬ 
tor's decision on the fairness of the financial statements 
is based, in part, on a posterior estimate of the state¬ 
ments' error rate. This rate, in turn, is determined 
through -Bayes' Theorem using a subjectively rated prior (the 
output of internal accounting control evaluation) and an 
objectively estimated error likelihood extrapolated from the 
results of the sampling tests. Given a minimally acceptable 
error rate and confidence level, and based on the estimated 
prior distribution, sample sizes can be determined to yield 
g 
The SEC has strongly recommended a voluntary program 
under which the auditor would express an opinion on manage¬ 
ment's statement of the reliability of its accounting sys¬ 
tems. In SAS 30, the AICPA has recognized that the render¬ 
ing of such an opinion would require the auditor to expand 
the scope of his examination of controls. 
7 
The Bayesian view of substantive test adjustment has 
been discussed heavily in the literature. Its inclusion 
here should not be construed as an advocacy of the position. 
Rather, it should be viewed as a descriptive approach. For 
details on the Bayesian approach, see Sorensen [1969], Tracy 
[1969], or Smith [1972]. 
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the most efficient audit program. 
Minimizing sample size is not a trivial objective. With 
the complexity and high volume of transactions that many 
accounting systems must process, a difference in sample 
sizes of only a few percentage points may translate into a 
significant variation in audit time and expense. 
The typical audit routine, with an emphasis on internal 
control evaluation, is flowcharted in Figure 1. The left 
side of the figure represents the internal accounting con¬ 
trol evaluation process. This process can be characterized 
as a four step approach, one step for each decision labeled 
A, B, C, and D in Figure 1. 
The first decision (step A) is on the strength of general 
controls. According to Barber [1974], "General controls are 
environmental in nature and span most or all of the applica¬ 
tions in an accounting system." (p. 136) General controls 
may be physical, social, or procedural in nature. They may 
limit or motivate certain patterns of behavior. As indi¬ 
cated in the flowchart, their basic objective may be charac¬ 
terized as fostering compliance with the organization's 
plans of operation, especially compliance with specific con¬ 
trols. If the auditor finds that general controls are not 
likely to foster compliance with established specific con¬ 
trols, he will exit the internal accounting control evalua¬ 
tion routine and proceed to plan an audit program that does 
18 
Devise audit pro¬ 
gram, placing 
appropriate reli¬ 
ance on controls. 
Perform substan¬ 
tive tests. 
Can an opinion 
be formed? 
Revise audit pro¬ 
gram. 
Give audit opinion. 
Figure 1 
Flowchart of Audit Process 
19 
not place any reliance on internal control. If his examina¬ 
tion of general controls leads him to believe that a serious 
lack of control exists, he may opt to decline the audit 
engagement. 
If the auditor finds no compelling reason to preclude 
reliance on internal control at this level, he then proceeds 
to the second stop, which culminates in decision B on spe¬ 
cific controls. Here the auditor identifies strengths and 
weaknesses in the procedures and techniques employed to 
maintain control in each accounting subsystem. For example, 
if the auditor intends to rely on inventory controls, he 
will review that subsystem for control strengths and weak¬ 
nesses. Here, again, if the evidence does not convince the 
auditor that the documented controls are sufficient to allow 
the audit program to place some reliance on the output of 
the subsystem under study, further examination is not under¬ 
taken. 
It should be emphasized that this is the point at which 
the actual reliability decision is made. Later decisions 
either feed back to this point or exit from the internal 
accounting control evaluation routine. Thus, the auditor 
should have a subjective rating of the reliability of the 
subsystem just examined as he leaves this step. However, he 
may not yet have a notion of the amount of reliance the 
audit program will place on that subsystem in terms of a 
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sample size determination. 
The preliminary plan of subsystem reliance is affected by 
the third step, decision C in Figure 1. Here the auditor 
considers non-control factors that mediate the internal 
accounting control evaluation - substantive testing rela¬ 
tionship. For example, if the auditor estimates that the 
costs of compliance testing will exceed the savings due to 
reduced substantive testing based on reliance on internal 
accounting control, compliance testing will not be performed 
and no reliance will be placed on internal accounting con¬ 
trol in that subsystem. Furthermore, other factors, such as 
audit risk or changes in the size of the client's opera¬ 
tions, may also affect the audit program and over-ride con- 
g 
trol considerations. If the auditor does not decide to exit 
internal accounting control evaluation for any of these rea¬ 
sons, he then proceeds to the final step, decision D on the 
results of compliance testing. 
Compliance testing is a verification task which investi¬ 
gates the status of documented specific controls. If such 
testing indicates that the documented controls are, in fact, 
correctly functioning, then the reliability assessment made 
by the auditor at decision 3 will be retained. If, on the 
o 
A discussion of, and empirical support for, this claim 
can be found in Morris & Anderson [1976]. 
21 
other hand, documented controls are not in place, the 
auditor must return to decision B and re-rate the subsys¬ 
tem's reliability, given the controls that are in place. 
The above discussion has been a rather gross rendering of 
the actual process. Although this description has addressed 
the sequence of events and the major decision points in the 
internal accounting control evaluation process, it has said 
little about how such decisions are made. 
Auditors are involved in internal accounting control 
evaluation on a regular basis, and major auditing firms 
direct significant energy into developing formal evaluation 
procedures. In the public domain, the professional account¬ 
ing literature contains many opinions and analyses related 
to internal accounting control evaluation. It is likely 
that auditing theorists and auditing practitioners can pro¬ 
vide some basic insights into the logical considerations to 
be made during internal accounting control evaluation. 
Thus, we now turn to auditing literature and practitioners 
with the goal of finding some generally accepted "truths" 
about internal accounting control and its evaluation. 
CHAPTER I I 
THE AUDITOR'S EVALUATION 
OF INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL 
This chapter presents a rather cursory scan of the pro¬ 
fessional literature that prescribes guidelines or identi¬ 
fies possible cues for the auditor to employ in the review 
and evaluation of internal accounting control. It also 
introduces information about the standard methods for evalu¬ 
ation employed by several 'Big Eight' accounting firms. The 
literature is examined for important considerations at each 
level in the evaluation sequence discussed in the last sec¬ 
tion of Chapter Is review of general controls, review of 
specific controls, non-control considerations, and compli¬ 
ance testing. The data on actual evaluation methods, gath¬ 
ered through a series of informal interviews, indicates how 
the internal accounting control evaluation logic is 'coded' 
by different auditing firms. 
The chapter, itself, is divided into two major sections. 
The first: section deals with the auditing literature. The 
second section summarizes the information accumulated during 
the interviews. The chapter closes with an overview of the 
internal accounting control evaluation process and some 
related implications for the study of the topic. 
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The Auditing Literature 
The review of general controls. 
The AICPA's Special Advisory Committee on Internal 
Accounting Control (SACIAC) calls general controls "the 
internal accounting control environment." [1979, p. 12] 
SACIAC recognizes that general controls can either be real 
or intangible, but does not seem to carry the distinction 
any further. An examination of the normative literature, 
however, discloses that these two types of general control 
are viewed quite differently. Intangible controls seem to 
require an overall evalution and are the basis for decision 
A in Figure 1. For example, SACIAC, which tends to empha¬ 
size the intangible general controls, comes to the following 
conclusion: 
The committee believes that an overall evaluation 
of a company's internal accounting control envi¬ 
ronment is a necessary prelude to the-^evaluation 
of control procedures and techniques. [emphasis 
added] (p. 12) 
On the other hand, some authors, such as Konrath 
[1971] and Barber [1974], indicate that real general con¬ 
trols should be examined individually so that relationships 
between particular real general control factors and specific 
Here the committee seems to be expressing an opinion 
that the atmosphere in which control procedures and techni¬ 
ques (i.e., basicallly specific controls) operate is the 
critical feature of general control. 
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control procedures can be taken into account. 
In the paragraphs below, each type of general control 
is discussed separately. 
The intangible aspect of the internal accounting con¬ 
trol environment may be termed the client firm's "social 
structure." Mautz & Snaraf [1961] discuss this notion in 
terms of the "pressures that motivate people in the system." 
(p.145) This discussion is expanded by Mautz & Mini [1964] 
and Carmichael [1970]. 
According to Arthur Andersen & Co [1978] and SACIAC 
[1979], management's style, goals, and policies will affect 
the client's social structure. SACIAC also concludes that 
accountability for performance and "... adherence to appro¬ 
priate standards for ethical benavior, including compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations" (p. 13) maxe important 
contributions to a strong internal accounting control envi¬ 
ronment. SACIAC adds, "Formalization of such matters is 
conducive to an environment in which internal accounting 
controls are likely to be understood and operate effi¬ 
ciently." (p.13) 
The overall evaluation of intangible general controls 
is recommended, apparently, based on the opinion that a 
client's social structure has a general effect on accounting 
system reliability. Carmichael [1970] and Mautz & Mini 
[1964] both imply that social structure is likely to ai I.'ect 
the reliability of accounting information by encouraging or 
discouraging compliance with controls at the specieic sub¬ 
system level. It is also likely that the social structure 
will affect the potential for collusive employee abuse of 
tne system and what Elliot & Rogers [1972] have called the 
potential for "management override of controls." (pp. 
49-50) Thus, evaluation of social structure can be thought 
of as a preliminary estimate of the probability of finding a 
lack of compliance with specific controls. 
Obviously, such social structure is difficult to 
assess in any objective fashion. This is probably why even 
the sources cited above have little to say about how this 
factor can be measured. Some explicit surrogates for social 
structure variaoles may be identified, such as the formali¬ 
zation of ethical standards mentioned by SACIAC [1979]. The 
positional analysis approacn suggested by Swieringa i Carmi¬ 
chael [1971] may also find application here. Nonetheless, 
most discussions of this kind of control advocate the use of 
"professional judgment" in the assessment of control 
strength. 
While intangible control is evaluated as a whole, tne 
literature indicates that real factors in the control envi¬ 
ronment may have unique effects cn the quality of ccntrol in 
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individual subsystems. A significant number of such factors 
are identified in the literature. Some of these factors 
direct and motivate employees. Depending on the emphasis of 
each of these factors within the firm, certain errors or 
irregularities are more or less likely to pass, undetected, 
into the accounting records. The list of such factors 
includes formal reports, financial control structure, divi¬ 
sional or company objectives and plans, and established 
reward structures. These factors are also frequently iden¬ 
tified as contributing to intangible control. Certain 
other factors, however, are specifically discussed in terms 
of the differential effects of their designs or structures. 
These factors include the internal audit function, EDP 
applications, aspects of organizational structure, and 
reporting or information objectives. 
The significance of these real general controls is 
mediated by the state of the economy and the nature of the 
firm and its industry. Both SACIAC [1979] and CAR [1978] 
emphasize this fact. The CAR report concludes that "... an 
« 
understanding of a client's business and the industry of 
which it is a part is critical to a proper audit." (p. 39) 
According to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co [1978], the 
presence of an internal audit function is important to gen¬ 
eral control because it can "... contribute significantly to 
the control consciousness of the business." (p. 7) Perhaps 
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more importantly, however, properly designed internal audit 
operations may mitigate specific control weaknesses by moni¬ 
toring and correcting subsystem records and controls. 
Barber [1974] indicates that EDP considerations may 
negate or enhance other control procedures in a client. The 
AICPA recognized this fact in SAS no. 3, "The Effects of EDP 
on the Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control." 
For example, because of the design of EDP systems, some 
employees may have indirect access to assets via computer 
application programs. This access may defeat other separa¬ 
tion of duties controls. 
SACIAC identifies organizational structure as an 
important feature of the general control environment. Dif¬ 
ferent organizational structures could have different 
effects on specific control procedures and techniques. For 
example, formal separation of duties (a specific control 
technique) in certain areas maybe more important to adequate 
control in a firm that is centralized than in one that is 
decentralized. 
Again tne professional literature has little to say 
about how the actual evaluation of real general controls is 
to be made. As in the case of intangible general controls, 
professional judgment is recommended. 
In summary, then, we have seen that general controls 
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may be divided into real and intangible factors. The 
intangible factors have global effects on a firm's internal 
control, and the authoritative literature prescribes a 
global evaluation of them. Real environmental control fac¬ 
tors can have differing effects on individual specific con¬ 
trols. In order to discuss the appropriate method of evalu¬ 
ating real general controls, we must first proceed to a 
discussion of specific controls. 
The review of specific controls. 
Specific controls are control factors that are specific 
to a particular transaction cycle or functional accounting 
suosystem. They are also often called procedural controls 
or, especially in the EDP area, applications controls. 
It is widely held in the literature that internal 
accounting control evaluation should incorporate the identi¬ 
fication and assessment of specific controls against the 
criteria of the achievement of specific control objectives. 
Procedural controls and techniques are usually assessed in a 
yes/no fashion in regard to their ability to adequately con¬ 
tribute to the achievement of those objectives. The variety 
of specific control procedures and techniques is practically 
endless, but categories such as separation of duties, 
authorization, inventory teams, reconciliations, batch and 
ledger controls, standarized recording procedures, and 
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transaction verification are frequently mentioned in the 
. . . 2 
auditing literature. 
Arthur Andersen & Co [1978] proposes an elaborate check¬ 
list of control objectives. SACIAC [1979] and Peat, Mar¬ 
wick, Mitchell & Co [1978] also discuss similar objectives 
and give examples of how procedures and techniques may be 
evaluated against them. We will hold our discussion of such 
multiple objectives until the second section of this chap¬ 
ter. 
It is frequently emphasized, however, that the final 
evaluation of cycle or subsystem reliability must incorpo¬ 
rate the results of the review of general controls. Appar¬ 
ently, both intangible and real controls are brought into 
consideration. For example, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co 
[1978] states: 
Strong general controls usually will enhance the 
effectiveness of specific control procedures 
related to individual transactions and, in some 
instances, may tend to mitigate weaknesses in 
specific control procedures. On the other hand, 
the absence of a strong control environment cre¬ 
ated by general controls may diminish the effec¬ 
tiveness of specific controls over transactions. 
Therefore, in evaluating specific control proce¬ 
dures, the effect of general controls also should 
be considered, (p. 15) 
2 The practice of enumerating specific control proce¬ 
dures and techniques may be traced back through the profes¬ 
sional accounting literature as far as the report of the AIA 
Committee on Internal Control. Page 6 of that report con¬ 
tains a list similar to the one presented here. 
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Warner indicates that this is true in EDP systems, as 
well.3 
Non-control considerations. 
After the evaluation at the specific control level, the 
auditor must determine if there are any non-control consid¬ 
erations that preclude testing for compliance with docu¬ 
mented specific controls. Basically, the auditor will not 
perform compliance testing for one of two reasons: 
1) The cost to perform compliance tests exceeds the 
expected savings due to reduced substantive test¬ 
ing based on reliance on control; or 
2) Reliance on internal control is deemed inappro¬ 
priate due to broad, non-control reasons. 
Morris & Anderson [1976] discuss such non-control reasons 
for not placing reliance on internal control. They claim 
that the major classes are inherent audit risk, change in 
the size of business, familiarity with the client, and firm 
policy. If the auditor determines that none of these situa¬ 
tions apply, he proceeds with compliance testing. 
Compliance testing. 
Although is is considered a part of the internal account¬ 
ing control evaluation process, compliance testing is more 
appropriately viewed as a verification of the evidence on 
Warner [1967] summarizes the relationships between 
internal control needs and EDP. 
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which the evaluation at the specific control level is made. 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co states that "... the purpose 
of compliance testing is to determine that control proce¬ 
dures are functioning as intended." [1978, p.15] That is, 
compliance tests are made to ensure that the documented or 
stated specific controls are actually achieving their objec¬ 
tives. 
Compliance testing, itself, is much more objective than 
the two evaluation steps discussed above. If all compliance 
tests are positive, no new "judgment" is formed. Where com¬ 
pliance tests are negative, the auditor returns to the spe¬ 
cific control level and makes a new "judgment" based only on 
the specific controls he now knows to be in place. 
Having outlined some of the authoritative discussions of 
the four internal accounting control evaluation steps intro¬ 
duced in the last section of Chapter I, we now summarize and 
integrate those prescriptions. 
Summary of the literature. 
Our quick review of the normative literature has provided 
us with two major benefits. First, it has expanded our 
knowledge of the routine that the auditor goes through dur¬ 
ing the internal accounting control evaluation process. 
Second, it has yielded a list of factors and considerations 
that should impact on the final evaluation of the quality of 
32 
controls. However, our review has not provided us with a 
general model of control relationships to be applied during 
the evaluation. Indeed, much of the literature emphasizes 
the fact that the auditor must rely on his "professional 
judgment" in arriving at the final decision on the quality 
of controls. Even the most elaborate approaches discussed 
in the literature (e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co [1978] or 
SACIAC [1979]) are heuristic in nature. That is, they pro¬ 
vide a set of guidelines for the auditor's assistance in 
utilizing his professional judgment. 
It must not be concluded that the two benefits mentioned 
above are insignificant, however. They do, in fact, provide 
us with a firm base from which to start our research. In 
order to codify that base of information. Table 1 summarizes 
the factors that, according to the professional literature, 
affect the strength of internal control. Furthermore, Fig¬ 
ure 2 presents a more detailed flowchart of the evaluation 
routine. 
The complexity of the table serves to emphasize the 
intricacy of the internal accounting control evaluation pro¬ 
cess. Two features of Table 1 are worthy of special men¬ 
tion. First, note that certain general control variables 
(in the rightmost column) both contribute to the overall 
assessment of intangible general control and are also exam¬ 
ined separately as real general controls. Second, note that 
Type of Control 
Affected* 
Intangible 
A. General 
Control 
Real 
General 
Controls 
Specific 
Controls 
Conpliance 
D. Tests 
* Letters refer 
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Method of Examples Cited 
Analysis Recommended in Literature 
Overall Assessment 
-Decision on likelihood 
that employees will 
comply with subsystem 
controls 
Individual Assessment 
-Consideration of hew 
certain general control 
features will affect 
specific controls, 
especially in view of 
external states: econaiy 
industry, and client’s 
position in industry 
Individual Assessment 
-Decision on whether 
reliance can be placed 
on documented controls 
in particular subsystem 
given general controls 
and subsystem objectives 
Individual Assessment 
-Verification of 
Documented Controls 
Social Structure 
-Accountability for 
Performance 
-Ethics 
-Formal Conduct Rules 
-Motivation 
-Management's Style, 
_ Goals, & Policies 
Formal Reports 
Financial Controls 
Divis ional/Coirpany 
Objectives & Plans 
Reward Structures 
Internal Audit 
EDP Applications 
Organizational Structure 
Reporting/Information 
Objectives 
Separation of Duties 
Authorization of 
Transactions 
Transaction Verification 
Inventory Teams 
Standardization of 
Procedures 
Direct Observation 
and Tests 
to decision steps labeled in Figures 1 and 2. 
Table 1 
Factors Affecting the Strength of Internal Control 
Identified by the Professional Literature 
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Obtain an understanding 
of Economy, Industry, and 
Firm. 
Examine General Controls. 
Are General Controls Likely 
to Foster Compliance with 
Specific Controls? 
Examine Individual General 
Controls Which are Likely 
to Affect tne Value of 
Certain Specific Controls. 
Examine Specfic Controls: 
Identify Objectives in 
Subsystem. 
Identify Procedures and 
Techniques. 
Are Specific Controls 
Strong Enough to be 
Relied on Given: 
-Cycle and Subsystem 
-Interaction of General 
Control Items and 
Individual Specific 
Controls 
-Overall Mitigating 
Effect of General Controls 
Any Reasons to Preclude 
Compliance Tests? 
-Audit Risk 
-Cost/Benefit 
-Already Tested 
-Other 
Perform Compliance Tests 
Are Documented Controls 
in Place? 
Flowchart of 
Internal 
Figure 2 
the Audit Process, with Detail 
Accounting Control Evaluation 
on 
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real general controls and specific subsystem or cycle con¬ 
trols interact in the decision on control reliability. 
Before we proceed to a review of research studies of 
internal accounting control evaluation, it will be helpful 
to examine some of the procedures used by major auditing 
firms to assess control quality. 
Auditing Practice 
Reports such as those of SACIAC and CAR have addressed 
internal accounting control evaluation from a conceptual 
point of view. Auditing firms, however, must take a more 
pragmatic approach. The demands of the audit and the coor¬ 
dination problems it entails require these firms to estab¬ 
lish standard policies and approaches. 
The material in this section is the result of a series of 
informal interviews conducted to gain information on the 
kinds of methods major auditing firms apply to the evalua¬ 
tion task. Discussions were held with auditors from five 
"Big Eight" firms. These individuals represented a range of 
experience from under two years to over twenty-five years of 
auditing. 
The most important results of the discussions with audi¬ 
tors related to the use of evaluation of objectives and the 
approaches used to analyze the focal system's achievement of 
them. Each of these topics is covered oelow. 
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Qbjectives. 
The literature cited in the first part of this chapter 
frequently mentioned the evaluation of systems against con¬ 
trol objectives. In the case of SACIAC, the objectives were 
discussed in broad terms. In practice, however, the stated 
criterial objectives range from the most broad single objec¬ 
tive of system control strength to an elaborate "checklist" 
of objectives. 
Tne purpose of elaborating control objectives seems to be 
to focus attention on areas where errors or irregularities 
might be likely. The recent trend has apparently been 
towards the elaboration of multiple objectives, presumably 
to keep pace with the growing complexity of accounting sys¬ 
tems . 
Only one firm we visited employed what might be called a 
"classical" approach to control evaluation. The single 
stated objective used by the firm was an overall assessment 
of control strength. Each of the other firms rated controls 
against several objectives. 
The impression left by the series of interviews was that 
the most typical "state of the art" formulation was one 
based on three to seven broad objectives using terminology 
similar to SACIAC’s three broad objectives. Typically, 
these objectives were broken down further into sub-objec¬ 
tives, cycle-related objectives, or criteria related to 
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approaches to meeting the objectives. In one firm, how¬ 
ever, internal accounting control evaluation was accom¬ 
plished through a complex set of cross-referenced tables and 
questionnaires. 
One of the direct results of the use of multiple objec¬ 
tives appears to be the routinization of substantive test 
planning. Again a range of such standardization was found, 
but it seems that several firms used their objectives as a 
"template" to apply to each accounting subsystem of each 
transaction cycle. Superimposed upon each focal system, the 
objectives were typically translated into lists of specific 
control procedures. Evaluation of those procedures led more 
or less directly to substantive test procedures. 
Evaluation Approaches. 
As stated above, firms differed on their identification 
of objectives and on the uses to which they put those objec¬ 
tives. Another area of difference that became apparent dur¬ 
ing the interviews was the way in which duties relating to 
internal accounting control evaluation were structured. 
The variety of such approaches seemed to parallel the 
specificity of objectives employed. In fact, the combina¬ 
tion of objectives and approaches marxed off each firm's 
"philosophy" about internal accounting control evaluation. 
Auditors at the firm which used the "classical" evalua- 
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tion approach indicated that evaluation frequently involved 
informal group discussion. It v/as not unusual for these 
auditors to call or meet their peers to discuss impressions 
of a client's control system. Generally, that firm seemed 
to encourage a collegial, judgmental approach to control 
evaluation. 
Other firms utilized a "team" approach to evaluation. 
The teams, however, seemed to be fairly structured as to 
each memoer's area of concern and level of responsibility. 
These firms also used evaluation models that were hierarchi¬ 
cal in nature. 
The firm with the most structured and specific evaluation 
model also employed the most structured evaluation approach. 
Areas of responsibility were well defined and interaction 
about judgments was infrequent. 
To summarize, then, our discussions with auditors 
revealed several facts about the evaluation of internal 
accounting control. 
1) Auditing firms utilize a range of evaluation 
objectives from a single overall objective to a 
list of many discrete ones; and 
2) Auditing firms exhibit a range in terms of the 
formality or standardization of their approaches 
from informal and judgmental to formal, struc¬ 
tured, and programmed. 
The material in this chapter has several implications for 
the study of internal accounting control evaluation. For 
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example, it is logical that a study of internal accounting 
control evaluation should incorporate the variation of both 
general and specific control features, given the information 
above. In addition, it is apparent that uncertainties or 
variations in certain environmental information (like audit 
risk and costs of compliance tests) should be controlled or 
specifically isolated from the dependent variaole in studies 
that intend only to deal with internal accounting control 
evaluation. Furthermore it appears to be likely that the 
evaluation behavior of auditors from different firms might 
be analyzable in terms of their firms' evaluation 
approaches. To date, however, studies of internal account¬ 
ing control evaluation have not dealt with these issues. In 
fact, they have basically concentrated on the effects of 
specific procedures and techniques only. It is now appro¬ 
priate that we examine those studies. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH 
Given the importance of internal accounting control eval¬ 
uation to the audit process, surprisingly few studies of 
such decisions exist. Furthermore, most of the investiga¬ 
tions that do exist are not centrally involved with internal 
accounting control evaluation, itself. In the following 
sections, we review the methodology and results of the more 
recent studies in this area. First, judgment studies that 
include internal control related decisions are examined. 
Next, -four studies centrally concerned with internal 
accounting control evaluation are reviewed. Third, the 
principal studies are compared and contrasted. Finally, 
conclusions and implications for further research are pre¬ 
sented. 
Judgment Studies Incorporating Internal Control 
There have been a handful of studies not primarily inter¬ 
ested in internal accounting control evaluation and auditor 
expertise, per se, but which have produced results relevant 
to that topic. The basic message in the results of these 
investigations is that there appears to be little consensus 
among auditors (acting independently) on judgments based, at 
least in part, on internal control quality. 
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Aly & Duboff [1971], in a mailed questionnaire study, 
collected recommended test sample sizes from 158 CPAs for 
the audit of accounts receivable in a small retail firm. 
They found the recommendations to vary widely (10% to 100% 
of accounts receivable). 
Corless [1972] conducted a study of the application of 
Bayesian statistics to auditing. In a mailed questionnaire, 
he presented each of 88 auditors with two case descriptions 
incorporating different levels of internal control strength. 
He constructed the subjects' (Ss) prior probability distri¬ 
butions on error rates in a payroll system utilizing judg¬ 
ments collected in the questionnaire. He reported that 
"there was considerable variability among the prior distri¬ 
butions assessed by different auditors for each audit case." 
(p. 560) 
Weber [1978] conducted a controlled experiment in which 
40 auditors each dealt with a single case. Ss were required 
to make a variety of decisions within the structure of two 
basic tasks. His results with respect to consensus on judg¬ 
ment of error existing in inventories, like those above, 
showed considerable variation across Ss. 
These studies share two important trains. First, they 
all involved a ininimun of manipulation of internal control 
quality. In fact, only the Corless study involved any such 
manipulation at all. Thus, these studies do not provide any 
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indication of why the low consensus was obtained. Second, 
these investigations did not measure judgments on internal 
controls. The Corless and Weber studies elicited judgments 
on expected error levels, which may have been mediated by 
other factors in the cases or by unfamiliarity with the 
instruments and tasks involved in the experiments. (Both 
studies employed methodologies not typical to the audit.) 
The other studies gathered judgments relating to the scope 
of audit testing, which as indicated in Chapter I, may be 
affected by factors otner than internal control. Thus, it 
is impossible to tell precisely how much of the lack of con¬ 
sensus is due to the evaluation of internal control. 
Four Principal Studies On Evaluation Judgment 
Four previous studies have been centrally concerned with 
accounting control evaluation judgments.'*' Two of them pro¬ 
vide the basic model of the research proposed in this paper: 
Ashton [1974] and Joyce [1976]. However, the others, Mock & 
Turner [1978] and Reckers & Taylor [1979] deal with issues 
that are relevant nere as well. 
The results of two more studies of internal accounting 
control evaluation were published after the experiment 
described in this thesis was completed. Ashton & Kramer 
[1980] and Ashton & Brown [1980] each replicated Ashton's 
original [1974] experiment, using students and experienced 
auditors as subjects, respectively. The implications of 
their results are integrated into the discussion in Chapters 
VIII and XI. 
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In a controlled experiment, Ashton [1974] systematically 
manipulated the presence of six payroll control procedures 
employed by a hypothetical air conditioner manufacturer. 
The 63 auditor Ss were asked to give, in each case, their 
opinion of the strength of control in the described payroll 
g 
system. The study was a 1/2 replication of a 2 factorial 
design. Thus, each S gave responses for 32 different cases. 
The strength of controls was measured through a six point 
rating scale ranging from "extremely weak" (=1) to "adequate 
to strong" (=6). The presence of control procedures was 
indicated by yes/no answers to questions on a filled out 
internal control questionnaire similar to those employed 
during a typical audit. 
Ashton's results showed a rather high level of decision 
suability for each S (i.e., test-retest reliability). Also, 
consensus, as measured by pairwise correlations among the 
S's, was substantially higher than that reported in similar 
kinds of studies. Individual auditor decision models showed 
that, of the six control procedures employed, about half the 
variation in the judgments could generally be accounted for 
by the two separation of duties variables. Few significant 
effects could be attributed to the interaction of pairs of 
control procedures. 
Joyce [1976] employed a factorial design with five fac¬ 
tors in a mailed questionnaire study. As in Ashton's exper- 
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iment, the manipulated variables were operationalized as one 
of two levels of control procedures in a hypothetical firm, 
in this case a tire manufacturer. Rather than asking for a 
judgment of control strength, however, Joyce required his 35 
auditor Ss to formulate a "summary audit program for 
accounts receivable," comprised of man-hour allocations for 
each of five applications within the accounts receivable 
audit. He reported a significantly lower level of inter¬ 
auditor consensus, but about the same level of judgment sta¬ 
bility as Ashton. Also like Ashton, he found that the most 
significantly weighted main effect was due to his separation 
of duties variable. Again, few significant interaction 
effects for control procedures were detected. 
In a controlled experiment, Mock & Turner [1978] utilized 
a much more complex design than either of the above investi¬ 
gations. 73 auditor Ss were asked to adjust planned sample 
sizes in each of four different substantive test areas in an 
audit program for the revenue cycle of a firm described in 
an experimental case. The case materials outlined the oper¬ 
ations and audit of a picture frame wholesaler and were far 
more realistic than those previously studied. Mock & Turner 
did not determine the effects of specific control proce¬ 
dures, since the only manipulated cue variable was the qual¬ 
ity of procedural controls as a whole (fair/strong). Con¬ 
sensus was, in general, found to be low. However, decisions 
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under "strong" controls were much less variable than those 
under the "fair" control condition. Mock & Turner also spe¬ 
cifically addressed the issue of biases. Their results 
indicate that both halo and anchoring biases may be present 
in such judgments, although results on the anchoring test 
were hard to interpret due to design problems. 
Reckers & Taylor [1979] attempted to expand upon Ashton's 
[1974] study through an experiment that used a few complex 
cases rather than many relatively simple ones. 30 practic¬ 
ing auditors from 5 different firms were asked to rate five 
cases on a 0-100 percent reliability scale. The cases were 
filled-out internal control questionnaires, each consisting 
of 32 payroll-related items. Background about the case 
organization and its industry were provided, but Reckers & 
Taylor did not elaborate on their content. Due to the 
design of tne experimental material, relationships between 
factors and judgments could not be determined. The authors 
concentrated on measuring inter-subject consensus (which was 
quite low) and the relationship between auditor experience 
and consensus. They also indicated that the more experi¬ 
enced subjects had a higher mean correlation than the less 
experienced ones. However, Ashton [1979] demonstrated that 
the difference between the group means was not significant. 
The cue combinations tested in the Reckers & Taylor study 
did not reflect any theory-driven or test-oriented patterns. 
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Since many control items varied from one case to another, 
the judgment effects of individual controls were confounded. 
Having outlined these four studies, it will now be help¬ 
ful to compare and constrast them. However, due to the 
ambiguity in the Reckers & Taylor results, that study will 
be omitted from the discussion. 
Comparison of the Principal Studies 
Major features of the three main experiments discussed in 
the section above are summarized in Table 2. 
A quick scan of that table should suffice to demonstrate 
that there are a number of significant differences among the 
studies. Analysis of these differences with reference to 
the discussions in Chapter II may throw some light on the 
possible sources of the disparity in results. Below, we 
posit some plausible explanations for these inconsistencies 
based on discussions of a) general controls, b) manipulated 
variables, and c) the judgment task. 
In our review of the normative literature, we found con¬ 
siderable emphasis placed on the importance of general con¬ 
trols and the control environment in the internal accounting 
control evaluation process. Specifically mentioned as fac¬ 
tors involved in tnis process were: the nature of the firm 
and industry, the control objectives in the tasx, and the 
relation between the quality of general controls and spe- 
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Feature Ashton [1974] Joyce [1976] Mock & Turner [1978] 
Firn\/ 
Industry 
Air Conditioner 
Manufacturer 
Tire 
Manufacturer 
Picture Frame 
Supply Wholesaler 
Audit 
Task 
Payroll System Accounts 
Receivable 
Revenue Cycle 
(Sales to A/R) 
Variable 
Manipu¬ 
lated 
Specific 
Controls 
Specific 
Controls 
Specific 
Controls 
Judgment 
Type 
Single Stage 
(Strength) 
Multi-stage 
(Audit hrs. ) 
Multi-stage 
(Audit sample) 
Findings: 
*Consis- 
tency 
High High 
*Consen- 
sus 
*Biases 
High Lew Low 
Halo 
?Anchoring 
Separation 
of EUties 
Separation 
of Duties 
*Most 
Inportant 
Factor(s) 
*Inter¬ 
act ions 
Few, Lew 
weights 
Few, Lew 
weights 
*Self 
Insight 
High Moderate 
*Mediat- 
ing 
Variables 
No Firm Effect Some Firm 
Effect 
Audit Experience 
Commercial 
Experience 
Client Mix 
Special Training 
Office Location 
Table 2 
Summary of the Features of the Three Principal Prior Studies 
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cific control strengths and weaknesses. Note that all three 
of these factors vary across the three studies. Thus, the 
fact that consensus results vary among these studies may be 
due to the variety of general controls and the control envi¬ 
ronment. For example, the fact that Ashton used payroll 
controls, where, presumably, control relations are reason¬ 
ably well defined, may have been partially responsible for 
the high degree of consensus he obtained. 
All three of these studies were exploratory in nature and 
none were hypothesis-driven. The cues they employed seem to 
have been selected on the basis of their assumed importance 
in the examined accounting subsystem. This may have been in 
part responsible for the fact that only specific controls 
were manipulated in each of these studies. However, such an 
approach may have led to the apparent absence of configural 
cue use, as well. If interactions are to oe found, it is 
most likely that they would emerge only where the meanings of 
the manipulated cues depend on the presence or absence of 
other cues. Thus, the cues must be examined a priori before 
expectations about configural cue use can be justified. 
Finally, another source of variation between results may 
have been the kind of judgment task involved. While Ashton 
had Ss make a single judgment on control strength, Joyce and 
Mock & Turner required Ss to make audit plan decisions. 
As we have pointed out previously, other factors besides 
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quality of control will affect the ultimate audit plan. In 
fact, in the Mock & Turner study Ss reported in post-experi¬ 
mental questionnaires that cost/benefit factors, audit risk 
considerations, and other factors figured into their deci¬ 
sions. Thus, the lack of consensus in audit plan decisions 
in the Joyce and Mock & Turner investigations could be the 
additive effect of biases and errors in judgments other than 
those concerning internal control strength. 
Beyond this, the fact that the audit plan decisions were, 
of necessity, multi-stage may have affected the consistency 
results. In order to make audit plan decisions, Ss presuma¬ 
bly had to go through at least two steps. First, they had 
to make decisions about the strength of internal controls. 
Second, they had to use the first decisions as input to 
decisions about the extent of testing in the audit plan. 
Thus, their final decisions were a function of the internal 
accounting control evaluations, not the individual cues 
themselves. In the psychological literature, such multi- 
2 
stage judgment is termed "cascaded inference." Gettys, 
Kelly and Petersen [1973] indicate that in such cascaded 
inference tasks, Ss tend to use a simple "best guess" strat- 
2 
See Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein [1977], p. 3 for 
a quick overview of cascaded inference studies. Funaro 
[1977] compares a number of cascaded inference theories on 
their ability to account for some empirical data. 
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egy in going from one decision stage to the next. That is, 
they assume that their first judgment is correct and make 
their second decision assuming that "fact." Thus, in a cas¬ 
caded inference task, one would expect that simple random 
error would have an entropic effect, increasing the variance 
of judgments at each successive decision stage. (We shall 
have more to say about this in the section on selection of 
variables.) Thus, the low consensus obtained by Joyce and 
Mock & Turner may be an artifact of the experimental task. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The variety of results in investigations of internal 
accounting control evaluation make generalizations about the 
process difficult. However, it appears plausible that the 
variety of results may be partially due to the designs and 
methodology of the experiments themselves. The following 
facts, at least, are clear: 
1) No study has directly investigated the effects of 
variations in general controls or the control 
environment; 
2) No study has attempted to find generalizaole 
relationships based on a priori expectations; and 
3) In an attempt to enhance external validity by 
enlarging the judgment task, two of the principal 
studies may have sacrificed internal validity and 
obtained muddled results. 
The current study incorporated responses to these facts 
into its design. However, neither the kind of results that 
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should be expected in a study dealing with these factors, 
nor the clusters of variables that can be expected to elicit 
the desired information is clear at this point. In the next 
chapter a systems model of internal control is developed in 
order to provide some guidance for dealing with these prob¬ 
lems . 
CHAPTER I V 
A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL 
Although the literature on internal accounting control 
evaluation contains a plethora of guidelines, checklists, 
and terminology, there still exists no unifying framework to 
describe and analyze factors that affect internal control 
from a general (i.e., context-free) point of view. Cer¬ 
tainly, there are many ad hoc approaches to internal 
accounting control evaluation, but they are unintegrated and 
thus fail to identify general classes of controls (as 
4 
opposed to specifically-named instances) in terms of their 
effects. The result may be viewed as a problem of not see¬ 
ing the forest for the trees. 
In order to give this study a general perspective from 
which to view the auditor's evaluation of internal account¬ 
ing control, this chapter develops a simple systems model of 
such control. The model outlined in this chapter will be 
used not only to guide the selection of variables to be 
examined in auditors' judgments, but also to determine if a 
systems approach to internal accounting control appears to 
have validity insofar as its predictions match the overall 
pattern of auditors' judgments. 
The idea of applying systems notions to internal account¬ 
ing control is not new. For example, Cushing [1974] 
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describes a mathematical model of internal accounting con¬ 
trol design and evaluation based on reliability theory from 
systems engineering. Cushing [1975], Ishikawa [1975], Bod¬ 
nar [1975], and Stratton [1979] elaborate and modify this 
approach. Other quantitative approaches are exemplified by 
Yu & Neter [1973] and Hamlen [1980]. However, the models 
presented in each of these articles are prescriptive in 
nature and primarily related to the analysis and design of 
internal accounting control systems with components of known 
reliability. They are not concerned with conceptually 
describing cause and effect relationships in control systems 
or with characterizing the current evaluation process. 
The descriptive tools that are developed in this chapter 
take a different approach. The discussion here is based on 
systems concepts from cybernetic systems theory and organi¬ 
zational systems theory. Konrath [1971] discussed internal 
accounting control using cybernetics notions, but did not 
attempt to develop a model based on those ideas. 
In the sections below, the notion of reliability as an 
oojective of internal accounting control is discussed first. 
Next, some stability and control ideas central to cybernet¬ 
ics system theory are covered. Then descriptive parameters 
from a systems-based organizational theory are introduced. 
Finally, these concepts are integrated into a general model 
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of internal accounting control. 
Information Reliability 
The basic objectives of internal accounting control have 
been frequently classified as authorization, accounting, and 
asset safeguarding.^ Close examination of these objectives 
discloses a common overall feature. Each of the objectives 
can be subsumed under the goal of assuring that all and only 
information reflecting authorized transactions is produced 
by the accounting system. That is, the information must be 
accurate and reliable. 
Carmichael states that internal controls exist to ensure 
that information is reliable [1970, p. 235-6]. He also 
claims that the accounting and safeguarding objectives can 
be reduced to a goal of reliability. Unfortunately, how¬ 
ever, the term reliability means different things to differ¬ 
ent people. The systems engineering definition of reliabil¬ 
ity used in the past theoretical work is not particularly 
useful in dealing with the auditor's problem in evaluating 
internal accounting control. That notion describes a single 
input-output relationship to be used in calculating the 
■'‘The Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting 
Control of tne aICPA [1979] reaffirms these standard objec¬ 
tive areas in its report, although at least one of the com¬ 
mittee's memDers question their current usefulness. See 
page 28 of che committee's report. 
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overall likelihood of error in a configuration of smaller 
units of known (or estimated) reliability. Thus it is a 
"bottom-up" concept which requires some knowledge of atomic 
unit reliabilities in order to determine overall system 
reliability. However, the auditor's problem is precisely 
that such unit reliabilities are unknown. In fact, deter¬ 
mining precise estimates of atomic unit reliabilities based 
on the history of the unit's operations (or on the results 
of those operations) is essentially the same task as sub¬ 
stantive testing. The basic motivation for the auditor's 
evaluation of internal accounting controls is that it allows 
him to avoid doing unnecessary substantive testing. Thus, 
the engineer's concept of reliability is not an appropriate 
overall goal for internal accounting control. In order to 
avoid confusion arising from the use of the term reliability 
in a different context from the engineering application, the 
central objective of internal accounting control is 
described as system stability in the sections below. The 
concept of system stability nicely captures the accountant's 
meaning of the term reliability. 
Thus, the next section of this chapter is basically con¬ 
cerned with defining stability and identifying factors that 
affect a system's stability. First, however, some general 
systems concepts must be introduced. 
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Systems, Stability, and Control 
Systems theory was originally a response to the limita¬ 
tions of thermodynamics. Instead of the "closed" assump¬ 
tions of thermodynamics, systems theory is based on the con¬ 
cept of an "open" system, which reacts to or interacts with 
its environment.^ A system may be loosely defined as a 
bounded collection of inter-related parts which, in combina¬ 
tion, form a unitary whole [Nanni (1978, p. 7)]. Churchman 
has noted that every system is embedded in a larger system. 
Thus, a payroll system.is embedded in an information system, 
which is embedded in an organizational system, which is part 
of an industrial system, and so on [Churchman (1968)]. 
One of a system's defining traits is its goal directed- 
ness [Churchman (1968, p. 29-34)]. A system's components 
may oe discussed in terms of structures and processes 
[Miller (1971, p. 84)]. These components are defined, how¬ 
ever, in terms of the goal-oriented tasks they perform 
[Churchman (1968, p. 40)]. Thus, the identification of a 
system's goals and the ways in which the components contrib¬ 
ute to the achievement of those goals is the core of any 
evaluation of a system's effectiveness. 
‘“Since systems theory has not been frequently cited in 
the accounting literature, I will provide basic references 
to descriptions of systems and systems terms. The seminal 
work in this area was done by Von Bertalanffy [1951]. 
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One can easily see how these concepts map onto an 
internal accounting control system. Such a system has the 
central goal of keeping the error rate and total dollar 
value of errors within a restricted acceptable range. The 
various activities and techniques use to achieve these ends 
are the internal accounting control system's components. 
Note that, under this definition, the components of the 
internal accounting control system are not simply a subset 
of the components of the accounting and record-keeping sys¬ 
tem. A single internal accounting control system component 
may be comprised of one or a number of sub-parts and/or par¬ 
tial operations from several accounting and record-keeping 
components. For example, multiple copies of a pre-numbered 
accounting form may flow through several components of the 
overall record-keeping system (i.e., data capture, classifi¬ 
cation, journalizaing, posting, etc.), but the use of those 
forms and their ultimate cross-verification (neither of 
which is a necessary part of the basic record-keeping sys¬ 
tem) makes up a single internal accounting control system 
component. Conversely, acquiring appropriate authorization 
for checks is only a small part of the disbursement routine, 
but it is a complete control component in itself. 
We will expand our discussion of internal accounting con¬ 
trol system components in tne last section of this chapter. 
The remainder of this section discusses the concepts of sta- 
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bility and control identified by cybernetic systems theory. 
The purpose of cybernetic theory is to describe the control 
_ 3 
or systems. 
A system is stable if there is some trait about its con¬ 
tent that is invariant or unchanging. Stability, then, can 
be defined as maintaining the state of a system within a 
certain range on some critical variable or set of variables. 
This is precisely the goal of internal accounting control. 
In an information system, stability may be viewed in terms 
of the level of error. For example, the criterion in an 
information system by which stability is defined may be a 
frequency of errors in the system of one percent or less of 
the entire system's total number of transactions or total 
dollar value. "The presence of stability always implies 
some co-ordination of the actions between the parts," i.e., 
control of the systems process [Ashby ( 1960, p.57)]• Thus, 
by definition, instability in a system indicates the pres¬ 
ence of error. 
A disturbance is any factor that causes a system to move 
from one state to another. That is, disturbances tend to 
upset a system's stability. For example, an oversight that 
Indeed, the term "cybernetics," taken from the Greek 
term for "the art of steersmanship," was coined by Norbert 
Wiener [1948] to describe the science of control in animal 
and machine. 
59 
caused the system to move from an error-free state to an 
. • 4 
error-containing state would be a disturbance. Since dis¬ 
turbances are the source of error in a system, a critical 
determinant in the maintenance of the system's stable 
error-free state is the variety of disturbances with which 
the system is faced. We will return to a discussion of the 
implications of this fact later in this section. 
Cybernetics emphasizes two concepts related to the goal 
of stability (also called homeostasis). These concepts are 
constraint and regulation. Constraints may be conceived of 
as barriers between outside sources of disturbance and the 
system. Like a turtle's shell, they prevent disturbances 
from reaching the critical system. Regulators, on the other 
hand, are active mechanisms that detect or correct the 
effects of disturbances. 
Constraints represent redundancy, regularity, or the 
probabilities of certain events. They "... cannot be clas¬ 
sified in any simple way, for they include all cases in 
which a set, for any reason, is smaller than it might be" 
[Ashby (1964, p. 57)]. Thus, any regularity in the environ¬ 
ment that drives down the variety of disturbances, eliminat¬ 
ing certain of their sources or reducing the probability 
^See Ashby [1964] for a discussion of the relationship 
between disturbances and system errors. 
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that certain types will reach the system, is a constraint. 
Regulators protect the system's stability by dealing with 
disturbances within the system. In order to maintain sta¬ 
bility, regulators must be designed to monitor a particular 
signal and react to some attribute of that signal. Note 
that this means that, unlike constraints, which operate 
against disturbances or their sources, regulators work on 
the effects of disturbances. 
Regulators may be classified into two groups: open-se¬ 
quence and closed-sequence [Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzweig 
(1967, p. 75)]. 
Open-sequence regulators are activated by a particular 
signal, i.e., the signal's critical attribute is its own 
presence. Thus, in a sense, open-sequence regulators are 
independent of the operating system in which they function. 
In Ashby's terms, they are "machines with input" [1964, 
chapter 4]. It follows that the usefulness of "... an 
open-sequence [regulator] depends upon the correct proper¬ 
ties being built into the controller..." [Johson, Kast, and 
Rosenzweig (1967, p. 76)]. That is, it must be designed to 
respond to the appropriate signal or set of signals. 
Because of their mechanistic qualities, we shall refer to 
open-sequence regulators as 'programmatic' regulators. 
Closed sequence regulators are activated directly by the 
results of operations. Rather than waiting for the presence 
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of a particular signal to 'turn them on,' closed-sequence 
regulators respond to critical differences between two sig¬ 
nals. Frequently, the magnitude of the difference will 
determine the response of the closed-sequence regulator. 
The central difference between open- and closed-sequence 
regulators is the presence of a feedback comparator 
[Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzweig (1967, p. 76)]. In fact, by 
coupling a feedback comparator to an open-sequence regula¬ 
tor, one obtains a closed-sequence regulator. Thus we can 
identify two kinds of regulator components: feedback and 
programmatic regulators. These two kinds of components are 
illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. 
Figure 3a characterizes a programmatic (open-sequence) 
regulator. Each input signal instigates a particular 
response. In tne simplest case, beta is equivalent to 'not 
alpha.' Thus, for Figure 3a, when a signal other than alpha 
is received, action 'B' is taken. 
Of course, many more input signals may be defined, 
increasing the complexity of the scanning procedure and the 
action response set. The control's complexity can also be 
expanded by defining different action response sets for dif¬ 
ferent tasks, system states, or system goals. Such a situa¬ 
tion is depicted in Figure 3b. The prescribed choice of 
actions in this complex regulator depends upon the system's 
state when the input signal is received. Thus, if signal 
a. Simple Regulation 
Signal Attribute alpha beta 
Signal Response A B 
Input 
Output 
*-> 
System Signal 
******** 
b. Complex Regulation 
Input 
Signal 
Attribute 
beta alpha beta 
1 A B C 
System 
2 B C A 
State 
3 C A B 
Action Re isponse 
XL 
Output 
System Signal 
Figure 3 
A Programmatic Regulator 
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alpha is received when the system is in state 2, action C is 
automatically initiated. 
Figure 4 illustrates the acivity of a feedback campara- 
tor.^ In such a regulator, the standard of signal comparison 
is not a particular attribute of a single input signal, but, 
rather, a difference between two signals. In this case, 
when the difference between signals X and Y is greater than 
1 (the standard of comparison in this example) the compara¬ 
tor outputs signal alpha. Otherwise, signal beta is output. 
Note that the complexity of the feedback comparator can be 
increased by establishing a number of range criteria. For 
example, signal alpha^ can be output for positive differ¬ 
ences and alpha^ can be output for negative differences. 
Obviously, coupling the feedback comparator in Figure 4 
to the programmatic regulator in Figure 3a yields a complete 
closed-sequence regulator. The importance of closed-se¬ 
quence regulation is its versatility. This type of regula¬ 
tion does not 'look for' absolute properties of signals, 
but, instead, checks for relative properties of signals: 
those which define instability. This versatility is a nec¬ 
essary response to an important fact of life for the system. 
^The term feedback is used generically here. The com¬ 
parison process may occur at input (feedback) or at output 
(feedforward). The distinction is unimportant here and, 
thus. Figure 4 show comparison in the 'middle.' 
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Task 
Input Process 
-> 
Output 
Signal X Sig nal Y 
Figure 4 
A Feedback Comparator 
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which is captured in Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety. 
Ashby describes this law as the fundamental thesis of the 
general theory of regulation [1964, p. 207]. The law states 
that, in order to have effective regulation, a system must 
have a variety of responses at least equal to the variety of 
disturbances it faces. Ashby's colorful phrase is "only 
variety can destroy variety" [1964, p. 207].6 
Recall now the fact that regulators operate on the 
effects of disturbances. Despite the face that feedback 
comparators can detect a variety of errors due to their 
dynamic definition of disturbance, their operation 'assumes' 
that one of the two signals they receive is 'correct.' 
Therefore, closed sequence regulators basically protect the 
system from internally-caused errors (i.e., distortion), not 
errors due to outside disturoances entering with input. 
This fact is the basis of an important assertion of the sys¬ 
tems model of internal accounting control, and we shall 
return to it later in this chapter. 
We have thus far discussed the cybernetics notions of 
stability, constraints, and regulation. Stability is the 
goal of system control. The effectiveness of control in 
achieving this goal is determined oy the overall result of 
^See cnapter 12 of Ashby [1964] for a detailed discus¬ 
sion of variety and regulation. 
66 
constraint and regulation. As Ashby points out "... the 
main cause of difficulty [in maintaining stability] is the 
variety in the disturbances that must be regulated against" 
[1964, p. 244]. Thus, the likelihood of stability is 
enhanced when: 
1) The variety of the disturbances facing the system 
can be reduced; and 
2) The system has the capacity to detect and respond 
to disturbances that arise within it. 
Figure 5 depicts how constraints and regulators combine 
to assure system stability. 
This discussion has provided a very general framework in 
which to examine the problem of internal accounting control. 
However, before we proceed to develop a model of internal 
accounting control, it is useful to identify some of the 
classes of constraints that exist in the business world. In 
order to do this, it is appropriate that we now review some 
concepts employed by organizational systems theorists. 
Organizational Systems Theories 
A school of thought in organizational theory which has 
oeen developing over the last twenty years takes a systems 
view of the organization. Under this view, usually referred 
7 • • - to as "contingency theory," the organization is examined 
"^This term was first coined by Lawrence and Lorsch 
[1969]. Hayes [1977] indicates its general use. 
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Figure 5 
Factors Contributing to the Maintenance of Stability 
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"... as a unit in interaction with its environment" [Tosi 
(1975, p. 93)]. The central notion of this school of 
thought is that such a thing as a "natural" organizational 
structure exists. The claim is that there is no single best 
way to structure an organization, but, rather, that the most 
effective structure for an organization is contingent upon a 
o 
number of situational factors.0 Our focus here is not on the 
organization but on one of its subunits: the accounting sys¬ 
tem. Thus, in the discussion beiow, the notions taken from 
contingency theory will be expressed in terms of systems 
within the environment of a single organization. 
• Contingency theory is not a single, unified theory. It 
is a meta-theory, a frameworK in which a family of theories 
exists. Contingency theory does have some basic family 
traits, though. One of these is the "natural system" con¬ 
cept. Another is the idea that the following four dimen¬ 
sions (or some variation thereof) hold the keys that unlock 
9 
system effectiveness: 
o 
See Tosi [1975] for a discussion of the variety of 
points of view within this paradigm. 
^These dimensions bear closest resemblance to Perrow's 
[1970, p.2], but they have also been influenced by the work 
of other theorists cited in this section. 
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1) The system's environment; 
2) The goals and tasks of the system; 
3) The system's structure; and 
4) The system's technological core. 
The environment is comprised of factors outside of the 
system that are related to the system's task(s). It poses 
ooth constraints and what Thompson calls contingencies 
[1967, p. 30]. Contingencies are like 'gaps' in the wall of 
constraints which allow particularly salient disturbances to 
affect the system. The system's goals delimit the tasks to 
be performed, where tasks are the production of basic out¬ 
puts. The system's structure is the collection of inter-re¬ 
lated parts comprising the system (i.e., its components). 
Technology refers to attributes of the procedures involved 
in performing the task. Thus, the technological core is 
usually defined as the amount of routinization possible, the 
area of known cause-effect relationships in the input-output 
transformation, or the rational and analyzable portion of 
the system's processes. 
One of the heavily emphasized ideas in tnis literature is 
the notion that naturally adapted systems will build buffers 
around the highly routinizable operations (the technical 
core of the system) in order to protect them from outside 
influences. When such boundaries are in place, governing 
the input and output to the technical core, 'classical' 
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methods of control (i.e., closed system approaches like 
standardization of procedures, formal lines of authority, 
and delineated responsibility) can be reasonably employed.^0 
Thus far we have introduced a number of notions that, at 
oest, we have only vaguely tied to the internal accounting 
control situation. In the next section these ideas are 
drawn together into a general cause-effect model of internal 
accounting control. 
A Systems Model of Internal 
Accounting Control 
In this section, we will pull together our discussion of 
systems, cybernetics, and contingency theory into a model of 
the relationships among the basic factors mediating the 
effectiveness of the system of internal accounting control. 
Note that, at this point, our focus is on describing inter¬ 
nal accounting control cause and effect reationships, not on 
the auditor's evaluation process. We will return to the 
topic of internal accounting control evaluation in the chap¬ 
ter on hypothesis development. 
The unit of analysis in the framework below is the 
^See Thompson [1967] for a more elaborate summary of 
the technical core, buffering by boundaries, and related 
control issues, especially on pp. 13-15. 
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accounting system and the factors affecting its error-free 
stability. The analysis is targeted on the efficacy of con¬ 
trols within the system itself. Four kinds of information 
will be provided. First, the basic assumption of the model 
will be presented. Next, the basic descriptive assertions 
will be made. Third, the variables in the model (i.e., the 
factors affecting system stability) will be identified. 
Finally, the model’s dynamic relationships will be 
described. 
Basic assumption of the model. 
The development of the model requires a single basic 
assumption. 
The objective of internal accounting control 
procedures and techniques can be characterized as 
a single goal: system stability. 
Thus, the factors identified as mediating system stabil¬ 
ity by cybernetic system theory should conceptually capture 
the factors affecting internal accounting control. 
Descriptive framework. 
Three statements comprise the basic outline of the model. 
These ideas have discussed in some depth in the sections 
above, so they will not be redefined here. If the assump¬ 
tion above holds, cybernetics and contingency theory would 
indicate that tne following statements are true of account¬ 
ing systems. 
« 
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1) The accounting system's environment contains con¬ 
straints. 
2) These constraints reduce the variety of potential 
disturbance sources for the accounting system, 
thus establishing a pattern of disturbance proba¬ 
bilities. 
3) Regulators within the accounting system detect 
and correct only those errors which they are 
designed to anticipate. 
* We now proceed to map the systems terms in the above 
statements into the internal accounting control context. 
Factors. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter II refers to general 
and specific controls. General controls affect the entire 
accounting system. Specific controls are designed to ben¬ 
efit only one accounting subsystem. One can draw a loose 
correspondence between the control components identified 
below and the traditional concepts of general and specific 
controls. Environmental constraints would often fit the 
definition of general controls. Most system boundary con¬ 
straints, feedback regulators, and programmatic regulators 
would probably be classified as specific controls. There is 
no point in enumerating the relationships between these two 
sets of concepts any further, however, since the control 
types outlined below are meant to be viewed as an alterna¬ 
tive to the traditional scheme, not an elaboration of it. 
The systems-based classification is pursued here specifi- 
73 
cally because it identifies control components by the way in 
which they enhance control as well as by where they reside. 
We mention general and specific controls here simply for the 
sake of comparison and contrast and as a take-off point for 
the discussion below. 
Environmental constraints. These are factors in the 
environment that affect system stability. Identified by 
ooth cybernetics and contingency theory, these factors 
define the variety of potential disturbances that the 
accounting system has to deal with. Probably the major 
source of environmental constraints is the set of factors 
that tend to elicit predictable behavior by employees. 
Thus, social structure, rules of acceptable behavior, 
rewards, and punishments are all important environmental 
constraints. 
System boundary constraints. Both cybernetics and con¬ 
tingency theory identify constraints or buffers at the crit¬ 
ical system's boundaries. System boundary constraints limit 
the access that external variables have into the system. 
They reduce interaction (via personnel, for instance) 
between subsystems or oetween functions within subsystems. 
They also constrain inputs by establishing criteria for 
input acceptability. The major such constraint found in 
classical manual accounting systems is provided by the seg- 
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regation of duties, but other procedures that limit access 
to the system, such as approval routines or authorization 
standards, are also important system boundary constraints. 
System internal regulators. These factors are monitor¬ 
ing/correcting techniques employed within the accounting 
system. As discussed in the section above on cybernetic 
theory, regulators may be classified into one of two groups: 
1) Feedback regulators utilize comparison as their 
cue to effects of disturbances. They are com¬ 
prised of testing, checking, or verification pro- 
, cedures like physical inventories, bank reconcil¬ 
iations, and other tests of account balances. 
2) Programmatic regulators trace the effects of dis¬ 
turbances and correct them through officially . 
established standard procedures. The regularity 
of these controls reduces error due to variety in 
the execution of this task. For example, an 
employee unfamiliar with a correction task, or a 
group of employees who share the responsibility 
for such a task, could maxe erroneous or incon¬ 
sistent changes in accounting records without 
programmatic regulation. Such controls include 
standard operating procedures and formal excep¬ 
tion routines. Note that, as opposed to the case 
of shared responsibility, segregation of duties 
affords a certain measure of programmatic regula¬ 
tion, due to the existence of human memory. 
In order to discriminate feedback regulators that rely on 
human judgment for tracing errors to their sources and cor¬ 
recting them from those that rely on standard operating pro¬ 
cedures for tracing and correction, we will include only the 
former type under the heading of feedback regulators. We 
snail describe the latter type as feedback regulators cou- 
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pled to programmatic regulators. 
Table 3 lists the four internal accounting control fac¬ 
tors and gives examples of each. 
Dynamic relationships. 
Below, four basic relationships between the variables in 
the model and their effects on system stability are devel¬ 
oped from the previous discussions. These relationships are 
tendencies, not absolute isomorphisms. They are basically 
true only of logically designed systems. Thus, it will be 
assumed below that accounting systems are constructed with 
at least the intention of placing a higher priority on con¬ 
trolling high expected cost errors tnan on controlling low 
expected cost errors. 
According to contingency theory, the accounting system, 
as a highly routinizable, analyzable process, will tend to 
be best established through buffering. Buffering means iso¬ 
lation from outside disturbances. Reduction in the variety 
or probability of outside disturbances is accomplished by 
constraining the environment and establishing constrained 
system boundaries. Thus, the model predicts that: 
1) Constraints are more important than regulators in 
securing system stability. 
Furthermore, system boundary constraints are embedded 
within the system of environmental constraints. That is, 
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Factor Direct Effect in 
Enhancing Stability 
Examples 
Environmental 
Constraints 
Reduce Variety of 
Potential Error 
Sources 
State of Economy 
Nature of Firm 
and Industry 
Firm's Social 
Structure 
Management 
Policies 
System Boundary 
Constraints 
Reduce Probability of 
Certain Errors 
Getting into System 
Segregation of 
Duties 
Physical Barriers 
Authorization of 
Transactions 
Required Approval 
System Internal 
Regulators: 
Feedback Type Detect Errors by 
Comparison 
Reconciliations 
Transaction 
Verification 
Physical 
Inventories 
Programmatic 
Type 
Reduce Effect of 
Errors by Resetting 
System Using a 
Regular Routine 
Standard Operating 
Procedures 
Formalized 
Exception 
Routines 
Table 3 
Factors Affecting Accounting System Stability 
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they are serially related. Thus, when environmental 
constraints are strong, system boundary constraints have a 
reduced set of potential disturbances to deal with. 
Since constraints reduce the probability of error, they 
can be viewed in the mathematical terms of reliability engi¬ 
neering. As serially coupled components, constraints will 
have overall effects of an error rate equal to the product 
of their individual error rates.. However, as discussed in 
the section in this chapter on reliability, this 'knowledge' 
is not particularly useful when unit reliabilities (or error 
rates) are unknown. Nonetheless, from its own perspective, 
the model predicts that: 
2) The overall effect of environmental plus system 
boundary constraints is less than the sum of 
their individual effects. 
In non-technical terms, tnis statement means that an 
environmental constraint (systems boundary constraint) has 
relatively more 'responsibility' for preventing disturbances 
from affecting the system when no supporting systems bound¬ 
ary constraint (environmental constraint) exists. A 'lone' 
constraint is more critical than one one among many. 
Regulators are designed to search for particular classes 
of disturbances. That is, they can only detect and correct 
errors with certain characteristics. As discussed in the 
section above on cyDernetic theory, internal regulators 
basically deal witn errors arising within the system. Con- 
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straints, however, prevent external errors from reaching the 
system. Thus, constraints and regulators are essentially 
complementary in function rather than overlapping. Since 
these two types of controls deal with, in effect, different 
'pools' of disturbances, the model predicts that: 
3) Internal regulators and constraints have indepen¬ 
dent effects in securing system stability. 
Some feedbacK ana programmatic regulation exists in 
accounting systems even when no formal procedures exist. 
This is due to that fact that human beings, possessing mem¬ 
ory, judgment, and intuition, perform these tasks as a cor¬ 
ollary to their record keeping chores. This fact was 
alluded to earlier. In terms of the mathematical reliabil¬ 
ity engineering model, feedback and programmatic regulators 
are not, then, atomic units (under the definitions intro¬ 
duced in the section above). Their nature allows them to 
cornuine to become atomic units, however, since one component 
'detects' errors and the other 'corrects' them. A numerical 
example helps to demonstrate this relationship. 
Assume that 'casual human observation' will detect the 
presence of a particular error in a particular transaction 
processing tasx 10 percent of the time. Assume further that 
informal human procedures will then determine the source of 
such an error and properly correct it 50 percent of the 
time. Now let us assume tnat formal methods improve these 
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rates to 95 percent and 93 percent, respectively. Under 
such circumstances, the following overall regulation effects 
(for the particular transaction) would obtain. In the case 
of no formal procedures, the prooaoiiity of detection and 
correction would oe 5 percent (.1 x .5). In the case of 
formal feedback regulation only, this figure would rise to 
47.5 percent (.95 x .5). For formal programmatic regulation 
only, 9.3 percent (.1 x .98) of the errors would be detected 
and corrected. But in the case of both formal regulators, 
the result ^ould oe 93.1 oercent detection and correct:ion. 
Thus, the cc.mir.ea effect of feedback regulation and pro¬ 
grammatic regulation is significantly stronger than either 
individual effect or even the sum of these effects. This is 
exactly the opposite of tne situation in the area of con¬ 
straints. 
Again, nowever, the model is designed to oe applied 
oefore re^iaoility estimates are Known, so the most the 
moce^ predicts, a priori is: 
4/ The overall effect of regulators when both feed- 
oac/c and programmatic regulators are in place is 
greater than the sum of their individual effects. 
The purpose of this cnapter nas oeen to develop a general 
node~ of internal accounting control based on the perspec¬ 
tives of several systems theories. The model was pursued in 
oroer to present an alternative to descriptions of internal 
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accounting control found in the accounting literature. That 
literature has failed to produce a taxonomy of internal 
accounting control factors which is both general and able to 
classify factors by their effect on control. 
The notions of reliability and stability were discussed 
above as internal accounting control systems goals. Cyber¬ 
netics and contingency theory were reviewed for insights 
into the internal accounting control situation. Based on 
this discussion and review, a simple systems model of inter¬ 
nal accounting control was described. Four general control 
components were identified as factors that mediate the 
effectiveness of an internal accounting control system. 
Finally, the relationships among those factors in terms of 
their effects on systems stability were identified. 
In Chaper V, the model outlined above and the information 
from the review of the accounting literature and prior 
empirical research given in Chapters II and III will be used 
to derive five basic propositions about the auditor's evalu¬ 
ation of internal accounting control. The hypotheses tested 
in this thesis are ceveloped from these propositions. 
CHAPTER V 
HYPOTHESES 
The basic thrust of this research study is to investigate 
the auditor's evaluation of internal accounting control. 
The general researcn questions are: 
1) Can auditors oe characterized as experts in the 
area of internal accounting control evaluation as 
defined dv the consistency, consensus, and lack 
of bias in their judgments? and 
2) Can a systems model of internal accounting con¬ 
trol capture the evaluation behavior of auditors 
in a carefully varied set of hypothetical situa¬ 
tions? 
3) Which oackground and experience variaoles mediate 
auditors internal accounting control judgments? 
Up to this point, we have not discussed the specific 
issues that are involved in these questions. Normative 
auditing theory provides a perspective from which to view 
the first researcn question. The systems model presented in 
Chapter IV can be tested to investigate the second research 
question. However, we have no particular model to employ in 
examining the third research question. Prior research pro¬ 
vides us with an inkling of which variables to investigate, 
but such 'leads' are not the proper sources of research 
hypotheses. Thus we will address research question three 
through some post hoc explorations which are described in 
Chapter X. 
In tne sections oelow, we discuss each of the first two 
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major research questions and identify the issues involved in 
resolving each of them. Following this, propositions relat¬ 
ing to each issue are developed and a set of hypotheses is 
developed from each proposition. 
It should be noted here that, strictly speaking, these 
will not really be hypotheses, since they will not be in an 
immediately testable, operationalised form. The selection 
and operationalization of specific variables will be covered 
in Chapter VI on the experimental design and procedures. 
The First Research Question 
In order to assess the expertise of a group of individu¬ 
als, one must first nave a set of criteria to judge exper¬ 
tise against. The following four criterial dimensions are 
frequently cited in both the psychological and accounting 
judgment literature as capturing the notion of expertise:'*' 
1) Judgment accuracy - the degree to which the judg¬ 
ment matches empirical fact. 
2) Judgment consistency - the degree to which a 
judge will produce the same judgment given 
repeated administrations of a single case. This 
is also known as intra-judge or test-retest reli¬ 
ability. 
3) Judgment consensus - the degree to which differ¬ 
ent judges will produce the same judgment on the 
same case. This is also called inter-judge reli¬ 
ability. 
4) Judgment bias - the degree to which a judge 
See, for example, Ashton [1974a, 1974b, & 1979], Ein- 
norn [1974], Goldberg [1968], Hoffman, Slovic, and Rorer 
[1968], Joyce [1976], and Mock and Turner [1978]. 
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demonstrates a consistent variation from accuracy 
or from the consensus of his peers. 
Obviously, for a group to be considered experts on a task, 
they must exhibit high scores on the first three dimensions 
and low scores on the last. 
The normative literature seems to assume that auditors 
are internal accounting control evaluation experts, since it 
frequently refers to the use of 'professional judgment.' 
Empirical investigations have found high consistency levels, 
various consensus levels, and possible biases. No multi¬ 
case study involving accuracy has been performed. 
Let us deal with the accuracy issue first. The following 
list of reasons probably accounts for the dearth of accuracy 
studies. 
1) Actual data on the strength of internal account¬ 
ing control is nearly impossible to gather. 
First of all, few firms would be willing to publicize the 
fact that they have (or have had) poor accounting control. 
Thus, data on that end of the internal accounting control 
quality scale is unlikely to be directly accessible. Sec¬ 
ond, such situations uncovered in audits would, at present, 
be considered confidential information. CPA firms would be 
reluctant to make such data available. Beyond this, only 
those situations in which tne quality of controls had been 
assessed empirically (as opposed to assessment simply 
through auditor evaluation) would qualify as hard data. 
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2) Judgment testing requires a variety of situations 
as well as a variety of control quality. 
The need for repeated measures and a reasonable cross-sec¬ 
tion of situational features (cue configurations) compounds 
the problems identified above. 
3) Simulation, the only reasonable alternative to 
gathering actual data, is extremely expensive, 
time consuming, and circular in its definition of 
'accuracy.1 
Weber [1978], who used simulation to generate an error level 
rate for a single case in a single subsystem for only the 
top four products out of a total of 2000 in the modeled 
firm, reported that it took him several weeks to adapt and 
debug the programs. Futhermore, simulation-based informa¬ 
tion on judgment accuracy is suspect due to the fact that 
such a definition of accuracy assumes precision in the simu¬ 
lation's model of behavior, a heroic assumption at best. 
Given the Herculean nature of testing for accuracy, it is 
not hard to see why such studies have not oeen done. The 
research reported in this thesis joins that tradition and 
does not attempt to incorporate any direct measures of judg¬ 
ment accuracy. Although we cannot make any claims about 
auditors' objective judgment accuracy, the three other cri- 
terial dimensions of expertise still remain. It is with 
these that we will deal. 
We will now address the implicit assumption in the pro¬ 
fessional literature that auditors are internal accounting 
control evaluation experts. No strong evidence exists to 
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the contrary. As discussed in Chapter III, Ashton's [1974] 
results tend to support this idea. Both Joyce's [1976] and 
Mock's and Turner's [1978] studies have mixed results. 
Thus, we state our first proposition: 
Auditors will demonstrate expertise in the area 
of internal accounting control evaluation. 
This proposition will be tested via hypotheses relating 
to consistency, consensus, and bias. 
Consistency, or test-retest reliability, is the likeli¬ 
hood with which an auditor will give the same rating to the 
same case on two separate evaluations. The ideal level of 
consistency would be a correlation of 1. However, it would 
be unlikely to expect such performance on any but the most 
simple tasks. Therefore, we will use a necessarily arbi¬ 
trary criterion here. 
Ashton [1974] and Joyce [1976] report mean consistency 
correlations of .81 and .863, respectively. These figures 
are described oy Ashton [1979] as "... high relative to the 
consensus found in studies of other types of expert judges" 
[1979, p. 63]. It appears then that an appropriate hurdle 
for assessing expertise from a test-retest perspective is a 
minimum correlation of .8. Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
H^: Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a 
mean intra-judge correlation not significantly 
less than .8. 
Consensus is a concept of agreement among individuals. 
In this study it will be assessed through correlation of 
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ratings across judges. Obviously, the ceiling for such 
correlations is the measure of consistency obtained to test 
the hypothesis above. We cannot expect two different judges 
to agree with each other more than they agree with them¬ 
selves. However, expertise does imply a high degree of 
interchangeability. Thus, our criterion here is embodied in 
the second hypothesis. 
Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a 
mean inter-judge correlation not significantly 
less than their average intra-judge correla¬ 
tion. 
Another aspect of the notion of interchangeability of 
expert judges mentioned above is a lack of bias across those 
judges. Bias is defined here as consistent over- or under¬ 
rating (leniency bias), or as consistent over- or under-re- 
action to situational changes or other consistent differ¬ 
ences in interpreting the meaning of individual cues (cue 
sensitivity bias). This definition will be operationalized 
in the next chapter. At this point, we will simply posit 
the following: 
: Auditor subjects will produce judgments with 
insignificant bias effects. 
Note that the above hypotheses do not spring from a par¬ 
ticular behavioral theory. Rather, they test a set of 
assumptions underlying normative theory in auditing. If 
these assumptions do not hold, then placing more emphasis on 
the auditor's evaluation of internal accounting control may 
be ill-advised. 
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Regardless of the outcome of the tests of the above 
hypotheses, however, it is possible to establish, from the 
auditors' judgment data, a description of any 'implicit con¬ 
sensus' among the auditors. This description can be exam¬ 
ined to address the second research question. 
The Second Research Question 
Early in this thesis it was pointed out that, although 
the importance of internal accounting control evaluation is 
generally recognized, we still lack an integrated model of 
internal accounting control quality measurement. If it were 
possible to utilize a complete 'lens model' approach in this 
experiment, the environmental (left side) model could pro¬ 
vide us with such a measurement approach. However, we can¬ 
not derive such an environmental model in this study since 
we do not nave any 'actual' events. We do have the opportu¬ 
nity to construct a general decision (right side) model 
here, though. Since the auditor's decision is already being 
used in the field as a measurement tool, a uniform auditor 
decision model may oe an appropriate surrogate for the envi¬ 
ronmental model. In fact, although an empirical measure of 
accuracy is not available, an extracted consensus (the mean 
response) is. Ijiri [1975] and Ijiri & Jaedicke [1966] 
argue that objectivity may de defined as consensus of opin¬ 
ion, where the degree of ODjectivity is indicated by the 
dispersion of that opinion. We will discuss this issue fur- 
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ther in Chapters VIII and IX. 
Our central objective here is basic data gathering. We 
have little guidance on what weighting schemata to expect in 
the auditors' judgments. On the one hand, the normative 
literature on internal accounting control evaluation gives 
us a basic idea about where the cues having impact will come 
from, but little more. On the other hand, the empirical 
research on internal accounting control evaluation has had a 
different focus than the study proposed here. The single 
ma}or expectation those studies provide is that the most 
important specific level cues in the auditors' judgments 
would be related to segregation of duties. 
However, the systems model outlined in Chapter IV makes 
several predictions about the relationships between classes 
of variables in determining the effectiveness of internal 
controls in an accounting system. Thus, we will employ 
these predictions as a positive model of what kinds of cue 
utilization will be captured in the auditors' judgments. 
The propositions below are basically drawn directly from 
the model presented in the last section of Chapter IV. Lit¬ 
tle discussion will be offered beyond the identification of 
the descriptive statements or dynamic relationships employed 
in deriving each proposition. Before presenting these prop¬ 
ositions, however, one last caveat must be given. While 
support for the hypotheses stated below may be interpreta- 
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ble, failure of those hypotheses in capturing the auditors' 
judgments cannot be taken as an indication of anything in 
particular. Such failure may be the fault of the operation¬ 
alization of the model, the fault of the model itself in 
describing control relationships, or the fault of the audi¬ 
tors in assessing them. This topic will be addressed again 
in Chapter VIII of this thesis. 
Recall that we initiated our outline of the systems model 
of internal accounting control with a central assumption. 
We now offer that assumption as our second proposition. 
P^: The objective of internal accounting control 
procedures and techniques can be characterized 
as a single goal: system stability. 
In the experiment described in this thesis, auditors will 
judge internal controls against three objectives identified 
in the professional literature. If the above proposition is 
true, the ratings produced by the auditors should be able to 
be nicely captured by the transformation of the ratings onto 
a single dimension. Thus, we set out our fourth hypothesis: 
H.: Auditor's ratings on the three dependent vari¬ 
ables will be captured by a single underlying 
dependent factor. 
The systems model identifies four major types of con¬ 
trols. If all of these classes of controls are, indeed, 
important in tne determination of the quality of internal 
accounting control, then the auditors' judgments should 
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reflect it. Thus, we expect that: 
?-: All constraints and regulators will have signif¬ 
icant individual effects on auditors' judg¬ 
ments. 
Four hypotheses can oe derived from tnis proposition. 
H_: Environmental constraints will have a signifi¬ 
cant main effect in tne analysis of auditors' 
judgments. 
rv : System boundary constraints will have a signif¬ 
icant main effect in the analysis of auditors' 
judgments. 
H-: Feedback regulators will have a significant 
main effect in the analysis of auditors' judg¬ 
ments. 
Programmatic regulators will have a significant 
main effect in the analysis of auditors' judg¬ 
ments. 
We new come to the four dynamic relationships discussed 
at the end of Chapter IV. Three of these relationships can 
be tested in the experiment described in this thesis. The 
other cannot. Below, the issues involved in testacility are 
discussed for each relationship. Then, where applicable, 
resulting propositions are stated and hypotheses are derived 
from them. 
Our first dynamic relationship stated that constraints 
are mere important than regulators in securing system sta¬ 
bility. This claim was intended to emphasize the value of 
the prevention of aisturoances as the mainstay of an inter¬ 
nal accounting control system. Note, however, that tne 
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intent of this statement relates to complete classes of 
controls, not individual control procedures. Thus, this 
prediction of the model does not indicate that, for example, 
a particular programmatic control cannot contribute more to 
stability than any single environmental constraint. 
In our examination of auditors' judgment, we would expect 
to find, based on the above relationship, that the total 
contribution of all constraints to the auditors' judgments 
would be greater than that of all regulators. More techni¬ 
cally, we would expect constraints as a class to account for 
more variance in the auditor rankings than regulators as a 
class. 
Unfortunately, the classes of constraints and regulators, 
even in a simple accounting system, include many more indi¬ 
vidual instances than the number that can be effectively 
manipulated in an experiment of the kind described nere. In 
this study, only one control of each type is manipulated in 
order to prevent the factorial design from producing too 
many cases. The great majority of constraints and regula¬ 
tors are fixed in the background common to all rating situa¬ 
tions. Thus, decision model weights cannot be compared nere 
for all constraints versus all regulators. We cannot there¬ 
fore test dynamic relationship 1. 
Dynamic relationships 2 through 4 nave to do with what 
can be called combined, interactive, or contingent effects 
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of control types. Relationship number two addresses the 
interaction of environmental constraints and systems bound¬ 
ary constraints. Since one control of each type is manipu¬ 
lated in this study, we can state the relationship as a 
test-oriented proposition. 
P^: Auditor judgments will display an interaction 
effect between environmental constraints and 
system boundary constraints that is less than 
the sum of their individual effects. 
This proposition implies two hypotheses. 
Hg: Auditor judgments will display a significant 
interaction effect between environmental con¬ 
straints and systems boundary constraints. 
: The mean judgment rating for environmental con¬ 
straints crossed with system boundary con¬ 
straints will be less than the sum of their 
mean main effects. 
Dynamic relationship 3 states that internal regulators 
and constraints have independent effects in securing system 
stability. Thus, we should never find contingent effects 
between constraints and regulators in the quality of inter¬ 
nal accounting control. This leads to another proposition. 
P : Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬ 
cant interactive effects between constraints 
and regulators. 
Four hypotheses are inherent in this proposition. 
Hu* Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬ 
cant interaction effects between environmental 
constraints and feedbacK regulators. 
H : Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬ 
cant interaction effects between environmental 
constraints and programmatic regulators. 
K^: Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬ 
cant interaction effects between system bound¬ 
ary constraints and feedback regulators. 
: Auditor judgments will not display any signifi¬ 
cant interaction effects between system bound¬ 
ary constraints and programmatic regulators. 
Finally, the last dynamic relationship in the model indi¬ 
cates that feedback regulators and programmatic regulators 
enhance each other's effect in obtaining system stability. 
Thus, we derive our last proposition. 
: Auditor judgments will display an interactive 
effect between feedback regulators and program¬ 
matic regulators that is greater than the sum 
of their individual effects. 
Proposition 6 yields our last two hypotheses. 
H,_: Auditor judgments will display a significant 
interaction effect between feedback regulators 
and programmatic regulators. 
H,,: The mean judgment rating for feedback regula¬ 
tors crossed with programmatic regulators will 
be greater than the sum of their mean main 
effects. 
We have now posited six propositions, yielding three 
hypotheses on auditor expertise (the first research ques¬ 
tion) and thirteen hypotheses on auditor judgment behavior 
(the second research question). These propositions and 
their sources are recapitulated in Taole 4. Note that among 
the latter propositions there are several indications of 
expected configural cue use (i.e., interactive effects in 
the judgments). Altnough it is true that the previous 
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Proposition Source 
Is Auditors will demonstrate ex¬ 
pertise in the area of internal 
accounting control evaluation. 
Normative Theory 
(Assumption) 
2: The objective of internal 
accounting control procedures 
and techniques can be character¬ 
ized as a single goal: 
system stability. 
t 
Systems Model 
(Assumption) 
3: All constraints and regulators 
will have significant individual 
effects on auditors* judgments. 
Systems Model 
(Descriptive 
Framework) 
4: Auditor judgments will display 
an interaction effect between 
environmental constraints and 
that is less than the sum of 
their individual effects. 
Systems Model 
(Dynamic 
Relationship 2) 
5: Auditor judgments will not 
display any significant inter¬ 
active effects oetween con¬ 
straints and regulators. 
Systems Model 
(Dynamic 
Relationship 3) 
6: Auditor judgments will display 
an interactive effect between 
feedback regulators and pro¬ 
grammatic regulators that is 
greater than the sum of their 
individual effects. 
Systems Model 
(Dynamic 
Relationship 4) 
Table 4 
List of Propositions and Their Sources 
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research on internal accounting control evaluation has found 
little configural use of cues, such use is not contra-indi¬ 
cated for chis study. Both the systems model and several 
sources in the normative literature suggest that such 
effects should be found. It should be noted that each of 
the posited configural uses are expected in areas that were 
not examined in the previous internal accounting control 
evaluation research studies. In fact, feedbacK regulators 
and programmatic regulators were not investigated separately 
in the previous studies at all. At this point, we turn to a 
description of the experimental design and methodology. 
CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
This chapter describes the organization and methodology 
of the experiment administered for this study. Included in 
the following sections are discussions of design, subject 
selection, task and administration, experimental materials, 
variable selection and definition, and experimental con¬ 
trols. 
Design 
This study utilized a version of the fixed-effects facto¬ 
rial approach employed in many judgment studies, including 
Ashton [1974] and Joyce [1976]. The specific framework was 
4 
a fully-crossed 2 factorial design with orthogonal manipu¬ 
lation of the four dichotomously classified independent 
variables. Each resulting cell (hereafter, case) required a 
judgment on each of three dependent variables. Replications 
were within subjects, and, in addition to the single repli¬ 
cation of the 16 primary cases, repeat presentations of four 
cases were included in order to allow the assessment of each 
subject's intra-judge reliability. Thus, each subject pro¬ 
vided three ratings on each of twenty cases, yielding 60 
judgments per subject. 
The repeat cases were not identified as such in the 
96 
97 
experimental materials. Rather, they were randomly 
interspersed among the last ten cases. This, of course, 
does not guarantee that none of the subjects were aware of 
the presence of repeat cases. In fact, a few subjects 
reported such awareness in the debriefing section of the 
experimental booklet. This subject is covered in the first 
section of the next chapter. Further details on case 
arrangement are presented in the section on controls at the 
end of this chapter. 
Subjects 
Auditors with at least three years of experience were 
sought as subjects. Due to the practical problems in con¬ 
vincing firms to, in essence, donate many valuable man-hours 
to a doctoral research project, random selection of auditors 
from a large pool of potential subjects was not feasible. 
Instead, subjects were solicited through partners in four 
national ('Big Eight') firms. In order to gain some repre¬ 
sentativeness, the experimenter requested subjects from a 
broad range of backgrounds and office locations. 
Each individual in the resulting pool of potential sub¬ 
jects was contacted and sent the package of experimental 
materials described below. No special monetary incentives 
were offered. Nonetheless, of the 35 subjects initially 
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sent materials, 89 percent (31) returned complete responses. 
Demographics of the subject group are presented in the third 
section of Chapter VII: Preliminary Data Review. 
Task and Administration 
The experimental data was gathered through the mailed 
administration of a series of related internal accounting 
control evaluation tasks using simulated evidence. These 
judgment cases were presented in a booklet of written mater¬ 
ials which included a brief introduction to the task as well 
as detailed instructions on determining and recording the 
ratings. The instructions asked each subject to proceed 
through the booklet at his own pace. Each case required 
decisions on the effectiveness of the controls in the 
described hypothetical situation in terms of their ability 
to meet three different control objectives. The booklet is 
described below. 
The Experimental Instrument 
The experimental instrument was the case booklet referred 
to above. The booklet was composed of five sections, each 
of which is covered in the following paragraphs. A copy of 
the booklet itself is contained in Appendix A. Before 
finalization, the format and contents of the booklet were 
pilot-tested on five CPAs with a variety of experience and 
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backgrounds. After debriefing the pilot subjects, certain 
minor changes in the materials were instituted to clarify 
the instructions and simulation data. 
The first section of the booklet was designed to gather 
demographic data from the auditor subjects. Nine pieces of 
information, in part adapted from Joyce [1976] and Mock and 
Turner [1978], were requested. All of the information 
related to experiential factors which were suspected of 
mediating auditors' internal accounting control evaluation 
behavior. The items requested were: 
1) Firm 
2) Rank 
3) Office location 
4) Number of years audit experience 
5) Number of years commercial experience 
6) Client size experience 
7) Client mix experience 
8) Types of specialized training 
9) Internal accounting control evaluation experience 
All of the above information was collected on a single 
sheet, as shown in Appendix A. 
The second section of the booklet contained a summary of 
the study's objectives and instructions for completing the 
ratings. It also contained an example case to familiarize 
the subjects with the type of processing and responses 
expected from them. 
The third section described the background common to all 
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the cases. It covered the state of the economy, the nature 
of the company and its industry, the history and organiza¬ 
tion of the company, and other general characteristics of 
the situation designed to fix the background variables and 
provide a reasonably realistic setting for the required 
judgments. Finally, it included a description of the 
accounting system, the accounts receivable subsystem, and a 
detailed flowchart of accounts receivable operations. 
The fourth section of the booklet provided the twenty 
cases. Each case was comprised of two parts. The first 
part was four item questionnaire, filled out with yes and no 
answers. It was designed to be similar in appearance to the 
typical kind of internal control questionnaire used by audi¬ 
tors during the evaluation stage of an audit. Two random 
case orders were used, allowing a test of case order effect 
(discussed in Chapter VII). The second part provided places 
for the subject to record his responses. Both parts 
appeared on a single page for each case. An example of such 
a page is given in Exhibit 1. 
The last section of the booklet contained a short 
debriefing questionnaire. Subjects were asked for informa¬ 
tion relating to: 
1) Comfort in performing the task 
2) Interest in the task 
3) Opinion of the realism and clarity of the cases 
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SITUATION 01 
The following four items complete the description of the accounts 
receivable subsystem at Craftmate, Inc. 
ITEM 
1. Have the client's personnel been in¬ 
formed of their employer's ethical 
standards and are formal statements 
of these standards posted in visible 
locations? 
2. Are credit sales approvals checked and 
initialed by the department manager? 
3. Are invoices reconciled numerically 
at least once a month and are missing 
numbers investigated and their dis¬ 
position documented as a part of each 
reconciliation? 
•4. Do formalised procedures exist for 
handling the non-routine activities 
of investigating and correcting 
mismatching pairs of sales invoices, 
shipping documents, billing amounts, 
and payment receipts? 
YES NO 
_ _/ 
_Z _ 
/ 
Please rate the accounts receivable subsystem described in 
this situation on its reliability in assuring appropriate : 
Authorization- 
Unreliable 
-=-1-i-5-5-1-5-1-5-=- 
123456789 10 Reliable 
Accounting¬ 
's-*-sr 
Unre liable 123456789 10 Reliable 
Safeguarding- 
Unreliable 
i-X-£--£-X-£-£-1-£-£- 
123456789 10 Reliable 
Exhibit 1 
Sample Rating Page 
102 
4) Previous experience in experiments 
5) Opinion of experiments 
6) Time taken by the study 
The purpose of this section was to provide some indica¬ 
tion of response bias, discussed under the section on con¬ 
trols . 
Selection of Variables 
Independent variables. 
The systems model described in Chapter IV was the basis 
of the measurement model used in this study. Thus, there 
were four independent variables in this experiment. These 
were operationalizations of the four causal factors identi¬ 
fied by the systems model in Chapter IV. Each one was 
manipulated through two levels or categories. 
The environmental constraints factor was defined as the 
presence or absence of formal company ethical standards. 
Although many kinds of environmental constraints surround 
the typical company's accounting system, our objective in 
defining this variable was to find a control that was both 
objectively measurable and emphasized in the normative lit¬ 
erature growing out of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977. This operationalization met both requirements. 
The system boundary constraints factor was defined as the 
presence or absence of an approval requirement for credit 
sales. Such approval specifically mediates access to the 
103 
system and, thus, is clearly (and only) a system boundary 
constraint. 
Feedback regulation was represented by the presence or 
absence of a monthly numerical reconciliation of invoices. 
The two signals undergoing feedback comparison in this case 
were the sequence numbers on invoices generated by sales and 
the file copies for completed shipments. 
The definition of programmatic regulation was the pres¬ 
ence or absence of formalized procedures for investigating 
and correcting mismatching pairs of internal documents. In 
order to emphasize the programmatic nature of these proce¬ 
dures, the word 'formalized' was underlined in the question 
relating to this variable on the case rating page. 
Each of these variables was finally operationalized as a 
question and answer on the case rating page, as depicted in 
Exhibit 1. Table 5 summarizes the relationships between the 
conceptual and operational forms of the independent vari¬ 
ables . 
Other factors which can affect the quality of internal 
control were held fixed in the experiment. Chief among 
these is segregation of duties, a control which incorporates 
features of all three of the control factors that exist at 
the subsystem level. Segregation of duties is basically a 
systems boundary constraint variable, since it controls 
access to the internal activity of the accounting system. 
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Variable Operational Form Level 
Environmental Standards for Employees Present Absent 
Constraints Ethical Behavior 
System Boundary Transaction Approval Present Absent 
Constraints 
Feedback Numerical Reconciliation Present Absent 
Regulators of Invoices 
Programmatic Formalized Exception Present Absent 
Regulators Routines 
Table 5 
List of Independent Variables 
and Their Operational Forms 
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However, duties are segregated through individual employees. 
Through their memory, these individuals provide a measure of 
feedback regulation. Furthermore, their own personal behav- 
ioral habits also tend to produce some programmatic regula¬ 
tion. This may explain why Ashton [1974] and Joyce [1976] 
found segregation of duties variables to weigh so heavily in 
auditors' judgments. It is unclear just how much of each 
kind of factor is captured by segregation of duties. It is 
probably most dependent upon the particular individuals 
involved. Thus, the effect of such a variable in this 
experiment would not have been easy to attribute to the var¬ 
ious factors. In order to avoid muddling the implications 
of the results, then, segregation of duties was held fixed 
in this experiment. 
Table 6 presents the complete list of factors that were 
explicitly dealt with in the experiment and shows whether 
each was held fixed or varied. 
Dependent variable. 
The dependent variable was the judged relative reliabil¬ 
ity of the described accounting system in assuring that each 
of the three objectives of internal accounting control were 
being met. These three objectives, accounting, authoriza¬ 
tion, and the safeguarding of assets, have been identified 
both by the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Account- 
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Factors Having Potential Impact 
on Subsystem Stability 
Fixed Varied 
Economy X 
Industry X 
Firm's Position in Industry X 
Firm's Size/Growth X 
Management's Characteristics X 
Firm's Informal Social Structure X 
Firm Objectives and Plans X 
Reward Structure X 
Internal Audit Function X 
Formal Ethical Standards X 
Accounting System Design X 
Accounting Subsystem Investigated X 
Segregation of Duties X 
Authorization X 
Transaction Approval X 
Document Matching X 
Numerical Reconciliation of Invoices X 
Standard Operating Procedures X 
Formalized Exception Routines X 
Table 6 
Status of Factors in Experiment 
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ing Control of the AICPA and by the SEC as the broad 
objectives of internal accounting control. This fact was 
addressed in Chapter II. A single measure of stability was 
not used as the dependent variable for two primary reasons. 
First, the term stability (or its equivalent) would not be 
familiar to the subjects, and thus it could have affected 
the variability of their responses. Second, the recent nor¬ 
mative literature and the current trends in internal 
accounting control evaluation determined in our interviews 
with auditors demonstrate a definite emphasis on evaluation 
against a set of discrete specific objectives. Furthermore, 
the use of multiple rating criteria, then, allowed investi¬ 
gation of the systems model's central assumption. 
Judgments were measured using three ten point scales num¬ 
bered from 1 (indicating no overt control) to 10 (indicating 
complete overt control). The end points of the scale were 
labeled 'unreliable' and 'reliable' and referred to state¬ 
ments which were worded in such a way as to be as familiar 
as possible to the auditor subjects. As stated above, the 
rating scales appeared on the same page as the other case- 
specific information (see Exhibit 1). On the rating sheets, 
the scales were labeled rather than actually defined. The 
specific definitions of the three scale dimensions appeared 
only once, earlier in the booklet. Exhibit 2 reproduces the 
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11. Task. Instructions. 
This section describes the output desired from you in this study. In 
the next section of this booklet (Section III), the general description of 
a single firm and its accounting system is presented. A more detailed out¬ 
line of the firm's accounts receivable subsystem, and its relationship to 
the rest of the revenue cycle system, is then given. In Section IV, a number 
of different situations within this accounts receivable subsystem are set 
forth. In each of these possible situations you will be asked to review the 
accounts receivable subsystem as documented and assess its reliability. 
You will be asked to assess the subsystem's reliability in relation to 
each of the three broad objectives on internal accounting control outlined 
by AICPA in the Report of the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting 
Control. These objectives are classified as authorization, accounting, and 
asset safeguarding. The task in this experiment is a preliminary evaluation 
of the reliability of each of 20 variations of an accounts receivable subsystem 
in terms of its ability to achieve each of these objectives. For the purposes 
of this study, then, you should employ the following criteria in each evaluation: 
Authorization. The subsystem's procedures and techniques should 
assure that transactions occur only in compliance with policies 
and criteria established by management such that, for example, 
kinds of customers serviced, prices, credit, terms of sales, cus¬ 
tomer acceptance, sales-related adjustments, and billing and 
collection practices are appropriate as determined under some general 
or specific form of authorization. 
Accounting. The subsystem's procedures and techniques should assure 
that transactions are recorded as executed such that, for example, 
all and only bona fide transactions are recorded, that they are 
correctly classified, and that their recording Is timely. 
Asset Safeguarding. The subsystem's procedures and techniques should 
assure that assets are protected from loss, abuse, mishandling, or 
misappropriation such that, for example, access to assets, records, 
critical forms, and processing is restricted to responsible parties 
and that records are inspected for accuracy in representing asset 
values at regular intervals. 
Exhibit 2 
Rating Instructions 
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booklet section that defined and explained the rating task. 
The dependent variable employed was like Ashton's [1974] 
to the extent that it was a single-stage scaled judgment. 
It was unlike Ashton's in that the decision was on the three 
'broad objectives' rather than control strength. This 
should have been a more familiar evaluation notion for the 
subjects. These three criteria have found acceptance as a 
general statement of the objectives of internal accounting 
control.'*' It was also unlike Ashton's in that it was a ten 
point unlabeled scale rather than one with six labeled 
points. The decision to use this approach was motivated by 
the functional measurement work done by Anderson [1974, 
1977] and his associates. The primary reasons for this 
decision are: 
1) As fine a discrimination as practical was 
desired. 
2) Anderson [1974] indicates that scales of a size 
less than ten points are suspect in judgement 
scales due to end-points elimination, distribu¬ 
tional flattening, and related contextual effects 
(pp. 2-10). 
3) Scales with over twenty points tend to elicit 
lumped responses yielding effective lengths of 
about twenty, anyway (e.g., most tests using 100 
percentage points tend to get responses at only 
the 5 and 10 percent graduations). 
4) Anderson [1974] states that about 15 to 20 years 
One of the firms providing subjects employs a single 
strength-of-control concept in its internal accounting con¬ 
trol evaluation process. However, Chapter II indicates the 
popularity of the 'three broad objectives'. 
110 
of research in measurement theory and judgment/ 
perception research has indicated to him that a 
ten to twenty point response scale is about opti¬ 
mal for judgment studies. In fact, his research 
indicates that such a scale, with labels at the 
'end anchors' only, often yields interval scale 
properties in the responses, (p. 1,2). 
5) Initial reactions from auditors was that a scale 
with more than ten points would be too discrimi¬ 
nating for the purposes of internal accounting 
control evaluation. 
The final decision on the scale was made after an analy¬ 
sis of the results of the pilot study showed the ten point 
scale to be both sensitive and selective in the rating task. 
The single scaled judgement approach has been criticized 
for its so-called lack of relevance. Joyce [1976] first 
tried to avoid this criticism by using judgments on man¬ 
hours in the audit program. Mock and Turner [1978] used 
planned sample sizes as their dependent variables for the 
same reason. However, a number of problems are inherent in 
such a dependent variable, which is why such an approach was 
not used here. There are two reasons to believe that the 
audit program variables used in earlier studies may have 
diluted the internal validity of those experiments. First, 
evidence cited in Chapters II and III indicates that non¬ 
control factors exert a significant influence on the design 
of the final audit plan. Thus it is unclear how well pro¬ 
gram planning acts as a surrogate for judged quality of 
internal accounting control. Second, any multi-stage deci¬ 
sion process (as the program planning decision must be cat- 
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egorized) has an inherent 'spreading effect' on individual 
judgments due to the natural properties of cascaded judg¬ 
ment. Such an effect would have reduced the visible measure 
of consensus, yielding lower correlations. It may have 
affected the investigation of significant effects in the 
analysis of variance, as well. Appendix B demonstrates the 
effect of cascaded judgment through an example. 
There is another reason for using the 'unrealistic' 
scaled response. 
Even though no such decision is separately required as 
part of the regular audit, the AICPA now allows that such a 
decision be made and discussed formally in a special state¬ 
ment. This fact emphasizes the value of information about 
the auditor's ability to make such a separate judgment. 
Since we were interested in the evaluation of internal 
accounting control and not the development of the audit pro¬ 
gram, it was deemed appropriate to seek decisions on con- 
2 
trols, themselves. Thus, the multiple criteria defined by 
the SEC (and invoked in the auditor's statement prescribed 
by Paragraph 39 of SAS 30) was chosen as the appropriate 
dependent variable set. 
2 In fact, individual judgments may not be terribly ger¬ 
mane to the problem of audit program planning. Interviews 
with CPAs indicated that such decisions often made in 
groups, or at least after informal communication with peers. 
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Controls 
The primary source of the control of extraneous factors 
in this study was the use of a detailed simulated decision 
setting. Within this setting, we: 
1) Fixed the background information and interactions 
of subjects with others so that effects due to 
variation there would not intrude upon the 
results; and 
2) Utilized a design which allowed within subjects 
comparisons. 
Unfortunately, completely random selection of subjects, as 
explained above, was not possible. 
Further efforts were made to avoid task artifacts (i.e., 
effects due to the experiment's formalism as opposed to the 
underlying conceptual relations under scrutiny). Among 
these efforts was the use of the single-stage scaled judg¬ 
ment described above. Besides cascading effects, this 
approach eliminated the potentially confounding effects of 
audit risk and compliance test outcomes/costs that would be 
associated with an audit program-oriented dependent vari¬ 
able. Mock and Turner [1978] identified such confounding 
effects in their study. 
A type of confounding effect of particular importance 
here is that due to the operationalization of the design. 
It is conceivable that subject behavior could be influenced 
by the cases chosen as repeats or by the overall order of 
case presentation. Ashton & Brown [1980] found such 
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effects. Order effects could be due to some carryover of 
context across cases. In order to assess such effects, the 
experiment was operationalized into four sets of final 
materials. Two case presentation orders were used (orders* A 
& B), and two sets of repeat cases were used (sets I & II). 
Both orders and repeat sets were chosen at random, with the 
restriction that no repeat case could fall within three tri¬ 
als of the duplicated original. Their crossing resulted in 
the four final versions (AI, All, BI, & BII). 
Another set of confounding variables not directly con¬ 
trollable involves what is generally called experimental 
demand. The subjects' perceptions of the study's goals and 
their attitudes towards the experimenter, the task, and 
those perceived goals, may effect the experimental outcomes. 
We chose here to be straightforward with the subjects about 
the general objectives of the study. Knowledge about the 
experiment's goals should not have adversly influenced sub¬ 
jects, per se. In fact, such knowledge may have served as a 
motivator, since the general internal accounting control 
evaluation problem has become highly visible lately. The 
method used to assess the probability of any strong impact 
from this source on the results was an analysis of the 
series of questions eliciting the subjects' attitudes toward 
the study and performance on it which appeared in the 
debriefing section of the test instrument. The results of 
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that analysis are discussed in the next chapter. 
Summary 
The sections above have described the experiment and its 
administration. However, they have not provided any details 
about the subjects that participated in the final study. 
They have not discussed the results of the preliminary scan¬ 
ning of the data for outliers and confounding effects, 
either. Both of these topics are covered in the first sec¬ 
tion of the next chapter, which then proceeds to present the 
general results of the experiment and the analyses of those 
results. 
CHAPTER VII 
PRELIMINARY DATA REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the basic results obtained from the 
administration of the experiment described in Chapter VI. 
The purpose of this review is to "set the stage" for the 
tests of the hypotheses presented in Chapter V. Those tests 
will be conducted in Chapters VIII and IX. 
It is appropriate that, prior to testing this study's 
hypotheses, the data be cleansed of possible biases and 
artifactual effects. Accordingly, this chapter examines 
both attributes of the data and of the subject sample that 
provided it. The objectives of this review are twofold. 
First, it is desired that a "clean" subset of the data (that 
is, one free of effects not under study) may be selected for 
the purpose of the ultimate tests of hypotheses. Second, it 
is felt that such a preliminary review of the data and its 
source will provide an appropriate perspective from which to 
evaluate the results of the statistical analysis of the 
hypothesized relationships. 
A general objective of empirical research is that its 
data be representative of typical target behavior in natural 
settings. In a simulation study such as the current one, 
there are several potential sources of distortion in the 
observed behavior. Generally, these sources are referred to 
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as the "demand characteristics of an experiment" [Orne 
(1962)]. Subjects react to experimental stimuli in the con¬ 
text of their perceptions of the experimental task. These 
perceptions are, in turn, mediated by the attitudes they 
bring to the experiment, their impressions of the experi¬ 
ment's importance and the quality of its execution, and the 
structure of the task, itself. 
In order to detect the presence of demand characteristics 
effects in the data obtained for this study, the first sec¬ 
tion of this chapter assesses the likelihood of such effects 
through the analysis of the subjects' responses to the 
debriefing questions from the end of the experimental book¬ 
let. Based on this examination, one subject's responses are 
deleted from the data and those of another two are omitted 
from the tests of hypothesis 1. 
The second section of this chapter presents an investiga¬ 
tion of effects in the data due to question order and the 
choice of repeat cases. 
The third section of this chapter presents another facet 
of the quality of the data. Obviously, the generalizability 
of the patterns of rating behavior elicited by the current 
study is dependent upon the representativeness of the sub¬ 
ject sample in relation to the population of auditors making 
such decisions. Thus, the third section of this chapter 
reviews the demographics of the subject group. 
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Finally, this chapter ends with a summary of the 
preliminary analysis of the data and an assessment of the 
data's quality. 
Review of Debriefing Questions 
The last section of the experimental booklet contained 
five debriefing questions designed to determine potential 
bias in the subjects' responses to the rating task. In the 
analysis below, responses to each question will first be 
investigated individually. At the conclusion of this sec¬ 
tion, the implications of the overall pattern of responses 
will be discussed. 
The first question in the debriefing section asked sub¬ 
jects to rate four aspects of the experiment. The results 
of these ratings are summarized in Table 7. No single sub¬ 
ject rated all four aspects consistently low; individual 
average ratings over the four aspects ranged from 3.75 to 8. 
Note that the only mean aspect rating below the scale mid¬ 
point (5.5) was the one for interest, indicating that the 
subjects found the task somewhat dull, overall. 
Nonetheless, based on these ratings alone, there appears 
to be no reason to suspect any significant level of response 
bias. 
The second and third questions in the debriefing section 
asked subjects if they had participated in an auditing 
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ASPECT OF EXPERIMENT RATINGS 
RANGE MEAN 
Interest in task 1 to 8 4.5 
Clarity of instructions 4 to 10 7.3 
Realism of situations 1 to 9 6.4 
Comfort in making ratings 3 to 10 5.9 
Notes: -Possible range of ratings was 1 to 10 
-Increasing values indicate more interest, 
clarity, etc. 
TABLE 7 
Debriefing Ratings 
research study before and what their opinions of such activ¬ 
ity were. Five subjects reported that they had participated 
in a previous audit study. Three of those expressed beliefs 
that such experiments were quite valuable. One said only 
that they should let subjects know about the results;how did 
he compare to others? The remaining subject (hereafter 
referred to as S-16) thought that audit experiments were 
"...generally nonsensical. Performed only to write thesis 
or other degree requirements. Generally useful in case of 
fuel shortages." This subject rated his interest in the 
rating task at 1. 
Of the 26 subjects who had not taken part in prior audit¬ 
ing studies, thirteen had positive comments about the value 
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or importance of such studies and nine made no comment. The 
remaining four made statements reflecting feelings that such 
studies were generally too restrictive or lacking in reality 
to yield much insight into auditing problems. Nonetheless, 
these four subjects each rated their interest in the current 
experiment at 4 or above. Thus, although their opinions of 
audit experiments may have been low, these subjects appear 
to have been interested enough in the internal accounting 
control evaluation problem to provide acceptable responses. 
Question 4 asked subjects to estimate the total time they 
devoted to the experiment as well as the time they spent on 
the ratings, alone. The mean reported times were 87.5 min¬ 
utes total time and 40 minutes rating time. Reported total 
times ranged from 25 minutes (reported by S-16) to 240 min¬ 
utes, with quartiles at 60, 85, and 112.5 minutes. Reported 
rating times ranged from 10 minutes (S-16) to 120 minutes, 
with quartiles at 20, 30, and 45 minutes. 
The last question was an open-ended one included to allow 
subjects to comment on their experience in the experiment. 
No particular pattern was evident in the responses. Eleven 
subjects made no comment. Eight described their analytical 
approaches. Three expressed an opinion that the task had 
been boring. One said the experiment had not lived up to 
his expectations. Three subjects reported that they had 
found the task difficult. One subject said that he would 
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have been more comfortable rating on a single scale, while 
another claimed that he had found the three-scale rating 
system commendable. Finally, six of the subjects specifi¬ 
cally mentioned that they had noticed or determined the 
existence of repeat cases. 
Further investigation revealed that three of these last 
individuals did not attempt to justify their two sets of 
responses since their repeats showed somewhat different pat¬ 
terns from the original appearances of the same cases. One 
subject actually reported changing his earlier responses to 
the duplicated cases because he felt that he should give the 
same ratings to two instances of a single case. However, 
since the original ratings had merely been crossed out, they 
were recoverable. 
The two remaining individuals had identical responses for 
their original and repeat cases, as did one other subject 
who had not reported an awareness of the repeats. If these 
subjects artificially produced identical ratings for origi¬ 
nal and repeat cases, their inclusion in the test of intra¬ 
auditor reliability would result in an upwardly biased mean 
correlation. Therefore, the data from these three subjects 
was examined for an indication of the ’naturalness' of their 
identical pattern. The ratings of the subject who did not 
report an awareness of the repetition of cases were highly 
systematic (i.e., regular) across all cases. That subject 
0 
121 
also reported significantly more internal accounting control 
evaluation experience than the other two. Based on this 
information, a decison was made to include his ratings in 
the test of hypothesis 1. Since the comments of the other 
two had indicated an awareness of the repeats, it was 
assumed that their identical patterns were due to an 
explicit attempt to find the repeat cases and duplicate the 
original responses. Thus, the original and repeat ratings 
for these two subjects were not included in the data used to 
test hypothesis 1 (intra-judge consistency).'*' 
The fact that only six of the thirty-one subjects 
reported an awareness of the inclusion of repeat cases can 
be taken as an indication that most of the subjects were 
more involved in the 'facts' of the cases than in the 
details of the experiment, itself. The design of the test 
required that subjects be exposed to many highly similar 
cases, thus the lack of recognition of repeats in more cases 
is not surprising. In fact, half of the subjects who did 
report an awareness of repeat cases indicated that their 
discovery was based on the fact that four cues at two levels 
could only produce 16 unique instances. At least three of 
those subjects that reported an awareness did not modify 
^As it turned out, the decision to include or exclude 
the ratings of these three individuals did not affect the 
final acceptance of hypothesis 1. 
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their ratings. This probably implies that they were either 
also overtly aware of the instructions to "... not re-exam¬ 
ine or change a rating once you have moved to a new rating 
situation" [booklet, p. 17] or not curious or motivated 
enough to search back through the booklet to find the match¬ 
ing rating page. In general, there does not seem to be 
enough evidence to conclude that the presence of repeats in 
itself had any direct effect on the ratings except in the 
two instances noted above. 
After reviewing all of the debriefing data, it was 
decided that the only significant response bias was exhib¬ 
ited by S-16. Although several subjects reported some nega¬ 
tive attitudes toward the task, these seemed to be mitigated 
by those subjects' other responses and comments or by the 
amount of time they reported spending on the rating task. 
Only S-16 expressed an opinion that audit-related experi¬ 
ments were of absolutely no value. The fact that he also 
reported the lowest times for both total dedicated time and 
rating time added to the sense that his responses may have 
been affected by a significant bias or, at the very least, 
little consideration. 
As a result of the analysis presented in this section, 
then, two major modifications were made in the data. First, 
S-16's responses were omitted from all analyses, due to the 
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conclusion that they were probably affected by a significant 
bias against the experiment. Second, two repeat sets were 
omitted from the intra-judge consistency test data since it 
was concluded that they would have biased the correlation 
figures upward by providing other-than-naturally-achieved 
matches between original and repeat ratings. 
In the next section, effects of the design of the test 
instrument, itself, are investigated. 
Analysis of Order and Repeat Effects 
In Chapter VI, the potential for the operationalization 
of the experimental materials to produce artifactual effects 
was discussed. One particular concern in this study was the 
fact that the order of case presentation or the selection of 
cases to be used as repeats could, in themselves, affect the 
rating behavior of subjects. Ashton [1974] and Ashton & 
Kramer [1980] reported such effects. Thus, as explained in 
Chapter VI, two case orders and two repeat sets were crossed 
to produce four basic versions of the test instrument. This 
section examines the final data set to determine if the case 
order, the choice of repeats, or their interaction had any 
effect on the rating behavior. The findings of that exami¬ 
nation are then discussed. 
The statistical approach used to determine if any regular 
effects due to booklet version were captured in the rating 
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data was a two-way multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA). Tested treatment effects were case order, repeat 
set, and the interaction of the two. 
The results of the analyses of booklet version effects 
are summarized in Table 8, below. 
These results show that there apparently were version 
effects. Equality of group centroids did not seem to be 
significantly affected by the choice of case order or repeat 
sets in themselves. However, the interaction of these two 
choices seems to have had such effects. 
Although one might be able to offer possible explanations 
for order or repeat effects, effects for interactions only 
seem to defy interpretability. Nonetheless, it must be con¬ 
cluded that the overall pattern of cases did affect response 
behavior. The question remains as to whether the observed 
effects indicate more about the test booklet or the way in 
which auditors' judgments are determined. 
How do the observed effects redound upon the interpreta¬ 
tion of the hypotheses tests in the next chapters? The pat¬ 
terns of cases do seem to have some effect on the evalua¬ 
tions. However, the very variety of the booklet formats 
that allowed the detection of such effects also affords some 
level of control over them. In a sense, the four booklet 
versions become four replications of the experiment. Thus, 
in order to ensure that the hypothesis tests are not 
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Test for Equality of Group Centroids 
Source Lambda F-value d.f. P > F 
Order .989 1.72 3,474 .1593 
Repeat set .993 1.15 3,474 . 3266 
Interact. .891 19.28 3,474 .0001 
Table 8 
Test of Version Effects 
affected by booklet version effects,- S's are grouped by 
booklet version exposure for the tests in Chapter IX. 
Subject Demographics 
As discussed in Chapter VI, the experimental instrument 
requested nine pieces of information from each subject about 
his background. This information was collected in order to 
determine whether the subject group's profile contained any 
indication that it was not representative of the general 
population of auditors that routinely make internal account¬ 
ing control evaluation decisions. 
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Subj ect1s firm. 
The first item of information requested was the subject's 
firm. Since different firms employ different methods in 
both training and standard procedures for internal account¬ 
ing control evaluation, it was felt that a variety of such 
backgrounds should be represented in the subject group. 
Accordingly, subjects were sought from four different 'Big 
2 
Eight' firms. These firms represent a good cross-section of 
the internal accounting control evaluation approaches dis¬ 
cussed in Chapter II. Firm A, which provided three sub¬ 
jects, employs a 'classical' evaluation approach that rates 
internal accounting control on an overall 'strength of con¬ 
trol' criterion. Firm B, which provided 15 auditor-sub¬ 
jects, uses an approach that identifies four types of con¬ 
trol objectives and a series of subsumed control criteria. 
Nine subjects were taken from Firm C, which evaluates inter¬ 
nal accounting control using a hierarchical model of control 
objectives broken down into specific systems and cycles. 
Within these areas, a heuristic approach to evaluation is 
used. Firm D employs a detailed formal evaluation model 
which is probably the most elaborate formal internal 
2 National firms were chosen because of their leadership 
in developing new evaluation techniques and approaches and 
their ability to provide auditors from a variety of geo¬ 
graphic locations. 
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accounting control evaluation methodology in use today. 
This firm provided three subjects. Thus, the composition of 
the subject group included small numbers of subjects with 
backgrounds in the most simple (heavily judgmental) method 
of evaluation and the most complex (heavily algorithmic) 
method and larger numbers of subjects from firms using the 
increasingly popular multiple-criteria methods. Pragmati¬ 
cally speaking, the representativeness of the subject sample 
appears to be acceptable in terms of firm/evaluation techni¬ 
que background. 
Subject1 s position/years of experience. 
Auditors of different position levels are responsible for 
the evaluation of internal accounting control. It is not 
inconceivable that the point of view concomitant with the 
auditor's position and responsibilities or simply the extent 
of his audit experience may affect his evaluation decisions. 
Thus, it was desired that a variety of position levels and a 
breadth of experience be represented in the subject sample. 
The final sample contained auditors reporting three dif¬ 
ferent ranks. Fourteen subjects were audit managers. Nine 
subjects reported titles of audit supervisor or advanced 
senior. The remaining eight subjects were audit seniors. 
Since different firms employ slightly different terminol¬ 
ogy for ranks and position titles, the reported number of 
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years of audit experience may help to clarify the meaning of 
the above information. Subjects reported a range of three 
to seventeen years of audit experience. Managers ranged 
from 5.5 to 17 years, with a mean of 7.61 years. Supervi¬ 
sors and advanced seniors (hereafter, supervisors) averaged 
5.61 years of audit experience in a range of 5 to 7 years. 
Seniors reported 3 to 5 years experience and averaged 3.94 
years. The grand mean for the subject sample was 6.08 years 
of audit experience. Thus an appropriate range of ranks and 
years of audit experience were apparently represented by the 
subject group. 
% 
Subject1s location. 
It is conceivable that the office an auditor works in may 
be associated with some systematic influence over his evalu¬ 
ation behavior. Such effects could be due to geographic 
location as well as the influence of local social organiza¬ 
tion or leadership. Thus, subjects were sought from a vari¬ 
ety of office locations. The final subject group came from 
six different office locations: Boston, New York City, Phil¬ 
adelphia, Chicago, Seattle, and Australia. The profile out¬ 
lined in Table 9 indicates that the subjects did, indeed, 
represent a diverse set of geographic locations. 
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Firm Bos 
Office 
NYC 
Location 
Phi Chi Sea Aus 
A 0 0 3 0 0 0 
B 0. 5 0 5 5 0 
C 4 0 5 0 0 0 
D 0 2 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 7 8 5 5 1 
Table 9 
Office Location of Subjects by Firm 
Subject1s experience and training. 
It is unlikely that many would argue with the notion that 
an auditor's judgment is tempered by his experience and 
training. Thus, it was desired that the subject group rep¬ 
resent a variety of experience and training. The general 
composition of each subject's experience was elicited 
through three questions on general work experience and one 
question on training. 
Five subjects reported non-auditing commercial experi¬ 
ence. Of that five, only one claimed experience in an 
accounting-related position. The mean number of years of 
commercial experience for this group was 3.7 years. They 
had been away from those positions for an average 5.3 years. 
In the audit experience area, subjects were asked about 
the size of the clients they had worked with. Six subjects 
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reported primary experience with clients reporting annual 
revenues under $30 million. Twelve subjects reported that 
they had primarily worked with clients on the other side of 
that criterion. The remaining twelve reported a fairly even 
mix of experience with clients over and under the $30 mil¬ 
lion annual revenue mark. 
Twenty-three of the 30 subjects indicated that they had 
worked with clients from a variety of industries. The other 
seven auditors in the study reported primary experience in 
specialized industry work. 
Subjects were also asked about specialized training they 
had received. At one end of the spectrum, six subjects 
reported no specialized training. On the other hand, three 
subjects reported specialized training in at least three 
areas. Ten subjects had had more than one type of advanced 
training. 
Subject1s control evaluation experience. 
A particular kind of experience that may affect the way 
an auditor evaluates internal accounting control is experi¬ 
ence in such evaluation itself. Subjects were asked to 
report how often they had had primary responsibility for 
making preliminary evaluations of a client's internal 
accounting control. Every subject claimed some such experi¬ 
ence. Three subjects indicated that they had made prelimi- 
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nary evaluations less than five times (two reported only two 
instances and the other, four). Eight of the auditors 
claimed they had made preliminary evaluations five to ten 
times, nine in the eleven to twenty range, and ten subjects 
reported over twenty occasions of primary responsibility for 
such evaluations. 
Representativeness of the subject group. 
In terms of the immediate investigation, the effort to 
obtain a variety of backgrounds in the subject group seems 
to have been effective. To the extent that ratings supplied 
by these subjects include regular patterns as determined by 
the hypothesis tests in the next chapter, the heterogeneous 
composition of the subject group assures us that these pat¬ 
terns are not due simply to the behavior of a unique, unre¬ 
presentative sample of auditors. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented a general review of the data 
and the subject sample. The purpose of this examination has 
been to clear the data set of biases and artifactual effects 
and to determine whether the attempt to collect a represen¬ 
tative subject sample was successful. 
As a result of the above analyses, two modifications were 
made in the data sets to be tested: 1) deletion of S-16's 
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ratings from all tests, and 2) deletion of the 
original/repeat data for two other subjects from the test of 
hypothesis 1. 
Analysis of booklet version effects revealed a small but 
significant interaction effect for order crossed with repeat 
set choice. However, it was concluded that this effect 
would probably not be deleterious to the analysis of hypoth¬ 
eses in the next chapter, given that the booklet effect 
could be isolated by its inclusion as an across-subjects 
factor. 
The subject group's demographics seem to support the idea 
that the subject sample is heterogeneous and representative 
of the general population of auditors currently involved in 
internal accounting control evaluation. 
Thus, we now turn to the tests of the hypotheses that 
were derived in Chapter V with a reasonable amount of confi¬ 
dence in the veracity of the data. 
CHAPTER VIII 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES INVESTIGATING 
AUDITOR EXPERTISE 
This chapter presents the results of the tests of hypoth¬ 
eses related to the first major research question this the¬ 
sis was designed to investigate: 
Can auditors be characterized as experts in the area of 
internal accounting control evaluation as defined by the 
consistency, consensus, and lack of bias in their judg¬ 
ments? 
Each part of this chapter proceeds according to the fol¬ 
lowing pattern. First, the propositions underlying the 
hypotheses to be tested are reviewed. Next, the conceptual 
issues involved in those propositions are unpacked and dis¬ 
cussed. Each hypothesis is then restated and tested. As 
part of the discussion of each hypothesis test, any new 
technical approaches chosen to deal with the relevant issues 
are introduced and discussed. Finally, the outcome of each 
hypothesis test is interpreted and discussed. 
The chapter ends with a review of the hypotheses and 
their acceptance or lack thereof, followed by a presentation 
of general conclusions about the first research question. 
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Proposition 1_ 
The first proposition presented in Chapter V was: 
: Auditors will demonstrate expertise in the area of 
internal accounting control evaluation. 
Based on the above statement, three hypotheses were 
developed relating to consistency, consensus, and bias in 
the auditor judgments. Before we examine the tests of those 
hypotheses, a short discussion of the philosophy underlying 
them is in order. 
A review of the hypotheses stemming from proposition 1 
reveals a common anomolous characteristic. While most 
research hypotheses typically posit a significant difference 
from a neutral position, these hypotheses predict no signif¬ 
icant difference from a positive position. 
The atypical specifications of the hypotheses here were 
chosen purposely. These hypotheses relate to an assumption 
underlying normative auditing theory. Such assumptions, by 
definition, are quite useful and are not to be cast aside 
lightly. Hence the hypotheses examining this assumption 
were stated negatively; the assumption should not be called 
into question unless the preponderance of evidence militates 
against it. Nonetheless, we do not wish to 'stack the deck' 
too heavily in favor of auditor internal accounting control 
evaluation expertise either. A false conclusion that audi¬ 
tors have the characteristics of ideal evaluation experts 
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could be quite costly too. 
Since there is no simple way of assessing the relative 
costs of Type I and Type II error, we will employ the tradi¬ 
tional alpha level criterion of five percent. 
Auditor Rating Consistency 
One of the criteria for evaluation expertise that was 
discussed in Chapter V was rating consistency, or test-re- 
test reliability. Ceteris paribus, we would expect the 
ideal expert judge to produce identical judgments when f^ced 
with the same case on separate occasions. Of course, the 
situation captured in the invocation of ceteris paribus sel¬ 
dom occurs in the real world. Thus, Hypothesis 1 utilized a 
criterial level of test-retest reliability that allowed for 
some random error: 
: Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a mean 
intra-judge correlation not significantly less than .8. 
Analytical approach. 
The data to be analyzed for Hypothesis 1 has two impor¬ 
tant characteristics — (1) observations are ratings and 
thus ordinal, and (2) observations are multivariate in that 
the ratings were collected on three different variables for 
each case. 
Since judgments were collected via a rating scale, the 
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traditionally mandated correlation method for analysis here 
would be non-parametric [Siegel (1956)]. However, we are 
interested in assessing the extent to which two population 
distributions are identical. Order statistics may be very 
insensitive to departures from identicality [Hays (1963, p. 
618)]. Michels and Helson [1949] argue that the use of 
interval techniques is more appropriate in such situations. 
The statistical technique known as canonical correlation 
measures the comovement of pairs of vectors of variables (as 
opposed to pairs of individual variables). Thus, it would 
be an appropriate approach in this case. Canonical correla¬ 
tion of the original and repeat data sets would identify the 
maximally correlated linear transformations of the two judg¬ 
ment vectors and give the coefficient of correlation between 
them. Unfortunately, canonical correlations could not be 
computed for each auditor-subject due to singularities in 
some of the individual 4 by 3 ratings matrices. Further¬ 
more, since canonical correlation returns correlations for 
each canonical variate, the interpretation of canonical 
correlations would be problematical. Thus, canonical corre¬ 
lations between original and repeat sets are not reported. 
To facilitate comparison to the criterion in Hypothesis 
1, a univariate approach was used for the test. Each rating 
was considered an independent event, yielding 12 observa¬ 
tions per set for each subject's originals and repeats. 
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Since we are interested in complete replicability across 
different administrations of a single case, a strong argu¬ 
ment can be made for the application of a univariate para¬ 
metric correlation technique here. Many auditing firms now 
employ multi-dimensional internal accounting control evalua¬ 
tion procedures. A central reason behind such approaches is 
the notion that ratings or analyses of the individual dimen¬ 
sions can be translated directly into implications for the 
audit plan. It is thus important that reliability exist at 
the individual evaluation dimension level. We therefore 
feel completely justified in using Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients in the test of Hypothesis 1. 
Test of Hypothesis _1. 
Correlation coefficients were calculated for each sub¬ 
ject. These ranged from -.524 to 1. The obvious outlier 
value obtained for subject 14 (-.524) was omitted, leaving a 
range of .066 to 1 with a mean of .715. The complete set of 
intra-judge correlations appears in Table 10. 
The null hypothesis tested here is that the mean intra¬ 
judge correlation obtained is less than .8. Since the test 
is performed on correlations, a straightforward t-test is 
inappropriate. As the absolute value of a population corre¬ 
lation increases, the probability density function of meas¬ 
ured correlations becomes more and more skewed. Thus, sim- 
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For Individual Subjects 
Subj ect# PPM Subject# PPM Subj ect# PPM 
1 .716 11 .898 22 .658 
2 .758 12 .798 24 .764 
3 .942 13 .963 25 . 688 
4 . 659 14 -.524 26 .533 
5 .611 15 .564 27 .680 
6 .066 17 .771 28 . 524 
7 .636 18 .701 29 .869 
8 .903 19 .799 31 .130 
9 .944 20 .785 
10 .938 21 1.000 
(Subjects 16, 23, and 30 omitted; see Chapter VII.) 
Summary (computed without Subject 14 i outlier value) • • 
Range of Correlations: .066 to 1.00 
Mean of Correlations: .715 
Quartiles of Correlations: .636 .758 .898 
I II III 
Table 10 
Intra-Judge Correlations 
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pie t-tests become less and less reliable [Kays (1963, p. 
530)]. Therefore, we tested Hypothesis 1 using a t-test on 
the z transform of the mean correlation as defined by the 
Fisher r to z transformation [Hays (1963, p. 530)], where: 
z = .5 [loge (1 + r)(1 - r)-1] 
The t-test is then based on the z-value — 
_z(r) - z(rho)_ 
square root ((1/(N1»3))(1/(N2))) 
where is the number of score pairs per comparison and 
is the number of comparisons 
Thus, for Hypothesis 1, 
z(r) = z(.715) = .8973 
z(rho) = z(.800) = 1.0986 
z = -3.19, P>z = .0007 
90 percent confidence interval: .661 < r < .762 
N1 = 12 and N2 = 28 
Discussion. 
The test above indicates that a lower correlation could 
only be expected with a .07 percent probability given a true 
population correlation value of .8. 
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The null hypothesis of no significant difference is 
rejected, thus Hypothesis 1 is rejected.'*' 
The obtained mean intra-judge correlation is signifi¬ 
cantly less than the values reported by Ashton [1974] (.81), 
Joyce [1976] (.863), and Ashton and Brown [1980] (.91). The 
test above indicates that the obtained outcome is not con¬ 
sistent with an underlying auditor test-retest reliability 
of at least 80 percent. 
Auditor Consensus 
Our second criterion of ideal judgment expertise is con¬ 
sensus. Experts should tend to agree with one another. In 
our statement of Hypothesis 2, we acknowledged a ceiling for 
inter-auditor agreement: 
H^: Auditor subjects will produce judgments with a mean 
interjudge correlation not significantly less than 
their average intra-judge correlation 
Analytical approach. 
Once again, canonical correlations were precluded due to 
singular matrices. Pearson product-moment correlation coef¬ 
ficients are used to test the hypothesis. 
^The deletion of the original-repeat data for the two 
subjects assumed to have artificially produced identical 
ratings did not affect the outcome of the hypothesis test. 
Their inclusion would have resulted in only a slightly 
higher mean z(r). 
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Our interest in this case is in how predictable a judge's 
ratings are, based on those of his peers. Since the corre¬ 
lation is a standardized covariance term, high correlations 
will be obtained as long as the subjects 'agreed in princi¬ 
ple'. That is, if subject A's ratings are x standard devia¬ 
tions from his mean rating and subject B's ratings are x 
standard deviations from his mean rating, over all ratings, 
the correlation between scores for the two is 1. This out¬ 
come will result regardless of the actual rating values. 
Test of Hypothesis 2. 
Pairwise correlations over 48 ratings (16 cases x three 
dependent variables) were calculated for all pairs of sub¬ 
jects. These correlations ranged from -.020 to .909. The 
means of correlations for each subject versus all other sub¬ 
jects were also determined. These values ranged from .156 
to .729. The grand mean inter-judge correlation was .619. 
Table 11 summarizes these results. 
Once again, the hypothesis does not allow for a simple, 
straightforward test. The strict formulation of the null 
hypothesis is that the z transform of the grand mean of 
inter-judge correlations is less than the z transform for 
rho=.715 (the mean correlation obtained for the intra-judge 
case). Using the t-test described above, the following 
results were obtained: 
t 
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Average 
Subject# Correlation With 
Other Subjects 
Subject# 
Average 
Correlation With 
Other Subjects 
1 .67 17 .64 
2 .73 18 .64 
3 .60 19 .60 
4 . 6 5 20 . 61 
5 .67 21 .50 
6 .60 22 .68 
7 .69 23 .46 
8 .58 24 .35 
9 .64 25 .72 
10 .71 26 .67 
11 .62 27 .64 
12 .69 28 .68 
13 . 6 0 29 .73 
14 .16 30 . 69 
15 . 68 31 .68 
(Subject 16 excluded from analysis; see Chapter VII. ) 
Range of Mean Correlations: .156 to .729 
Grand Mean Correlation: .619 
Quartiles of Mean Correlations: .605 
I 
.660 .695 
II III 
Table 11 
Inter-Judge Correlations 
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z(r) = z( .619) = .7234 
z(rho) = z(.715) = .8973 
z = -24.351, P>z = .0001 
90 percent confidence interval: .612 < r < .626 
Nx = 48, N2 = 435 
Discussion. 
Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted. In this case our sample 
correlations could only be obtained with a .01 percent prob¬ 
ability if the true across-rater reliability equalled the 
.715 mean intra-judge correlation. The hypothesized value 
of rho (.715) lies well above the upper bound of the 90 per¬ 
cent confidence interval. 
This result indicates that, for this study, at least, 
predicting ratings across auditors would result in a signif¬ 
icantly lower success rate than predicting within auditors. 
Thus, the auditor subjects in this study could not be inter¬ 
changed without affecting the ratings for the cases, even 
after 'recalibrating'. 
Judgment Bias 
The third criterion used to assess ideal evaluation 
expertise is the notion of bias. It must be emphasized that 
the term bias is used here in the technical sense. Biases 
are defined as systematic (as opposed to random) differences 
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between an auditor's actual ratings and the expected value 
of such ratings, where the expected value of a rating is the 
mean of all auditor ratings on the same case. 
This rather strict approach is used here to measure and 
real 'differences of opinion' among the auditor-subjects. 
To the extent that such differences exist, judges become 
less interchangeable. To the extent that judges become less 
interchangeable, they depart more from our definition of 
ideal expertise, which is posited by Hypothesis 3: 
H-: Auditor subjects will produce judgments with insig¬ 
nificant bias effects. 
Biases as defined above can manifest themselves in the 
ratings data in two ways. First, significant differences 
among the means of the ratings when the data is grouped by 
subject indicate leniency biases. That is, they indicate a 
tendency among the auditors to rate significantly higher or 
lower, in general, than the mean ratings produced by all 
auditors. However, since the rating scales were 'open,' the 
auditor-subjects were free to 'choose' their own mid-points. 
Thus significant differences among the subjects' mean rat¬ 
ings do not necessarily indicate any disagreements in prin¬ 
ciple . The second kind of difference potentially captured 
in the ratings data is what may be termed cue sensitivity 
bias. This bias is the result of a tendency to overempha¬ 
size, underemphasize or reverse the interpretation of a par- 
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ticular cue in comparison to its true relationship to the 
criterion variable. Thus, cue sensitivity biases would 
result in significant differences among the means of the 
ratings for each subject-cue combination. 
Analytical approach. 
The biases described above are assessed via the MANOVA 
test methodology introduced in Chapter VII for the examina¬ 
tion of booklet version effects. Since subjects represent a 
random variable, mixed model error hypotheses are used 
[Tatsuoka (1971, p. 199)]. 
In this case, leniency biases are examined through the 
null hypothesis of equality of rating centroids for the data 
grouped by subject. Cue biases are examined through the 
investigation of subject-cue interaction effects. 
Test of Hypothesis 3_* 
The results of the above tests are given in Table 12. 
The main effect for centroid differences by subject was 
significant at the .01 percent level. A more important 
result is that all of the subject-cue interactions were also 
significant at a probability of .01 percent. 
Discussion. 
The 'no bias' null hypothesis was strongly rejected. 
Leniency biases existed in our sample. However, as stated 
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Test for Equality of Group Centroids 
Source* Lambda F-value d.f • P>F 
S .1512 9.76 87, 964 .0001 
SxEC . 5499 2.45 87, 964 .0001 
SxSBC .2817 5.84 87, 964 .0001 
SxFR .2914 5.65 87, 964 . 0001 
SxPR . 2949 5.59 87, 964 . 0001 
* Note: S indicates subjects 
EC indicates environmental constraints 
SBC indicates system boundary constraints 
FR indicates feedback regulators 
PR indicates programmatic regulators 
x indicates interaction 
Table 12 
Test of Hypothesis 3 
above, this is of relatively minor consequence. The 
significant subject-cue interactions indicate that the dif¬ 
ferences in ratings across subjects and across cue levels 
did not vary in parallel. Thus, reactions to cues depended 
on the particular auditor involved, i.e., auditors were not 
interchangeable, even in principle. 
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Interpretation of the First Research Question Test Results 
The hypotheses tested above were based on the implicit 
assumption in normative auditing theory that auditors are 
internal accounting control evaluation experts. The cri¬ 
teria used to measure expertise in these hypotheses were 
based on an ideal notion of expert judgment. 
All three hypotheses were rejected. The stability of 
ratings by individual auditors across repetitions of the 
same case was not consistent with an underlying test-retest 
reliability of .8. Even so, the auditor subjects' ratings 
in this exercise were more consistent within auditors across 
time than across auditors. Furthermore, the overall pattern 
of the responses to individual cues differed from subject to 
subject. 
The results indicate that the auditors' behavior in the 
experimental task could not be characterized as that of 
ideal experts. 
What does the outcome here indicate about auditor evalua¬ 
tion of internal accounting control? First of all, it does 
not mean that we should necessarily reject auditor evalua¬ 
tion of internal accounting control as a useful part of the 
audit process. The notion of 'ideal expertise' is probably 
beyond reasonable expectations for most situations requiring 
judgment. Our results do not indicate that the behavior of 
our auditor subjects was inconsistent with the definition of 
what might be called 'practical expertise.' In fact, the 
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results of the tests above add to the accumulating evidence 
in support of the conclusion that auditors compare quite 
well to other professional groups in the exercise of 'ex¬ 
pert' judgment. 
Our results also show that there is substantial room for 
improvement in auditor internal accounting control evalua¬ 
tion, however. In the absence of a more objective assess¬ 
ment of internal control quality, it is important that audi¬ 
tor evaluations demonstrate a high level of consensus. If 
improvement in auditor consensus is to be forthcoming, it 
will have to build upon a common core of auditor agreement 
that already exists. As indicated by Ijiri and Jaedicke 
[1966], auditor consensus implies a uniform understanding of 
cause-effect relationships across individuals. In other 
words, consensual control evaluation requires that auditors 
share a common model of relationships between classes of 
controls and system stability. 
The second research question in this study is centrally 
concerned with such relationships. Thus, before we attempt 
to integrate our observations about auditor evaluation 
expertise with the results of previous studies, it is appro¬ 
priate that we first look at the tests of hypotheses based 
upon our systems model of internal accounting control. 
CHAPTER IX 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES INVESTIGATING 
THE SYSTEMS MODEL 
This chapter presents the tests of the hypotheses drawn 
from the systems model of internal accounting control out¬ 
lined in Chapter V. Recall that the model describes cause- 
effect relationships in the internal accounting control 
area. In the generation of the hypotheses tested here it is 
used as a positive model of auditor internal accounting con¬ 
trol evaluation behavior. The basic logic underlying this 
application of the systems model can be summarized as fol¬ 
lows : 
1) the systems model captures cause and effect rela¬ 
tionships in the internal accounting control 
area; 
2) the mean ratings of auditor-subjects can be 
interpreted as surrogates for auditor consensus; 
3) auditor evaluation consensus is likely to be 
based on the identification of and reaction to 
basic cause and effect relationships in the 
internal accounting control area; and, thus, 
4) relationships among the mean ratings of the audi¬ 
tor subjects should be predicted by the systems 
model. 
Thus these hypotheses are designed to address the second 
major research question underlying this thesis: 
Can the systems model of internal accounting control cap¬ 
ture the evaluation behavior of auditors in a carefully 
varied set of hypothetical situations? 
Unlike the situation in the previous chapter, most of the 
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hypotheses to be tested below are phrased in the conven¬ 
tional manner. Thus we will employ the standard criterion 
for assessing significance in the five propositions investi¬ 
gated in this chapter (i.e., an alpha = .05). 
However, the tests below represent the first attempt to 
investigate or verify the model of internal accounting con¬ 
trol relationships outlined in Chapter IV. Since we are 
looking for potentially useful relationships to be studied 
in greater detail at a later date. Type II error (the error 
of incorrectly accepting the null hypothesis) is deemed to 
be more noxious than Type I error. Thus the ’benefit of the 
doubt' will be given to the acceptance of the hypothesis 
when the results are marginally significant. 
This chapter employs the same basic format as Chapter 
VIII. Each of the five propositions is recapitulated and 
discussed and then the concomitant hypotheses are tested. 
The outcomes of the tests are then interpreted and dis¬ 
cussed. The chapter ends with a summary of the test results 
and an integrated set of conclusions. 
Proposition 2 
The systems model was based on a central assumption which 
became proposition 2: 
P^: The object of internal accounting control procedures 
and techniques can be characterized as a single 
goal: system stability. 
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To test this proposition, the following hypothesis was 
devised: 
: Auditors' ratings on the three dependent variables 
will be captured by a single underlying dependent 
factor * 
If the critical parameter of internal accounting control 
is some notion of stability, then systematic variations in 
the mean auditor ratings on each dependent variable should 
reflect some aspect of stability. Thus, systematic varia¬ 
tions in the mean dependent vector due to manipulation of 
the independent variables should associate highly with a 
single 'underlying' stability factor. 
Analytical approach. 
The logic of the argument above may be misleadingly sim¬ 
ple. The rationale implicit in the identification of three 
dimensions of internal accounting control by the Commission 
on Auditors' Responsibilities [CAR, 1978] and the Special 
Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting Control [SACIAC, 
1979] may be interpreted, in the systems model's terms, as 
the need to view stability from more than one perspective. 
As that perspective changes, the auditor may see the threat 
to stability clearly or vaguely and as greater or lesser. 
In order to test Hypothesis 4, however, we will examine 
the more restricted case where the three dependent variables 
are seen as simply three different alternatives for measur- 
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ing the same thing, like Farenheit and Celcius measures of 
temperature. If this is the case, then the joint distribu¬ 
tion defined by the ratings should be degenerate. 
A relatively straightforward way to expose a degenerate 
joint distribution is principal components analysis (PCA). 
PCA uses a variance maximizing process to reassign the vari¬ 
ance in the distribution to a set of principal axes (dimen¬ 
sions) which are transformations of the original variables. 
In terms of PCA, Hypothesis 4 may be viewed as a prediction 
that all but an insignificant portion of the total variance 
accounted for by the three dependent variables will load 
onto a single principal axis. PCA will define three prin¬ 
cipal axes here, ordered by the amount of variance they 
account for in the 3x3 correlation matrix for the 480 (30 
subjects x 16 cases) observations on the three dependent 
variables. 
Test of Hypothesis _4. 
The analyses described above were performed on the 480 x 
3 data matrix. The results of that analysis are presented 
in Table 13. 
The null hypothesis tested here is that more than one 
significant underlying factor exists. The assessment of 
significance is a sticky problem in PCA. One popular method 
available for testing our hypothesis under PCA is Kaiser's 
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Principal Components Analysis 
Correlation Matrix 
Authorization Accounting Safeguarding 
Authorization 1.0 .501 .610 
Accounting .501 
o
 • 
1—1 .769 
Safeguarding .610 .769 1.0 
Principal Components 
Component Eigenvalue Percentage 
Accounted for 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 2.259 75.3 75.3 
2 .525 17.5 92.8 
3 .216 7.2 100.0 
Table 13 
Core Factors in Control Judgments 
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rule. Kaiser's rule is that only components with 
eigenvalues equal to or greater than one are significant. 
Under this criterion, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Discussion. 
The analysis above constitutes some evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 4. Note that the first principal component 
extracted accounts for over 75 percent of the variance in 
the correlation matrix. Given the exploratory nature of our 
investigation, we feel justified in accepting Hypothesis 4. 
As stated at the beginning of this section, the proposi¬ 
tion above is more difficult to test than it at first 
appears. It is possible that the test investigated the 
wrong question. The idea that stability is the appropriate 
goal of internal control does not necessarily imply that all 
stability reduces to the same dimension. For example, in 
the internal accounting control area stability may be the 
goal within accounting, authorization, and safeguarding of 
assets, not vice versa. If this is indeed the case, any 
cross-auditor differences in the definitions of those terms 
could have obscured the relationships in the tests above. 
Consider the following scenario. Although the rating 
dimensions were defined in the test booklet, the subjects 
would, of course, bring their own interpretations. It is 
quite conceivable that a subject might have an internal def- 
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inition of the accounting goal which is broader than the one 
given in the booklet (e.g., accurate recording of all events 
rather than just bona fide transactions). If this were the 
case, he might view accounting stability as unaffected when 
unauthorized transactions took place, given that they were 
recorded with accurate numbers in the right classifications. 
Of course, this explanation is purely speculatory. There 
are many limitations to the acceptance of Hypothesis 4, not 
the least of which is that the relations posited by the 
hypothesis may be wrong. Nonetheless, the marginal amount 
of support indicates that it would be inappropriate to 
reject the notion of stability as a universal control goal 
at this time. 
Propositions 3-6 
In Chapter VII, a methodology employing multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was introduced without much 
explanation or discussion. MANOVA is the basic analytical 
technique used in the tests of the hypotheses based on Prop¬ 
ositions 3-6. It is appropriate that the rationale behind 
that approach now be discussed in some depth. 
MANOVA is a statistical technique designed to examine 
"... the 'realness' of the differences among the population 
centroids or mean vectors" [Cooley and Lohnes (1971, p. 
224)] based on a set of observations on a dependent vector, 
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or group of variables. Propositions 3-6 involve predictions 
about differences in the mean ratings of auditor-subjects 
given the presence or absence of certain cues in various 
hypothetical settings. Hence, the analysis of these pre¬ 
dictions is well matched to the application of MANOVA. 
The hypotheses derived from those four propositions 
define the following linear model for MANOVA, written in 
matrix notation.^" 
Y, . = M + H + E 
_ki_ 
where: 
Y^ is the vector of dependent variable scores on 
case k for subject i. 
M is the vector of grand means of the dependent 
variables. 
H is the vector of hypothesis effects, which is 
composed of main effects and interaction effects. 
E is the vector of errors. 
The analyses below are based on the results of a four 
sample, repeated measures, four-way factorial MANOVA with 
treatments defined as environmental constraints, system 
The model is only outlined here. MANOVA is directly 
analogous to ANOVA in its formulation. For more information 
on the computations involved in MANOVA, the interested 
reader is referred to Bock [1975] , Cooley & Lohnes [1971], 
and Tatsuoka [1971]. 
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boundary constraints, feedback regulators, programmatic reg¬ 
ulators, and all first-order interactions. The four samples 
are defined by the different booklet versions. 
The expectation expressed by each hypothesis to be tested 
below is that the mean vectors at each level of the hypoth¬ 
esized effect (i.e., the presence or absence of each treat¬ 
ment) will (or, for one proposition's hypotheses, will not) 
differ significantly from the grand centroid. The signifi¬ 
cance of such differences is determined through the use of 
an exact F-ratio based on Wilks' Lambda. Under this 
approach, differences in mean vectors are determined by the 
relationship between the dispersion in the ratings due to 
error and the sum of the dispersions due to the hypothesized 
effect and error. This relationship is calculated through 
the ratio of the determinants of the sum-of-squares-and- 
cross-products (SSCP) matrices so defined: 
SE 
SE + SH. 
As the hypothesized effect becomes smaller in relation to 
the error effect, the ratio approaches 1. Thus, a Lambda of 
1 indicates no hypothesis effect and smaller values indicate 
larger hypothesis effects. 
An important feature of the test, then, is the nature of 
error. The one-sample repeated measures MANOVA design may 
be viewed as a special case of the mixed model MANOVA 
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design. Subjects are considered the random factor while 
treatments are fixed factors within subjects. Due to the 
fact that observations are taken under all treatment combi¬ 
nations for each subject, a pooled within cells SSCP matrix 
based on independent observation cannot be determined. 
Thus, the significance of the random effects cannot be 
strictly determined. However, the fixed effects can be 
examined. As in the typical mixed model MANOVA, the appro¬ 
priate error matrix for the calculation of Wilks' Lambda is 
the SSCP matrix for the interaction of subjects and the 
hypothesis treatments [Tatsuoka (1971, p. 198)]. Thus, for 
example, in the test for effects due to the manipulation of 
the environmental constraints variable, Lambda equals: 
SSCPSE 
"sscpse+sscpe~ 
where SSCP indicates a sum of squares and crossproducts 
matrix [cf. note 2, supra] and the subscript E indicates the 
matrix for the environmental constraint main effects while 
the subscript SE indicates the matrix for subject-environ¬ 
mental constraint interaction effects. 
The remarks above relate to MANOVA in general. Two spe¬ 
cific features of the tests in this chapter are introduced 
below. 
In Chapter VIII, our interest was in rating behavior dif- 
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ferences across auditors. In this chapter we investigate 
differences across rating situations. Such a perspective 
implicitly requires an examination of similarities across 
our auditor subjects. The hypothesis tests in Chapter VIII 
indicated that there is a lack of uniformity in the audi¬ 
tors' actual ratings. Since the rating scale was "open,” 
the subjects were able to set their own neutral (zero) 
points as well as the sensitivity of the scale (i.e., the 
'value' of a one point change in ratings). In order to iso¬ 
late relative rating similiarities from unique scale inter¬ 
pretations in the following hypothesis tests, we will employ 
ratings which have been standardized within each subject. 
Thus, each subject's transformed score is equal to the dif¬ 
ference between his original rating and his grand mean rat¬ 
ing, divided by the standard deviation for his set of rat¬ 
ings. 
Since the four booklet versions comprise a between sub¬ 
jects factor, the error matrices in each hypothesis test are 
pooled across the four versions. 
In the previous MANOVA analyses, the assumptions underly¬ 
ing the centroids tests were generally ignored. Here, how¬ 
ever, the issue deserves closer attention. 
MANOVA involves two general assumptions. First, the 
observed dependent vectors are assumed to be independent 
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random samples from a multivariate normal distribution. 
Second, it is assumed that the error SSCP matrix is propor¬ 
tional estimate of a single common population covariance 
matrix. 
In the MANOVA tests in this chapter, the dependent 
hypothesis vectors can be viewed as the mean observation 
vectors of 30 independent mean observation vectors. Thus, 
the multivariate central limit theorem would indicate that 
the dependent vectors employed in each hypothesis test at 
least begin to approximate a multivariate normal distribu¬ 
tion [Bock (1975, p. 111-112)]. Furthermore, Ito [1969] and 
Korin [1972] have each reported that non-normality has lit¬ 
tle effect on the centroids test. 
Since each of the treatments in this study vary through 
only two levels and all observations are made on the same 
pool of subjects, each error matrix is by definition propor¬ 
tional to the estimate of a single common covariance matrix. 
Indeed, Jerome L. Myers [personal communication] has pointed 
out that the analysis of a multivariate repeated measures 
design with all treatments having only two levels reduces to 
2 
a series of simple Hotelling matched pair T analyses. 
Under this view, main effects tests are tests of differences 
and interaction effects tests are tests of differences 
between differences. 
Thus, the MANOVA tests for equality of centroids used in 
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this chapter are congruent with the underlying assumptions. 
In addition to the examination of centroids called for by 
the hypotheses, the rest of this chapter also includes an 
examination of variability of ratings across treatments. 
Although no hypotheses about variability were presented in 
this thesis, such information is interesting in itself since 
it may be interpretable in terms of rater uncertainty and/or 
inter-rater consensus. MANOVA tests on absolute deviations 
will be used to examine variation equality in each case. In 
2 
this chapter. Hotelling's matched T analyses will be used 
for this purpose since they allow a direct examination of 
the source of departures from parallelism. This process is 
strictly exploratory. No conclusions about the actual dif¬ 
ferences in variability of ratings can be presented. None¬ 
theless, this 'snooping' may be of value in determining the 
direction of future research. 
Having covered the methodology to be used in the follow¬ 
ing tests in some depth, we now turn to those analyses, 
themselves. 
Proposition 3_. 
The third proposition introduced in Chapter V was: 
P^: All constraints and regulators will have significant 
individual effects on auditors' judgments. 
Four hypotheses were devised to test this proposition. 
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Hj.: -Environmental constraints will have a significant 
main effect in the analysis of the auditors' judg¬ 
ments . 
Hg: System boundary constraints will have a significant 
main effect in the analysis of the auditors' judg¬ 
ments . 
H_: Feedback regulators will have a significant main 
effect in the analysis of the auditors' judgments. 
Kg: Programmatic regulators will have a significant main 
effect in the analysis of the auditors' judgments. 
If the systems model has any validity, the auditor-sub¬ 
jects' ratings should reflect sensitivity to manipulation of 
the four basic independent variables. 
Analytical approach. 
The tests of Hypotheses 5-8 employ the MANOVA methodology 
discussed above, as the use of the term 'main effect' would 
indicate. 
Tests of Hypotheses 5-8. 
The relevant results from the MANOVA plus results from 
the associated variability tests are summarized in Table 14, 
below. 
Null hypotheses for equality of centroids for all four 
main effects were rejected at a significance of p<.0001, 
well beyond our criterion of 5 percent. 
Discussion. 
Based on the above analyses, then, Hypotheses 5-8 are all 
accepted without reservation. The tests indicated that the 
manipulation of the main causative variables in the model 
163 
Test for Equality of Centroids 
Source* Lambda F-value d. f. P > F 
EC .4155 11.2520 3, 24 . 0001 
SBC .1064 67.1924 3, 24 . 0001 
FR . 0686 108.5428 3, 24 .0001 
PR .1085 65.7393 3, 24 .0001 
Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations 
Source T-squared F-value d. f. V
 
EC 3.502 1.4792 3, 237 .2194 
SBC 29.037 2.6328 3, 237 . 0498 
FR 7.726 6.2926 3, 237 . 0005 
PR 7.704 2.8664 3 / 237 . 0368 
* EC : Environmental Constraint 
SBC : System Boundary Constraint 
FR : Feedback Regulator 
PR : Programmatic Regulator 
Table 14 
Tests of Main Effects of Independent Variables 
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resulted in significant differences in the ratings. We thus 
conclude that each of these variables (environmental con¬ 
straints, system boundary constraints, feedback regulators, 
and programmatic regulators) has some consensual validity. 
The ratings demonstrate that the auditor subjects behaved as 
if they believed that the presence or absence of each vari¬ 
able would have an effect on the quality of internal 
accounting control. 
Of course, it is possible that the subjects reacted to 
the manipulation of these variables simply because the 
design of the task 'told’ them that they should. However, 
three subjects reported in the debriefing section of the 
booklet that the presence or absence of corporate ethical 
standards (the operationalization of environmental con¬ 
straints in this study) had little or no effect on their 
ratings. Actual review of their ratings verified this 
claim. Thus, in some instances at least, there is evidence 
that subject ratings are due to the subject's understanding 
of the conceptual situations and not his perceptions of the 
expectations of the experimenter. 
The environmental constraint effect deserves some addi¬ 
tional scrutiny. Although the effect was highly signifi¬ 
cant, the size of the effect was relatively small in compar- 
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ison to the other main effects. (Its eta-squared was .58 as 
2 
opposed to .89, .93, and .89 for the other main effects.) 
One possible explanation for this is the fact that the 
operationalization of this variable in the experiment (cor¬ 
porate code of ethics) may have been interpreted by some of 
the subjects as a psuedo-constraint. The use of a code of 
ethics in this study was motivated by its frequent emphasis 
in CAR and SACIAC. However, the existence of such a code 
does not, in itself, foster compliance. In fact, in a study 
of the 'state of the art' in internal control published 
after the collection of data for the present study, Bernard 
J. White [1980b, p. 389] concluded that some extant codes 
are "... haphazard in design, superficial in content, and 
packaged ... in a fashion which clearly does not encourage 
serious reading or facilitate understanding." He interprets 
management's intentions in such cases as simply "... a pro 
forma gesture ..." [p. 389] to be used to disavow culpabil¬ 
ity for the unethical or illegal conduct of any of the com¬ 
pany's employees. White believes that employees see through 
such charades easily. It is reasonable to assume that audi¬ 
tors would be able to make similar judgments. Thus some 
2 
Wilks multivariate generalization of Fisher's eta- 
squared multiple correlation coefficient is equal to 
1-lambda. Wilks [1932] originally proposed this statistic 
as a summary measure of the amount of variance in the depen¬ 
dent vector accounted for by the independent variable. 
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subjects might have downplayed the importance of the code of 
ethics in the absence of more information about its 'packag¬ 
ing'. 
2 
T tests on these treatments revealed interesting results 
except in the case of environmental constraints. The pres¬ 
ence of the system boundary constraint variable, the feed¬ 
back regulator variable, and the programmatic regulator 
variable apparently reduced uncertainty (i.e., increased 
subject consensus) as indicated in the across-the-board 
reduction in rating variances. 
Given this information, it seems that the presence or 
absence of these variables had secondary effects on the 
variability of the subjects' ratings as well as the primary 
effect on ratings means. 
Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4 dealt with the contingent effects of con¬ 
straints : 
P.: Auditor judgments will display an interaction effect 
between environmental constraints and system bound¬ 
ary constraints that is less than the sum of their 
individual effects. 
Two hypotheses were drawn from this statement. 
Hg: Auditor judgments will display a significant inter¬ 
action effect between environmental constraints and 
system boundary constraints. 
167 
q: The mean judgment ratings for environmental 
constraints crossed with system boundary constraints 
will be less than the sum of their mean main 
effects. 
Analytical approach. 
Once again the MANOVA methodology discussed above was 
used to test Hypothesis 9. Hypothesis 10 is really a corol¬ 
lary to Hypothesis 9 and is simply examined by the calcula¬ 
tion of differences between the present/present group means 
and the sum of the differences between the present main 
effects mean vectors and the grand mean vector. 
Tests of Hypotheses 9-10. 
The same factorial MANOVA again supplied the evidence to 
2 
test Hypothesis 9. T tests were also run on the rating 
data grouped by the four constraint combinations. The rele¬ 
vant results from these tests are summarized in Table 15. 
Discussion. 
The centroids test indicates that the mean vectors are 
not significantly different. Therefore, although the direc¬ 
tion of the differences in the test of Hypothesis 10 are in 
the expected direction, the lack of support for Hypothesis 9 
does not allow the acceptance of either hypothesis. We 
indicated earlier that the operationalization of environmen¬ 
tal constraints in this study may have been a weak one. 
This may partially account for the absence of a significant 
constraints interaction effect. 
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Tests On Centroids 
A. Equality of Centroids (Hypothesis 9) 
Source Lambda F-value d. f. P > F 
ECxSBC . 9007 .8819 3, 24 .4665 
B. Direction 
Ef feet 
of Differences (Hypothesis 10) 
Dependent Variable 
Authorization Accounting Safeguarding 
EC, Main . 3007 .0615 .0688 
SBC, Main . 7661 .1686 .1973 
Sum of Mains 1.0668 . 2301 . 2661 
Interaction (.9725) ( .2166) ( .3080) 
Int. < Sum . 0943 .0135 -.0419 
Exploratory Test for Equality of Mean Dispersions 
Source* T-squared F-value d. f. P > F 
SBC/EC 1.5509 . 5083 3, 117 .6814 
EC/SBC 1.1966 . 3921 3, 117 . 7620 
* Bar notation (/) is used to denote, for A/B, 
"A level differences across levels of B" 
Table 15 
Test of Constraints' Interaction Effects 
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2 
The T test implied that variability of ratings was about 
equivalent for the four conditions. That is, mean absolute 
deviations were not significantly different for the systems 
boundary constraint differences under the presence or 
absence of the environmental constraint variable, or vice 
versa. Thus, the presence or absence of one constraint did 
not seem to affect auditor consensus on the meaning of the 
other constraint. 
Proposition 5. 
The fifth proposition in Chapter V defined a negative 
expectation: 
P;.: Auditor judgments will not display any significant 
interactive effects between constraints and regula¬ 
tors . 
The following four hypotheses were derived from this 
proposition. 
H,,s Auditor judgments will not display any significant 
interaction effects between environmental con¬ 
straints and feedback regulators. 
Auditor judgments will not display any significant 
interaction effects betweeen environmental con¬ 
straints and programmatic regulators. 
H,.>: Auditor judgments will not display any significant 
interaction effects between system boundary con¬ 
straints and feedback regulators. 
Auditor judgments will not display any significant 
interaction effects between system boundary con¬ 
straints and programmatic regulators. 
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Analytical approach. 
The now familiar MANOVA approach was used to test for the 
lack of effects posited above. Recall from the discussion 
of the approach used in the tests of the first three hypoth¬ 
eses that testing such negative expectations is less 
straightforward than testing for significant differences. 
However, we will proceed as if the situations were exactly 
the same and simply 'invert' the outcome of the usual null 
hypothesis test. 
Tests of Hypotheses 11-14. 
The set of first-order interactions defined by the 
hypotheses above were tested through the repeated measures 
2 
MANOVA discussed earlier. The associated T tests were also 
performed. The results of these analyses are presented in 
Table 16. 
Discussion. 
The null hypotheses of significant centroids effects for 
all the constraints/regulators interactions can clearly be 
rejected. Therefore Hypotheses 11 through 14 are accepted. 
These results tell us very little in themselves. Based 
on the results of the judgment experiments reviewed in Chap¬ 
ter III, we would have to conclude that the prior probabil¬ 
ity of finding interactions in this study was quite low. 
Nonetheless, these interaction tests yielded insignificant 
eta-squares of .01, .12, .03, and .22. They add to the evi- 
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Tests for Equality of Centroids 
Source Lambda F-value d. f. 
i i i i 
V
 
ECxFR . 9887 . 0917 3, 24 ' .9590 
ECxPR . 8800 1.0910 3, 24 . 3728 
SBCxFR . 9721 .2300 3, 24 . 8739 
SBCxPR . 7875 2.15 3, 24 . 1180 
Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations 
Source* T-squared F-value d. f. 
i 
V
 
FR/EC 3.7619 1.2329 3, 117 . 3006 
EC/FR 1.8206 . 5967 3, 117 . 6224 
PR/EC 4.0591 1.3303 3, 117 . 2671 
EC/PR 5.4135 1.7742 3, 117 .1541 
SBC/FR . 8379 . 2746 3, 117 . 8444 
FR/SBC 3.7596 1.2321 3, 117 . 3009 
SBC/PR 3.0361 . 9950 3, 117 . 3990 
PR/SBC 2.1069 . 6905 3, 117 . 5632 
Table 16 
Tests of Constraints-Regulators Interaction Effects 
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dence supporting a general congruence between the relation¬ 
ships prescribed in the systems model and the evaluation 
behavior of the auditor subjects. 
2 
T tests for all interactions indicate no differences in 
consensus. 
Proposition 6. 
The last proposition stemming from the systems model 
posited a contingent relationship between regulator types: 
Pg: Auditor judgments will display an interactive effect 
between feedback regulators and programmatic regula¬ 
tors that is greater than the sum of their individ¬ 
ual effects. 
This prediction was decomposed into two hypotheses. 
H.^: Auditor judgments will display a significant inter¬ 
action effect between feedback regulators and pro¬ 
grammatic regulators. 
H,^: The mean judgment ratings for feedback regulators 
crossed with programmatic regulators will be greater 
than the sum of their mean main effects. 
Analytical approach. 
The same method was used to test the hypotheses in this 
case as was used in the case of Hypotheses 9 and 10. 
Tests of Hypotheses 15-16. 
The factorial MANOVA again provided the vehicle to test 
2 
the hypothesis of significant interaction effects. A T 
test was run on the data grouped by regulator combinations. 
Table 17 supplies the particulars for the tests of these 
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Tests on Centroids 
A. Equality of Centroids (Hypothesis 15) 
Source Lambda P-value d.f. ? > F 
FRxPR .7434 2.7619 3, 24 .0633 
B. Direction of Differences (Hypothesis 16) 
Effect Dependent Variable 
Authorization Accounting Safeguarding 
FR, Main .2065 . 6423 .5017 
PR, Main .2154 . 5084 .4444 
Sum of Mains .4219 1.1506 . 9461 
Interaction . 4203 1.2186 . 9385 
Int. > Sum -.0016 . 0679 . 0424 
Source 
Exploratory Test for Equality of Mean 
T-squared F-value d.f. 
Deviations 
P > F 
FR/PR 
PR/FR 
1.7722 .5808 3, 117 
7.8438 2.5707 3, 117 
.6328 
. 0566 
Table 17 
Tests of Regulators' Interaction Effects 
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hypotheses. 
Discussion. 
The centroids test indicated a significant interaction 
effect just short of the standard criterion alpha of .05. 
Furthermore, the direction of differences agrees with that 
predicted by Hypothesis 16 (with a minor exception in the 
ratings on the authorization variable). Since the tests 
here are a first attempt at investigating the systems model, 
we consider the synergistic effect of the two outcomes suf¬ 
ficient to allow acceptance of hypotheses 15 and 16. 
The finding* of an interaction effect here deserves some 
discussion. As in the case of an interaction in ANOVA, 
interaction effects indicate a significant departure from 
parallelism, which, in turn, indicates that examination of 
the associated main effects may be uninterpretable. This is 
due to the fact that a significant interaction means that 
the behavior of each variable under scrutiny strictly 
depends upon the level of the other variable. 
An examination of the lack of parallelism discovered 
here, however, reveals that this formal restriction is not 
of consequence in this case. 
Figure 6 shows that, under all regulator levels and on 
all dependent variables, the slope of the line for the 
change in a regulator's presence is positive. Thus, the 
main effect for each of the regulator factors still holds in 
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the broad sense. 
Figure 6 also shows that the interaction is due to rat¬ 
ings on accounting and safeguarding scales. In both cases 
for the authorization variable, the difference between the 
means only increases by a standard score value of .0058 from 
one regulator environment to the other. It also demon¬ 
strates that the interaction, as hypothesized, is due to 
feedback and programmatic regulators enhancing each others1 
effects. That is, the end points of each pair of lines are 
farther apart in the 'present' environment than in the 'ab¬ 
sent' environment. In each of the accounting and safeguard¬ 
ing cases, the change in the difference between means in 
approximately .25. 
This finding fits quite well into the overall pattern of 
congruence between the predictions of the systems model and 
the rating behavior of the subject sample. The impact of 
this support is probably greater than that supplied by any 
other single hypothesis test in this thesis. The configural 
use of cues has often been subjectively reported in judgment 
experiments. However, it has been quite elusive in the 
mathematical analysis of those judgments. It is logical 
that such effects will be found only in instances where they 
'make sense' in the given judgment task. 
The systems model's prediction of this interactive effect 
was logically deduced from a set of general premises. Thus, 
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the indication of such effects constitutes substantial sup¬ 
port for the model. The fact that the analysis used to 
detect this effect was based on an implied consensus of a 
pool of judges reinforces that support. 
2 
The results of the T test indicate that significant dif¬ 
ferences may exist among the mean absolute deviations of 
standardized ratings for programmatic regulation depending 
upon the presence or absence of feedback regulation. 
Interpretation of the Second Research Question Test Results 
The intent of this chapter was an assessment of the abil¬ 
ity of the predictions of the systems model of internal 
accounting control to capture the rating behavior of the 
auditor-subjects in this experiment. The five propositions 
derived from that model were tested via 13 hypotheses. The 
results of those tests are summarized in Table 18. 
The systems model proved to be a relatively good pre¬ 
dictor of the rating behavior of the subjects involved in 
this study. Only in the case of Hypothesis 9 were the 
results clearly not congruent with the spirit of the propo¬ 
sitions. In four cases, analyses of mean absolute devia¬ 
tions indicated that manipulation of independent variables 
had affected the variability of the auditor-subject ratings. 
Although no a priori expectations about variability of judg- 
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Hypothesis Status 
4: Auditor's ratings on the three depend¬ 
ent variables will be captured by a 
single underlying dependent factor. 
Accepted 
5: Environmental constraints will have a 
significant main effect in the analysis 
of auditor's judgments. 
Accepted 
6: System boundary constraints will have a 
significant main effect in the analysis 
of auditor's judgments. 
Accepted 
7: Feedback regulators will have a signifi¬ 
cant main effect in the analysis of 
auditor's judgments 
Accepted 
8: Programmatic regulators will have a 
significant main effect in the analysis 
of auditor's judgments. 
Accepted 
9: Auditor judgments will display a signifi¬ 
cant interaction effect between environ¬ 
mental constraints and system boundary 
cons traints. 
Not Accepted 
10: The mean judgment ratings for environ¬ 
mental constraints crossed with system 
boundary constraints will be less than 
the sum of their mean main effects. 
Not Accepted 
11: Auditor judgments will not display any 
significant interaction effects between 
environmental constraints and feedback 
regulators. 
Accepted 
12: Auditor judgments will not display any 
significant interaction effects between 
environmental constraints and program¬ 
matic regulators. 
Accepted 
Table 18 
Summary of Research Findings 
of Hypotheses Related to the 
for the Tests 
Systems Model 
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Hypothesis Status 
13: Auditor judgments will not display any 
significant interaction effects between 
system boundary constraints and feedback 
regulators. 
Accepted 
14: Auditor judgments will not display any 
significant interaction effects between 
system ooundary constraints and program¬ 
matic regulators. 
Accepted 
15: Auditor judgments will display a signifi¬ 
cant interaction effect between feedback 
regulators and programmatic regulators. 
16: The mean judgment rating for feedback 
regulators crossed with programmatic 
regulators will be greater than the sum 
of their mean main effects. 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Table 18 
Summary of Research Findings for the Tests 
of Hypotheses Related to the Systems Model 
(continued) 
182 
ments were offered in this thesis, it is intuitively 
appealing to account for the detected differences in disper¬ 
sion in terms of rater uncertainty. 
Following a line of reasoning similar to that of Ijiri 
and Jaedicke [1966], we can view the amount of consensus 
among auditors on a judgment as an indication of relative 
certainty. Thus, when the dispersion of judgments is 
smaller in situation A than in situation B, we can surmise 
that there is more certainty or agreement about the meaning 
of the cues in situation A than in situation B. 
For the main effects, the resulting interpretation is 
fairly straightforward. The only difference between the two 
sets of cases was the presence or absence of the system 
boundary constraint or one of the regulator variables. 
Thus, the presence of the variable must have reduced uncer¬ 
tainty about the stability of the internal accounting con¬ 
trol system in the cases, since the mean deviation for the 
'present' condition was less than that of the 'absent' con¬ 
dition . 
A general explanation for the regulator interaction was 
offered above. The problem in the interpretation of that 
interaction lies in determining the source of the difference 
in uncertainty. Does the difference parallel a true differ¬ 
ence in interpretability or is it due simply to a halo 
effect? The question cannot be resolved here, but it is a 
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rather important one since it bears directly on the issue of 
auditor consensus. This is a problem worthy of further 
investigation. 
The discussion above has been concerned with the effects 
that features of the evaluation situation have on auditor 
consensus. Another perspective on auditor consensus is 
addressed in the next chapter. In that series of analyses, 
the effects of various auditor demographics in mediating 
consensus are examined. 
CHAPTER X 
POST HOC ANALYSIS OF 
BACKGROUND EFFECTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to report on certain 
after-the-fact explorations of the ratings data. These 
explorations are concerned with the differences across audi¬ 
tor judgments on identical sets of cases where ratings are 
grouped according to the subjects' demographic attributes. 
No models were used to suggest what the sources of those 
differences might be. Rather, the explorations were guided 
by the results of prior research on internal accounting con¬ 
trol evaluation and by deduction. The hypotheses which were 
tested in the preceding chapters were model-driven. How¬ 
ever, all of those hypotheses were concerned with the simi¬ 
larities in the judgments of the auditor subjects (i.e., 
parallels across auditors). In this chapter, we are inter¬ 
ested in examining how differences among auditors lead to 
differences in their judgments. 
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Prior investigations of such differences have generally- 
lacked model-based hypotheses.1 This may be accounted for by 
two facts: 
1) Normative auditing theory does not address the issue 
of individual differences in the application of pro¬ 
fessional judgment; and 
2) Most theories of individual behavior and/or decision 
making are either too vague or too limited to be unam¬ 
biguously applied to the complex task of audit judg¬ 
ment. 
These barriers prevented the development of useful 
hypotheses about individual differences in judgment behavior 
in the current study as well. Therefore, the analyses below 
and any explanations offered for the observed results must 
be regarded as no more than contemplation and conjecture. 
The objective of this activity is to develop some useful 
generalizations about factors that mediate internal account¬ 
ing control evaluation judgment. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section reviews the earlier research which motivated the 
present analyses. It also outlines the logic of the analyt¬ 
ical approach used here and distinguishes it from that of 
those prior studies. The second section reports the out- 
1The only previous major studies on internal accounting 
control evaluation that have tested specific hypotheses have 
been Mock and Turner [1979] and Weber [1977]. Even in those 
investigations, however, the hypotheses did not spring from 
any overt, unifying theory. They were apparently drawn only 
from 'common sense' and the results of other research. 
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comes of the demographic effects tests for this study. 
Those results which are deemed to be more reliable or to 
illustrate potentially useful generalizations are presented 
in detail. The remaining results are only given a cursory 
review. The final section of this chapter summarizes and 
integrates the possible explanations and implications of the 
more important results. 
Examining Demographic Effects 
The statement that differences between individuals lead 
to differences in their decisions sounds nearly tautologi¬ 
cal. Considering the great variety of experiences and psy¬ 
chological traits that individuals apply to decisions, it 
may be surprising that their decisions are ever similar at 
all. 
Prior studies on internal accounting control evaluation 
have looked into the effects of both demographic and psycho¬ 
logical variables. Mixed results have been obtained and no 
consistent pattern of effects has yet emerged. A review of 
the major investigations in the area may help to identify 
the sources of the conflicting results. 
Ashton [1973J examined the effects of audit experience 
and firm affiliation on summary decision weight estimates 
(standardized regression coefficients and R-squared values). 
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He found that groups defined by firm affiliation were 
2 
"remarkably similar" [1973, p. 133] in terms of mean R val¬ 
ues. However, he found an indication of some differences 
when examining the sum of the average beta weights for the 
two most important independent variables (both related to 
segregation of duties). Ashton also found similar results 
for grouping by years of audit experience, although the 
indication of differences was weak. 
The firm differences seemed to cleave along the distinc¬ 
tion between local and regional/national firms. Local firm 
auditors placed less weight on the two segregation of duties 
variables. Ashton posited that this effect was due to the 
typical client profile for each type of firm. Local audi¬ 
tors were more likely to see small clients whose size might 
force them to collapse control-incompatible tasks into sin¬ 
gle positions. Thus, these auditors would have had to 
'learn' to place more emphasis on other internal control 
techniques and procedures. 
In terms of experience, Ashton found that his high expe¬ 
rience group (>_4 years) relied less on the segregation of 
duties variables than the other groups (1, 2, and 3 years). 
He suggested that this might be due to a better understand¬ 
ing of the critical control relationships on the part of the 
more experienced auditors. However, it is important to 
note that auditors typically do not have primary resposibil- 
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ity for internal accounting control evaluations until their 
third year. Thus, Ashton's examination seems to have 
focused on the distinction between little and no evaluation 
experience. 
Joyce [1976] investigated firm affiliation differences. 
He reported that firm affiliation seemed to affect decision 
weights for one of his five independent variables [1976, p. 
52]. All of his subjects came from Chicago vicinity offices 
of national firms. He offered no explanation for the 
observed differences. 
Mock and Turner [1979] examined years of audit and non¬ 
audit experience, the profile of typical clients, and audi¬ 
tor special/advanced training. Based on univariate analyses 
of mean planned audit sampling sizes for four different 
audit tests, they found suggestions of effects for both 
kinds of experience, but not for client profile or auditor 
training. Again, no explanations were offered for these 
results. Mock and Turner, like Ashton, used subjects of 
relatively little audit experience (78 percent under 4.5 
years), 
Weber [1977] tested hypotheses relating audit experience, 
dogmatism, and risk-taking propensity to the accuracy of 
probability distribution estimates for inventory dollar 
errors, the average range of those estimated distributions, 
decision time, decision confidence, extent of audit plan, 
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and decision flexibility. He found significant effects for 
experience versus raw materials inventory accuracy and 
extent of audit plan. However, both of these were opposite 
in direction from the hypothesized effects. Dogmatism was 
related to a significant effect on one of eleven dependent 
measures. Risk-taking propensity paralleled significant 
differences in four of six tests, but in each instance the 
direction of the effect was the opposite of the one hypoth¬ 
esized . 
Of the studies cited above, only Weber [1977] posited any 
a priori expectations about the effects of individual dif¬ 
ferences. Even these were drawn, to a large extent, from 
2 
intuition. Furthermore, none of these studies offered any 
detailed ex post hypotheses for the effects found except for 
Ashton [1973]. 
The investigation of individual difference effects 
described below was also performed without hypotheses. In 
fact, these analyses were only secondary objectives in the 
design of the current study. Nonetheless, some interesting 
patterns emerged in the investigations which seem to be 
2 
Weber's hypotheses were apparently based on the 
results of prior studies on decision making. After review¬ 
ing a broad list of variables studied, he summarized his own 
selection of factors to be tested by stating "...[my] intui¬ 
tion prevaled in the choice of variables investigated" 
[1977, p. 35]. 
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accounted for by useful generalizations. 
The analyses here are too rudamentary to be directly con¬ 
cerned with intervening psychological variables. Since we 
are involved in basic, exploratory analyses we care only to 
find out if groups of subjects classified under certain 
objectively defined attributes produce different ratings. 
Therefore, the analyses below study only the ratings vectors 
produced by the auditor subjects grouped only by demographic 
classes. 
Nine attribute categories are involved, as given in chap¬ 
ter VI: 
1) Firm 
2) Rank 
3) Office location 
4) Number of years audit experience 
5) Number of years commercial experience 
6) Client size experience 
7) Client mix experience 
8) Types of specialized training 
9) Internal accounting control evaluation experience 
Items 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were adapted from the studies 
cited above. Items 2, 3, and 9 were added to provide a 
slight reorientation of perspective for examining possible 
experience and client exposure effects. 
Two aspects of differences in auditor judgments are 
explored here. One kind of analysis is performed on group 
centroids. The other kind is performed on group variabil¬ 
ity. The logic behind these analyses is as follows. 
The centroids tents ask if the mean ratings vectors dif- 
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fer significantly based on the demographic groupings. These 
tests seek to determine whether the various demographic 
characteristics mediate the judgment values. Significant 
differences of this kind indicate that the members of each 
group make different decisons, on average, than their count¬ 
erparts in other groups. 
The variability tests ask if the level of agreement among 
auditors differs from group to group. These tests seek to 
determine whether the various demographic attributes mediate 
the consensus of decisions within groups. Such information 
is desirable for two reasons. First, our discussions of 
ideal expertise suggest that greater auditor judgment con¬ 
sensus is preferable to less consensus. High consensus sup¬ 
ports a conclusion that auditors are reliably interchange¬ 
able measurement 'instruments.' Second, auditor consensus 
can be viewed as a surrogate for objectiivity, as Ijiri and 
Jaedicke [1966] have proposed. This use of the notion of 
objectivity is based on the accountant's definition, i.e., 
verifiability by an independent observer [Ijiri and Jaedicke 
(1966, p. 476)]. Individual judges will give highly similar 
evaluations of the same object or event only if they share 
an effectively similar "measurement system" [Ijiri and Jae¬ 
dicke (1966, p. 476)]. Thus, relatively more consensus 
within one demographic group than another may indicate that 
the shared attribute within that group has enhanced the 
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development of a single and well defined measurement model. 
The use of the two tests resulted in at least one signif¬ 
icant finding on each of three of the demographic dimen¬ 
sions. These results are discussed below. 
Results of Demographic Analyses 
The ex_ post analyses revealed four major findings related 
to the nine attribute dimensions explored. The major find¬ 
ings, by attribute, were: 
1) Significant centroid differences by firm affiliation; 
2) Significant centroid and variability differences by 
rank and years of audit experience; and 
3) Significant variability differences by extent of 
internal accounting control evaluation experience. 
These results are presented below in detail. First, how¬ 
ever, a review of the analytical approach is in order. 
Analytical approach. 
The centroids tests in this chapter are one way MANOVA 
analyses. The MANOVA model used here is a simple version of 
the approach used in Chapter IX. In each case, only one 
effect is tested — the main effect of the demographic vari¬ 
able under scrutiny. Also as in Chapter IX, variability of 
ratings will be examined in each case. Since there are no 
interaction effects tested, and since more than two groups 
are examined in two cases, MANOVA on the absolute deviations 
within groups is used for the variability tests instead of 
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2 
the T methodology employed in Chapter IX. 
Although the analyses are completely exploratory, the 
null hypotheses of equal centroids and equal variability 
will be considered to be rejected if the outcomes are sig¬ 
nificant at five percent. It is felt that such indications 
are worthy of further pursuit. When 'significant1 results 
occur, the potential sources of the observed differences 
will be discussed. 
Firm affiliation. 
In order to determine whether the mix of firm backgrounds 
affected the rating responses the above tests were performed 
on the rating data grouped by firm. The results of that 
analysis are summarized in Table 19. 
These results indicate that firm background does have an 
effect on the evaluation of internal accounting control (or, 
at least, it did on the ratings in the current study). 
Examination of the mean ratings by firm seems to indicate a 
trend of increasing conservatism (i.e., falling ratings) as 
the simplicity of the firm's typical evaluation method 
3 
increases (i.e., firm D to firm A). Note, however, that 
3 
Recall that the subjects' firms ranged in their stan¬ 
dard approaches to internal accounting control evaluation 
from a highly unstructured, judgmental approach (Firm A) to 
a highly structured, algorithmic approach (Firm D). See 
Chapters II and VII for details about these standard proce¬ 
dures . 
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Exploratory Test for Equality of Group Centroids 
Source Lambda F-value d. f. P > F 
Firm .9532 2.5473 9, 1153 . 0077 
Mean Ratings by Firm/Type 
Evaluation 
Firm/ Type Authorization Accounting Safeguarding 
A - Judgmental 5.021 5.083 4.398 
B - Guided 
Judgment 5.688 5.813 5.475 
C - Multi-Criteria 
Guidance 6.033 5.674 5. 313 
D - Multi-Category 
Algorithm 5.813 5.771 5.854 
Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations 
Source Lambda F-value d.f. P > F 
Firm .9887 .6002 9, 1153 . 7988 
Table 19 
Tests of Firm Affiliation Effects 
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this trend is not without exception and that in no case is 
there as much as a whole point difference between the high 
and low mean ratings. 
The multivariate eta-squared for this effect is only 
slightly above four percent (.0468). This indicates that 
firm affiliation accounts for slightly less than 5 percent 
of the within-firm variation pooled across firms. Much of 
that variation, however, must be due to the variety of eval¬ 
uation situations each subject faced. Thus, the firm affil¬ 
iation effect seems to be ‘real’ as well as statistically 
significant. 
It is interesting to note that the variabilty differences 
by firm fall well outside of our criterion of significance. 
This evidence suggests that these firms have been equally 
effective in establishing within-firm consensual evaluation 
models. This fact serves to underline the differences 
across firms. 
The mean differences may be due to something akin to 
decision confidence or risk aversion (as a company policy) 
rather than operational differences in the firms' models. 
Nonetheless, if these differences translate into different 
audit plans, the implication is that not all of these firms 
are equally efficient in their audits. 
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Subject rank and years of audit experience. 
Prior studies have indicated that some differences in 
internal accounting control evaluation behavior may be due 
to audit experience. In the current study, the level of 
subjects' audit experience was generally higher than in pre¬ 
vious investigations. As one would expect, it was also 
closely aligned with subject rank. 
Table 20 cross-classifies the subject group by the three 
ranks and four audit experience levels used to produce the 
test groupings. 
For each of these two sets of groupings one-way MANOVAs 
were run on the rating data. Table 21 contains the results 
of those tests. 
Both sets of groupings yielded significant results on 
both kinds of tests. Grouping by rank produced a more 'sig¬ 
nificant' centroids result, a higher multivariate eta- 
squared, and a less sharp distinction in terms of absolute 
deviations. A look at the mean ratings by rank and the 
associated mean absolute deviations discloses an interesting 
pattern. The seniors and managers were both more conserva¬ 
tive and less uniform in their ratings than the supervisors. 
We may speculate about the causes of these observed results 
as follows. 
Recall that prior studies have found mild indications of 
differences in judgments along the dimension of years of 
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^^"\^Rank 
Years\^_ 
Senior Supervisor Manager Total 
Number 
<5 7 0 0 7 
5-6 0 5 2 7 
6-7 0 2 5 7 
>7 0 2 7 9 
Total Number 7 9 14 30 
Range of 
Years 3-4.5 5-7 5.5-17 3-17 
Average of 
Years 3.94 5.61 7.61 6.03 
Table 20 
Cross-Classification of Subjects 
by Rank and Years of Audit Experience 
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Exploratory Tests for Equality of Group Centroids 
Source Lambda F-value d.f. P > F 
Rank . 9620 3.0995 6, 950 . 0053 
Yrs of 
Audit . 9636 1.9652 9, 1153 .0399 
Experience 
Group 
Mean Ratings by Group 
Authorization Accounting Safeguarding 
Senior 5.5625 5.6339 5.2411 
Supervisor 5.9236 6.1181 5.8542 
Manager 5.7366 5.4509 5.5313 
< 4 yrs. 5.5625 5.6339 5.2411 
5 yrs. 5.4643 5.6518 5.4196 
6 yrs. 6.2321 5.9375 6.0000 
_> 7 yrs. 5.7500 5.5833 5.5764 
Table 21 
Tests of Rank and Years of Audit Experience Effects 
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Exploratory Tests for Equality of Mean Deviations 
Source Lambda F-value d.f. 
l 
T
) 
V
 
Rank . 9740 2.1032 6, 950 . 0501 
Years of 
Aud i t . 9424 3.1606 9, 1153 .0010 
Experience 
Mean Absolute Deviations by Group 
Group Authorization Accounting Safeguarding 
Senior 2.0379 1.8208 1.7047 
Supervisor 1.5965 1.5290 1.5177 
Manager 1.8884 1.7501 1.6116 
< 4 yrs. 2.0379 1.8208 1.7047 
5 yrs. 1.7526 1.8203 1.6932 
6 yrs. 1.7679 1.7076 1.8036 
> 7 yrs. 1.7917 1.6400 1.3574 
Table 21 
Tests of Rank and Years of Audit Experience Effects 
(Continued) 
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experience. Audit experience is assuredly associated with 
some learning effects, which might account for increased 
consensus with increasing experience levels. Relatively new 
auditors may also tend to be overly conservative in their 
evaluations until they become confident in their judgment. 
Beyond some threshold, however, such experience differ¬ 
ences should begin to diminish. At that point, experience 
may become secondary to responsibilities or evaluation goals 
in determining inter-auditor differences. Since the indi¬ 
viduals called supervisors in this study are typically oper¬ 
ational leaders, their primary concerns are probably short¬ 
term efficiency and output. Their responsibilities may lead 
them to risk higher reliance on internal controls during the 
audit. Their concentration on immediate goals may mediate 
greater consensus. 
Managers, however, hold broader responsibilities and 
long-term firm goals. Audit risk concerns are more salient 
to them. These concerns may cause them to become more con¬ 
servative. The greater uncertainty they face from their 
broader perspectives may reduce consensus. 
Therefore, both rank and years of audit experience may be 
real mediators of evaluation behavior due to the fact that 
they surrogate intervening variables of learning, responsi¬ 
bility (attention direction), and decision goals. Of 
course, the scheme above is purely speculative. However, it 
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seems to be worthy of consideration. 
Subjects1 control evaluation experience. 
If experience is truly a critical determinant in evalua¬ 
tion behavior, then internal control evaluation experience 
might be the most appropriate type of experience to examine. 
Obviously, the extent of such experience is positively 
correlated with both rank and extent of general audit expe¬ 
rience. Thus, the tests on this demographic variable were 
erected around the distinction between slight and extensive 
evaluation experience. A criterion of ten occasions of pri¬ 
mary evaluation responsibility was chosen to discriminate 
between these two classes. Thus, the analyses below were 
conducted on low experience (£10 times, n=ll) versus high 
experience (£11 times, n=19). The results appear in Table 
22. 
The centroids test misses the five percent alpha cri¬ 
terion by only a third of a point, but the multivariate 
eta-squared is less than a tenth of a percent. Questions of 
formal significance aside, no 'real' difference seems to 
exist. 
There does seem to be a real difference in variability, 
though. A look at the mean absolute deviations indicates 
that the basic difference between the two groups is that the 
more experienced evaluators agree with each other more. 
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Exploratory Test for Equality of Group Centroids 
Source Lambda F-value d.f. P > F 
Evaluation 
Experience .9993 .1158 3, 476 .0536 
Exploratory Test for Equality of Mean Deviations 
Source Lambda F-value d.f. P > F 
Evaluation 
Experience .9630 6.0939 3, 476 .0005 
Mean Absolute Deviations by Group 
Group Authorization Accounting Safeguarding 
Low 2.1152 1.8547 1.8161 
High 1.6859 1.6696 1.5291 
Table 22 
Tests of Evaluation Experience Effects 
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Thus, perhaps evaluation experience simply makes the 
auditor more consistent, since with only minor differences 
in ratings centroids across the groups, mean accuracy does 
not seem to be an issue. This result fits in well with Web¬ 
er's conclusion that "... experience contributes only 
slightly to decision accuracy" [1977, p. 175]. 
Conclusions 
The analyses presented above indicate that there are a 
variety of background influences that affect an auditor's 
evaluation of internal accounting control, at least in the 
context of the present study. The background variables 
investigated here were due to experience and learning as 
opposed to personality or intelligence. 
The implications of the significant effects detected in 
the analyses above cannot be assessed in any simple way. No 
a priori hypotheses about background variable effects were 
presented in this thesis. Nonetheless, some speculations 
about the potential sources of detected differences were 
included in the discussions above. 
Those conjectures extend two basic generalizations: 
1) The environment in which evaluations take place (the 
auditor's firm and his position or responsibilities in 
it) may have a pervasive influence on the evaluation; 
and 
2) The experience that the auditor brings to the engage¬ 
ment may determine the consistency with which he eval¬ 
uates internal accounting control. 
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The indication of demographic effects is important since 
it implies that, to a certain extent, audit judgements are 
based not on characteristics of the situation, but on the 
characteristics of the evaluator. More rigorous investiga¬ 
tion of such differences seems warranted for future 
research. 
Before discussing the kind of future research that this 
study suggests, it is appropriate that we review and criti¬ 
que the study, itself. Thus, we now turn to the last chap¬ 
ter of this thesis, which attempts to put the total study 
into perspective. 
CHAPTER XI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Any reasonable piece of research is flawed. The limita¬ 
tions imposed upon empirical investigation by time, cost, 
availability of subjects and data, and, of course, the 
researcher's own skill and depth of knowledge present insur¬ 
mountable restrictions and sticky problems of choice. None¬ 
theless, we continue to do research in the hope that the 
eventual preponderance of evidence will yield some insights 
into the activity in the world around us. 
What is taken as that preponderance of evidence changes 
as one's perspective changes. In testing a hypothesis, each 
experimental observation is taken as a piece of evidence. 
In determining the 'meaning' of the experiment's overall 
results, the outcome of each hypothesis test now becomes the 
evidential unit. This is not the highest level of analysis, 
however. One study is not a complete dissection of the 
examined behavior. Instead, the results of a single experi¬ 
ment must be integrated with evidence from other investiga¬ 
tions before reliable generalizations can be made. 
Various interpretations of this study's results, devel¬ 
oped from the 'local' point of view only, were presented in 
the preceding chapters. It is now appropriate that these 
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results be placed into a broad perspective. Accordingly, 
this chapter presents an overview of the research described 
in this thesis. 
The chapter begins with a summary of- the research problem 
and the approach to that problem taken in this study. The 
second section below discusses the problems inherent in the 
experiment that restrict the interpretations of the results. 
The next section presents the author's broad conclusions and 
conjectures about the research findings, integrating them 
with the results of prior research. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of the study for both 
practice and research. 
Review of the Research Problem and Approach 
We began this thesis with an examination of the recent 
resurgence in interest in the task of internal accounting 
control evaluation. This renewed interest was concluded to 
be the result of both (a) increased public sensitivity to 
and scrutiny of corporate behavior and (b) the auditing pro¬ 
fession's attempts to deal with the increasing complexity 
and cost of performing an audit. 
A review of the professional literature revealed that 
little information was generally available about either cur¬ 
rent control practices or the conceptual models used by 
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auditors that evaluate such controls.'*' Furthermore, it was 
found that, although the auditing practice abounds with dis¬ 
parate descriptive schemes and evaluation approaches, no 
general theory describing control cause and effect existed. 
As a result of this determination, three basic research 
questions were posed: 
1) Can auditors be characterized as experts in the area 
of internal accounting control evaluation as defined 
by the consistency, consensus, and lack of bias in 
their judgments? 
2) Can a systems model of internal accounting control 
capture the evaluation behavior of auditors in a care¬ 
fully varied set of hypothetical situations? and 
3) Which background and experience variables mediate 
auditors' internal accounting control judgments? 
These three questions really examine two sides of the 
same coin. That is, they each seek information about the 
level of systematic knowledge about internal accounting con¬ 
trol cause and effect shared by auditors. 
In order to examine either question, some basic measure¬ 
ment model needed to be chosen or developed. The measure¬ 
ment of behavior cannot be achieved without a theory that 
describes the behavior and thus tells the researcher what to 
1After this study was completed, an extensive "state of 
the art" review of internal control practices in U. S. cor¬ 
porations was published [Mautz, e_t aJL, 1980] . That study 
does provide a comprehensive overview and discussion of 
extant internal control practices. 
208 
observe. 
Therefore, the model of internal accounting control rela¬ 
tionships based on systems theory concepts was developed in 
Chapter IV. This model was used to both (a) make several 
predictions about rational behavior in internal accounting 
control evaluation, and (b) guide the development of experi¬ 
mental materials and measurement methods. 
The advantages of the model are seen as its generality of 
application, its internal consistency, and its ability to 
classify internal accounting control system components from 
several perspectives. While traditional evaluation schemes 
identify controls by the activities of which they are com¬ 
prised, the systems model classifies them by where they 
reside in the system and by the effects they are intended to 
produce. It also pinpoints where those effects will be 
* 
felt. 
The study was a mail administered experiment in which 31 
experienced auditors from four major audit firms in six 
locations were asked to make judgments on the reliability of 
internal accounting controls in a series of hypothetical 
situations. These situations, or cases, resulted from the 
orthogonal manipulation of four independent variables iden¬ 
tified by the systems model. For each case, each auditor 
was asked to rate the quality of control on each of three 
2C9 
different dimensions. There were twenty cases; thus each 
subject made a total of sixty judgments. 
4 
The test cases defined a fully crossed 2 factorial, 
repeated measures design. Four of the original cases were 
repeated for each subject in order to allow the assessment 
of his judgment consistency. 
The results of the experiment were examined from several 
perspectives. First, the raw data was reviewed in order to 
determine whether the experimental controls had been effec¬ 
tive, whether the subject group appeared to be representa¬ 
tive of auditors in general, and whether the subjects' 
responses could be reasonably interpreted as reactions to 
the experimental manipulations rather than reactions to the 
particulars of the experiment or its administration. Sec¬ 
ond , the hypotheses behind the study were tested and dis¬ 
cussed. These examinations of the data were concerned with 
similarities across auditor judgments. Finally, the data 
was explored to uncover differences among auditor judgments 
according to demographic class membership. 
Before reviewing the findings of this study and attempt¬ 
ing to glean their global meaning, it is important to remind 
ourselves of some of the limitations to interpreting those 
findings. 
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Limitations 
Limitations in the kind of empirical research described 
in this thesis may be grouped into two areas: experimental 
validity and analytical restrictions. These two topics are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
Experimental validity. 
The choice of experimental approach is a major determi¬ 
nant in the balance obtainable between internal and external 
validity. While both kinds of validity are highly desired, 
the perspective on the relative costs of invalidity that 
guided the design of this study can be summarized as fol¬ 
lows : 
1) The generalizability of the results of a single study 
is a moot point if the sources of the observed varia¬ 
tions in behavior are not identifiable. 
2) The overall results of a single experiment are most 
appropriately viewed as a single observation in the 
validation of a particular theory. 
3) Consequently, the external validity of one study's 
results are best assessed by their agreement with 
those of other studies investigating similar events or 
behavior, not necessarily by the naturalness of the 
setting in which the events or behavior are observed. 
4) Thus, the design of a single experiment should place 
emphasis on internal validity by seeking the greatest 
degree of control feasible. 
This study's design incorporated proportionately more 
energy into the maintenance of internal validity. Examina¬ 
tion of the results of this study (especially in Chapter VI) 
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led to the conclusion that the rating behavior of the audi¬ 
tor subjects was basically due to the manipulation of the 
independent variables. Further investigation showed that 
other variables may have had an impact in the ratings, but 
an attempt was made to identify them and estimate the magni¬ 
tude of their effects. One important source of reduced con¬ 
trol was the use of a mail administration of the experimen¬ 
tal materials. The impact of this lost control is not 
determinable. 
Returning to the external validity question, then, we of 
course accept that there are a plethora of restrictions on 
the generalization of our results beyond the subjects and 
situations in the current study. Although the experimental 
task was designed to simulate real evaluation situations, 
the operationalizations of the independent variables and the 
background data may have had little or no correspondence to 
the cues auditors normally attend to. The orthogonal manip¬ 
ulation of the cues, the reduced set of information availa¬ 
ble, and the lack of auditor control over the information 
set (in short, the artificiality of the exercise) may have 
resulted in behavior that has only a moderate relationship 
to real world behavior. 
In fact, the restricted set of dependent variables and 
the use of a rating measurement probably bear minimal overt 
resemblance to what most auditors actually observe and do in 
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their evaluations of internal accounting control. 
Nonetheless, the specific dependent dimensions were cho¬ 
sen to be as generally familiar to the subjects as possible. 
Also, the use of a ratings approach facilitated the internal 
validity of the results, since it did not incorporate cas¬ 
caded inference. 
Another potential restriction on generalizability is the 
fact that the subject sample was neither randomly selected 
nor strictly stratified. The review of the demographic 
characteristics of the auditors in the sample, however, led 
to the conclusion that those subjects provided a fair repre¬ 
sentation of auditors responsible for internal accounting 
control evaluations. 
Finally, the massed cluster of twenty evaluations may 
have affected the behavior of the subjects. The concetrated 
repetition of what would normally be a relatively infrequent 
procedure could easily have resulted in an abnormal sensi¬ 
tivity to certain cues. This effect might have been accen¬ 
tuated by the restriction of the subjects' attention to four 
specific cues. 
The comments above are not an exhaustive list of the 
validity limitations inherent in this study, nor are they 
meant to be. The point of this discussion has been simply 
to acknowledge that such problems exist and to enumerate 
some of the more salient ones. We now turn to more techni- 
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cal and specific problems in interpretation. 
Analytical limitations. 
Most empirical studies are performed with the intent of 
forming some conclusions about relationships between concep¬ 
tual classes of events or behaviors. Thus, a consideration 
of general importance is whether the analytical technique 
used to assess those relationships will be sensitive to 
them. It is critical that the analytical model be an appro¬ 
priate operationalization of the conceptual model. 
In this study, several analytical techniques were 
employed. Although each of these approaches was determined 
to be a logical choice to investigate the hypothesized rela¬ 
tionships, there is no guarantee that some other approach 
would not have provided a better fit to the data while still 
capturing the spirit of the hypotheses (or, perhaps, expose 
a worse fit to the data while better capturing the inten¬ 
tions of the hypotheses). 
In particular, three important potential limitations are 
recognized here. 
First, the investigation of intra-judge reliability 
sought to determine if auditors agreed with themselves in 
fact. The choice of Pearson product-moment correlations as 
the analytical technique thus seemed justified since it pro¬ 
vided a rather stringent test of that notion. However, if. 
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as posited by Hypothesis 4, overall system stability is the 
appropriate criterion on which to measure internal account¬ 
ing control effectiveness, then agreement on summary depen¬ 
dent vectors, not individual variables, may have been the 
more appropriate test approach. A similar criticism can be 
made of the inter-auditor reliability test. Unfortunately, 
the apparent multivariate approach of choice for those tests 
(canonical correlation) was precluded due to characteristics 
2 
of the data. 
Second, the test of Hypothesis 4 examined the degree to 
which the subjects' ratings loaded on a single dimension: 
stability. However, as discussed in Chapter IX, the princi¬ 
pal components analysis used may have been too sensitive to 
differences of opinion among the auditor subjects. 
Third, the basic MANOVA model employed in this study was 
a linear model. Since some hypotheses predicted configural 
cue usage, the analytical technique should have been sensi¬ 
tive to such behavior. However, the power of the linear 
model may have overwhelmed all but the grossest configural 
use of cues. As Goldberg [1968, p. 491] concludes, "... 
judges can process information in a configural fashion, but 
the general linear model is powerful enough to reproduce 
2 ... 
Recall that some subjects produced ratings with singu¬ 
lar matrices. This occured in both hypothesis test data 
sets. 
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most of these judgments with very small error." This poten¬ 
tiality actually makes the finding of interactive regulator 
effects more compelling and softens the impact of the fail¬ 
ure to find a significant constraints interaction effect. 
However, it also somewhat undermines the acceptance of 
Hypotheses 11-14, which posited the absence of regulator by 
constraint interactions. 
f 
Nonetheless, the analytical approaches used in this the¬ 
sis were determined to be the best available under the cir¬ 
cumstances. The model match they provided, though far from 
perfect, was deemed acceptable for our purposes. 
We have identified a substantial list of real and poten¬ 
tial limitations in this study. They have been presented as 
a reminder of the fragility of the results of this investi¬ 
gation. Nothing has been proved. Certain facts have merely 
been found to be true under the circumstances of this par¬ 
ticular experiment and the criteria established for its 
analysis. Having posted this caveat, we now proceed to dis¬ 
cuss the findings of this study in the convenient broad 
terms in which the research was framed. 
Conclusions 
Some of the territory covered in this thesis had been 
explored before and some had not. In terms of the expertise 
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issue, this study adds to an already existing body of 
evidence. The demographic analyses in Chapter X provide new 
perspectives from which to view the few bits of information 
from previous investigations of such effects. Finally, the 
fairly broad support found for the systems model of internal 
accounting control in the subjects' behavior opens new fron¬ 
tiers for future research. 
This section presents conclusions about the current study 
as its results integrate with findings of similar research. 
It is organized under the topics listed in the paragraph 
above. 
Auditor expertise. 
Earlier in this chapter, an argument was made that the 
results of an experiment are generalizable only to the 
extent that they are cross-validated by the outcomes of 
other studies. Substantial evidence has accumulated on the 
auditor expertise issue over the last several years. The 
results of this study help to bring the emerging patern of 
results into relief. 
The 90 percent confidence interval for mean auditor 
test-retest reliablitv reported in Chapter VIII was .661 to 
.762. The growing body of evidence seems to support the 
validity of this outcome. In fact, the major previous stud¬ 
ies reported even higher mean correlations than this study. 
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The mean value here was .715, while those reported by Ashton 
[1974], Joyce [1976], and Ashton and Brown [1980] were .81, 
.863, and .91, respectively. (Note that these figures are 
all above the confidence interval found for this study.) 
Although we have no solid criterion against which to evalu¬ 
ate these findings, it appears that auditors are relatively 
stable in their internal accounting control evaluations. 
There is substantially more information available on 
auditor consensus in internal accounting control evaluation, 
but it does not lead as clearly to a single implication as 
the evidence on the consistency issue. This study found a 
grand mean inter-judge correlation of .619 in a 90 percent 
confidence interval of .612 to .626. Other studies using 
ratings on internal control quality reported higher mean 
correlations. However, those studies utilized six-point 
scales. The fact that those scales had fewer rating alter¬ 
natives than the one in this study might account for the 
higher level of correlation. Joyce [1976] reported a 
cross-auditor correlation of .373 using a cascaded judgement 
as his dependent variable. Reckers and Taylor [1979] 
received judgments on five cases v/hich produced a mean 
inter-judge correlation of .155. The latter study used 
reliability (0 to 100 percent) as the dependent measure, so 
the greater number of rating alternatives may account for 
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some of the lower correlation. Also, as Ashton [1979] 
points out, their use of complex, non-extreme cases is 
. . 3 
likely to have biased the correlation downward. Our own 
findings of reduced consensus under situations with con¬ 
flicting cues would support such a conclusion. 
The attempt to justify this disparity of results produces 
some soft implications. First, it appears to be a general 
truth that auditors agree with each other less than they 
agree with themselves. Second, it also appears that cross¬ 
auditor consensus can be relatively high in instances where 
cues provide redundant information (i.e., where cues are 
congruent). Finally, it appears that consensus is reduced 
when cues conflict and when judgments are cascaded. 
Relatively little information is available about judgment 
biases in the evaluation of internal accounting control. 
Mock and Turner [1979] inferred (from somewhat tenuous indi¬ 
cations) the presence of halo and anchoring biases in audi¬ 
tor judgments. This study found some evidence of cue-sensi¬ 
tivity biases (differences of opinion on cause-effect 
relationships, perhaps analyzable as differences in halo 
effects). Nonetheless, since bias indicates a systematic 
deviation from accuracy and since no accuracy measure has 
Reckers and Taylor [1979] did not use any cases with 
highly congruent cues. Many variables differed from case to 
case, and there were conflicting cues in each case. 
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been employed in these studies, firm generalizations about 
auditor judgment bias are, at this point, impossible. 
Demographic effects. 
The results of the tests of demographic effects presented 
in Chapter X did not so much add to an existing body of evi¬ 
dence as provide an alternative perspective from which to 
view previous results. 
Prior studies have detected judgment differences due to 
firm affiliation. Ashton [1974] speculated that the differ¬ 
ences he observed were due to differences in client expo¬ 
sure. Joyce [1976] did not offer any explanation for the 
differences he found, although, since all of his firms were 
from the same location and were of roughly equal size and 
reputation, it is unlikely that client exposure would 
account for the difference. Both of these outcomes may be 
potentially explained by the account posed for the signifi¬ 
cant effects found in this study: the firm's standard eval¬ 
uation approach may foster a particular attention selectiv¬ 
ity and a particular attitude toward reliance on controls. 
Generalizations about the veracity of this explanation can¬ 
not yet be made, of course. 
Prior studies have also found differences due to years of 
auditor employment. This study redefined that variable into 
three dimensions: years of audit experience, auditor rank 
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and responsibility, and extent of internal accounting 
control evaluation experience. Due to differences in the 
experience levels studied and in the points of view pursued, 
the results of this investigation and those of previous 
studies cannot be easily reconciled. However, none of our 
results are inconsistent with those others. Since other 
studies have indicated that experience in itself has a mini¬ 
mal effect on accuracy, the notion offered in Chapter X 
appears to be as promising a path to follow as any. 
The systems model. 
The behavior of the subjects in this study genrally sup¬ 
ported the predictions of the systems model. Although the 
results of previous studies may be reinterpreted from the 
perspective of the systems model, their designs and the lack 
of available raw data would make such an exercise pointless. 
Until further study of the model is made, no strong state¬ 
ments about its validity can be made. In the meantime, the 
systems model may be useful simply as a descriptive scheme. 
Implications 
This study has implications for both practice and 
research. The first subsection below presents a discussion 
of the practical implications. The second subsection dis¬ 
cusses potentially fertile areas for research as indicated 
221 
by the results of this study. 
Significance for professional groups. 
This study has implications for at least four groups. 
Managers, systems designers, auditors, and regulative or 
legislative bodies each have a vested interest in informa¬ 
tion about internal accounting control and its evaluation. 
A review of the significance of this research from each of 
their respective viewpoints is given below. 
Managers should be interested in internal control and the 
auditor's evaluation in order to assure basic information 
reliability and in order to comply with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and SEC regulations. Specifically, this 
interest should center on two applications. First, the 
development of some criteria and guidelines for internal 
accounting control evaluation is necessary to allow manage¬ 
ment to assess the quality of its controls quickly, accu¬ 
rately, and efficiently. An understanding of the auditor's 
concerns in this area would assist management in 'cleaning 
up' its control system. Second, manitaining controls on 
which auditors would be more likely to rely would have imme¬ 
diate rewards in the reduction of audit time and cost. The 
model developed in this thesis and the fact that the auditor 
subjects appear to validate it in their judgments can pro¬ 
vide management with the foundation on which to erect a set 
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of general guidelines for evaluating and manitaining the 
internal accounting control system. 
Systems designers need similar guidance. The traditional 
design goals of effectiveness and efficiency require knowl¬ 
edge about the match between a system's goals and its proce¬ 
dures and about the marginal effects of additional controls. 
The systems model addresses such issues. 
Thus, for both of the groups referred to above, the major 
impact of this study is provided by the general support for 
the systems model. This model, even in its presently primi¬ 
tive form, can provide managers and systems designers with a 
heuristic approach to the examination of internal control 
problems. 
Of particular interest to these groups should be the 
indications in this study that programmed responses to feed¬ 
back signals seem to provide an extra measure of control 
that neither control technique provides by itself. 
Both the internal auditor and the independent auditor 
need to 'objectivize' their evaluation of internal account¬ 
ing control. The guidelines in SAS 30 have expanded the 
auditor's role and responsibility in the evaluation of 
internal control. Due to this responsibility change, the 
auditor needs a more complete and more general set of guide¬ 
lines for the evaluation task. They also need to know more 
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about the potential sources of evaluation problems. 
Those bodies that regulate the auditing profession need 
to know how the policies they establish will affect auditors 
and their behavior. This study has particular salience to 
their decisions on the various proposals relating to the 
auditor's responsibilities in internal accounting control 
evaluation. Only the general audit-related responsibilities 
seem to be well matched to the auditor's level of evaluation 
expertise. Given the 'fail-safed' nature of the current 
evaluation process, dysfunctional judgment will reduce the 
efficiency of an audit, but not its accuracy. 
The outcome of the experiment described in this thesis 
has several implications here. 
The analysis in Chapter X indicated that the auditor's 
responsibilities or decision goals may affect his evaluation 
of internal accounting control. If this is so, changing the 
auditor's internal accounting control evaluation responsi¬ 
bility will probably change the judgment he produces. Since 
such a change may, in fact, be entirely appropriate given 
the new goals, it may make sense for the auditor to make 
separate evaluations for different purposes. To some 
extent, this implication is reflected in the prescriptions 
of SAS 30. 
Our results show that the firm's evaluation approach or 
philosophy may affect final evaluation output. Thus, since 
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such evaluations may now result in audit opinions in them¬ 
selves, cross-firm differences should be recognized or mini¬ 
mized. The notion that such an 'opinion' can be impartially 
provided under current techniques is apparently based on an 
overestimation of the auditor's expertise and an underesti¬ 
mation of the effects of non-situational variables in con¬ 
trol evaluation. The solution may require the adoption of a 
uniform evaluation approach. Thus far, no such suggestion 
has been considered. 
In the process of refining evaluation procedures, the 
systems model may be a useful tool. One implication for 
such evaluation approach development comes from the fact 
that subjects' ratings were more disperse in the absense of 
systems boundary constraints, feedback regulators, and pro¬ 
grammatic regulators than they were in the presence of such 
control features. A prescriptive evaluation model would 
benefit from the requirement of more detailed examination of 
environmental constraints when overt boundary control proce¬ 
dures are missing, and of structured, but informal, regula¬ 
tion approaches when formal ones are absent. 
The discussion above has listed some immediate implica¬ 
tions that this study of internal accounting control evalua¬ 
tion has for at least four professional groups. This study 
also has produced several results and conjectures that may 
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provide a point of departure for more elaborate studies and 
model-building. In closing, we address these issues. 
Significance to future research. 
Research is a continuing incremental process. True to 
that notion, the research reported in this thesis builds on 
previous work, offers new perspectives, and, in the final 
analysis, raises more questions than it answers; it leaves 
us confused at a higher level. The potential is for this 
study to provide a take-off point for at least two major 
programs of future research. 
In the area of auditor judgment, it is expected that fur¬ 
ther study of the impact of environmental constraints on 
control quality (and control evaluation) will follow. It is 
expected that some of the issues identified but not dealt 
with through a priori hypotheses in this work will be sub¬ 
jects for further study. Prominent among these issues are 
the following: 
1) Investigation of the effect of cue combinations on 
auditor consensus may indicate the situations in which 
internal accounting control evaluations have reduced 
reliability. 
2) Investigation of the sources of differences across 
auditors (in terms of mean decision values) may help 
isolate sources of evaluation bias. 
3) Investigation of the non-situational sources of dif¬ 
ferences in auditor consensus may indicate ways of 
enhancing consensus. 
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We hope that the research here will also stimulate more 
research on and development of macro-level models of control 
cause-effect relationships. The systems model developed in 
this thesis seems to hold some potential in such future 
endeavors. Regardless of whether this particular model can 
stand up to more rigorous testing, however, such a 'top- 
down' analysis model is worthy of pursuit. While micro¬ 
level simulation of control systems may help us learn more 
about the efficacy of individual techniques or clusters of 
specific techniques, we will always require a global view¬ 
point in internal accounting control evaluation. The devel¬ 
opment of a general, empirically substantiated top-down 
model is a goal of the first order for auditing research. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Case Booklet 
AUDITOR JUDGMENTS ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL 
The study in which you are about to participate involves the 
evaluation of specified aspects of internal control. This audit task 
relies on the professional judgment of experienced auditors. The objective 
of this study is to examine the range of auditors’ judgments brought about 
by a limited variety of hypothetical auditing situations. 
The results of this study will be examined in a group and, thus, your 
specific responses will neither be known nor sought. Nonetheless, the 
value of this research and its potential contribution to our knowledge of 
professional judgment and internal accounting control evaluation depends 
on your complete cooperation and serious consideration in the task at hand. 
Do not put your name anywhere in this booklet. 
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I. Biographical Data. 
1. Your Firm's name: _ 
2. Your position title: __ 
3. Your office location:  
4. Number of years audit experience:  
5. If you have ever worked in commercial industry, please complete the 
following: 
Type of position: [ ] Internal auditor 
[ ] Accounting/information systems, non-audit 
[ ] Other (please specify): 
Type of industry: _ 
Number of years experience:  
Years since leaving above industry: _ 
6. Place an "X" in the box next to the category that best describes your 
auditing experience in terms of client size. 
[ ] Primarily firms with sales over $30 million. 
[ ] Primarily firms with sales under $30 million. 
[ ] Fairly even mix of over and under $30 million. 
7. Place an "X" in the box next to the category that best describes your 
auditing experience in terms of client mix. 
[ ] Primarily specialized industry (e.g., banks, insurance) please 
specify: _ 
[ ] Primarily a general mix of industries. 
3. Place an "X" in the box next to each kind of advanced or specialized 
audit training you have received. 
[ ] Advanced statistical techniques 
( ] Advanced computer auditing 
[ ] Other (please specify): __ 
Have you ever had primary responsibility for making preliminary 
evaluations on the quality of a client's internal accounting control? 
[ ] No [ ] Yes How often? __ 
9. 
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II. Task Instructions. 
This section describes the output desired from you in this study. In 
the next section of this booklet (Section III), the general description of 
a single firm and its accounting system is presented. A more detailed out¬ 
line of the firm's accounts receivable subsystem, and its relationship to 
the rest of the revenue cycle system, is then given. In Section IV, a number 
of different situations within this accounts receivable subsystem are set 
forth. In each of these possible situations you will be asked to review the 
accounts receivable subsystem as documented and assess its reliability. 
You will be asked to assess the subsystem's reliability in relation to 
each of the three broad objectives on internal accounting control outlined 
by AICFA in the Reoort of the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting 
Control. These objectives are classified as authorization, accounting, and 
asset safeguarding. The task in this experiment is a preliminary evaluation 
of the reliability of each of 20 variations of an accounts receivable subsystem 
in terms of its ability to achieve each of these objectives. For the purposes 
of this study, then, you should employ the following criteria in each evaluation: 
Authorization. The subsystem's procedures and techniques should 
assure that transactions occur only in compliance with policies 
and criteria established by management such that, for example, 
kinds of customers serviced, prices, credit, terms of sales, cus¬ 
tomer acceptance, sales-related adjustments, and billing and 
collection practices are appropriate as determined under some general 
or specific form of authorization. 
Accounting. The subsystem’s procedures and techniques should assure 
that transactions are recorded as executed such that, for example, 
all and only bona fide transactions are recorded, that they are 
correctly classified, and that their recording is timely. 
Asset Safeguarding. The subsystem's procedures and techniques should 
assure that assets are protected from loss, abuse, mishandling, or 
misappropriation such that, for example, access to assets, records, 
critical forms, and processing is restricted to responsible parties 
and that records are inspected for accuracy in representing asset 
values at regular intervals. 
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In your own auditing experience, you nay or nay noc have been required 
to make the kind of separate ar.d formal evaluations of reliability within a 
particular subsystem as you will be asked to make here. Since approaches and 
terminology vary somewhat from firm to firm, a method of recording your response 
has been chosen which allows you a good deal of freedom in framing your evalua¬ 
tion. This method employs the familiar "scale of 1 to 10" rating that has 
become so commonplace in our world. In this case, the scale represents the 
range of system reliability. 
The scale is composed of a line broken into separate spaces by capital I’s. 
The ends of the scale are labeled "unreliable" and "reliable" to indicate that 
spaces to the right represent judgments of greater system reliability than spaces 
to the left. Each space is labeled with a number from 1 to 10. Thus, your 
task is to rate the reliability of the subsystem in each situation from 1 to 10 
by placing an "X" in the space that corresponds to your evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the controls described in that situation. Be sure to put 
your "Xrs" in the spaces and not on the dividers. They should look like this 
-r , not like this -r 
6 8 6 
To give you some reference points, the end points of the scale are defined 
as follows: 
a. A rating of 1 indicates a situation in which the combination 
of controls is so poor that errors in authorization, accounting, 
or safeguarding would be prevented or detected and corrected 
only by chance. 
b. A rating of 10 indicates a situation in which the combination of 
controls is so strong that no errors in authorization, accounting, 
or safeguarding would go unprevented or undetected and uncorrected. 
You should record your evaluations as they relate to these reference points. 
You may use as many or few of the different ratings scores during the course of 
the experiment as you see fit. The situations have not been designed to 
"fill up" the rating scale. The rating scale has simply been chosen to allow 
you as much freedom as possible in making your responses. 
In order to give you a preview of the rating situation format, a structurally 
similar evaluation page is presented on the next page. Note that this example 
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SITUATION 00 
The following four items complete the description of the payroll 
subsystem at Craftmate, Inc. 
ITEM YES NO 
1. Have the client's personnel been informed of 
their employer's ethical standards and are 
formal statements of these standards posted 
in visible locations? 
2. Are payroll disbursements authorized by indiv¬ 
iduals acting within the scope of their duties 
and performed in accordance with appropriate 
authorization guidelines? 
3. Are individual earnings records verified against 
the applicable payroll accounts in the general 
ledger(including adequate investigation of 
reconciling items) at reasonable intervals? 
4. Are non-routine payroll disbursements (e.g., 
severance pay, retroactive pay, mispayment 
corrections) handled according to formalized 
operating procedures? 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Please rate the payroll subsystem described in this 
situation on its reliability in assuring appropriate: 
Authorization- 
Unreliable 
Reliable 
Accounting- 
Unreliable 
Reliable 
Safeguarding- 
Unreliable 
5-5-±- 
12 3 10 
Reliable 
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concerns a payroll subsystem. As you can see, the case specific information 
is given in the form of a series of questions with yes or no answers, similar 
to a part of an internal control questionnaire. 
The situations you will face provide similar information, which completes 
the general description of the accounts receivable subsystem given in a set of 
flowcharts at the end of the next section of this booklet. 
Your task is to rate each situation by placing an "X" on each of the three 
rating scales at the bottom of the page. Recall that the only constraints on 
your rating decision are the definitions of the endpoints given above. The 
results of the experiment will be standardized before they are analyzed, so 
you may define the "values" of a 3 or an 8, for example, as you see fit. 
Other factors beside internal control may affect the plan of the audit 
program, but this study is not concerned with them or with the audit program 
plan, itself. Your ratings should reflect control quality/reliability only. 
However, if it helps you in your consideration of each situation, you may 
assume that: 
a. Accounts receivable has been defined as a significant audit area; 
b. It has been identified as an area where reliance on internal controls 
has potential in the audit program, and 
c. Such reliance would appear to be cost efficient, if warranted. 
III. Common Background Data. 
This section contains background information that does not vary from 
one rating situation to another. An effort has been made to provide you with 
background information thac is as realistic as possible. The company described 
here is modeled on an actual firm. However, both experiments and audits are 
subject to time constraints. Thus, you may be working with less information 
that you would like to have. Nonetheless, please give your best effort and 
rate each situation as your training and experience dictate. Also, please 
attempt to base your decisions solely on the information given in this booklet. 
Avoid making any extra assumptions. 
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A. SETTING 
Assume that you have been assigned as accountant in charge of the 
12/31/79 audit of Craftmate, Inc., a home power tools manufacturer. You are 
In the early stages of the audit and are performing the preliminary evaluation 
of internal accounting control before embarking on the planning of the detailed 
audit program. 
This is your first year on this audit, but your firm has worked with 
this client for the last five years. Each previous audit has resulted in an 
unqualified opinion. You have worked with each of your assistants previously 
and are quite satisfied as to their competence and conscientiousness. 
Before making your preliminary evaluation of internal accounting 
control in the accounts receivable subsystem, you expect to receive a few 
more pieces of data. Thus far, however, you have accumulated the information 
summarized below. 
B. THE ECONOMY 
The general consensus among economists is that the United States will 
experience a recession in 1980. There is some disagreement about the severity 
of that recession and the time of its heaviest impact, however. This is due 
to some conflicting economic indicators, uncertainty about the energy situation, 
and the possible role of government intervention into the economy during an 
election year. 
Inflation is currently running at a 13% annual rate. GN? in the 
third quarter was up 2.4% on an annual-adjusted basis. This was a significant 
change from the 2.3% drop in GNP on an annual basis reported for the second 
quarter. The Federal Reserve Board's chairman, Paul Volcker, has vowed to 
hold down the money supply via direct monitoring. The prime lending rate is 
hovering around 15%. 
Petroleum costs continue to rise, although the oil supply seems to 
be sufficient for the short run. However, the OPEC nations may decide to 
reduce production at any time. In any event, energy costs seem certain to 
increase. 
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The fact chat 1930 is a major election year, when the President, the 
House, and one-third of the Senate will be chosen, may also have an impact on 
the economy. In order to forestall an economic slide on the way to the polls. 
Congress and the President may yet choose to "pump up" the economy in 19S0. 
C. INDUSTRY AND CONDITIONS 
The home power tool manufacturing industry is fairly mature and stable. 
It has experienced a slight growth over the last few years, subsequent to a 
period of rapid demand growth during the previous decade. Recently, however, 
any large increase in sales by a large company has been at the expense of one 
or more of its competitors. The industry is composed of approximately a dozen 
large manufacturers and a number of smaller firms. Most of the more familiar 
brands market their goods through national hardware wholesalers and retailers, 
while others either operate regionally or market their goods under house brand 
names. 
Product lines are quite stable and generally undergo only cosmetic 
changes from year to year. Some innovation in product design occurs, but 
almost no new kinds of tools have appeared since the early 1960's. Thus, little 
inventory fluctuation occurs and repeat purchasing is the general rule. 
Most manufacturers are not vertically integrated and thus purchase 
most input materials in component form (i.e., few firms wind their own armatures 
or produce their own tool bodies). No shortage of supplies is expected, but 
increases in costs have been partially responsible for a shift from steel to 
alloys and plastic parts. 
The outlook for the industry is relatively good. Although current 
economic conditions increase the uncertainty in any prediction, strong sales 
were experienced after an early stall during the recession in the early mid-1970's. 
Most industry analysts expect a stall in growth, but sales nearly equal to 
last year. 
D. FIRM STATUS AND HISTORY 
Craftmate was founded in 1951 as Frenier Electric by James Frenier, 
a self-educated electrical engineer. The company was originally established 
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as a producer of large motor assemblies to be sold as components for tool 
manufacturers or as replacement motors. In 1957, his son, Charles, assumed 
the company presidency at age 40. Charles, a college graduate, revamped the 
company (then Craftmade, Inc.) by expanding into the home tool product lines 
and pioneering the market outlets that are the core of Craftmate's current 
marketing system. 
Many management positions are held by members of the rrenier family, 
their in-laws, and family friends. Charles' son, Jim, an MBA, is assistant 
to the Sales V. P. All the key management personnel are college educated and 
appear to be quite able in their business activities. The V. P.'s for Sales 
and for Production each hold 3BA's and have been promoted from inside the firm 
after a number of years of service. They have held their current positions 
for at least eight years. The controller is an M3A who has been with the firm 
for 12 years. He was responsible for instituting all the EDP applications the 
firm employs. 
Craftnate currently manufacturers 16 different basic models of large 
home power tools (e.g., table saws, drill presses, radial arm saws) and 12 
different basic models of hand power tools (e.g., drills, circular saws, 
routers). A variety of different shells and cosmetic changes allow these 
basic models to be sold under several house brands as well as under the 
Craftmate name. Craftmate's largest single purchaser is a national department 
3tore and mailorder retailer, but the majority of the company's output is sold 
to a large number of small purchasers. 
Sales this year are expected to be about $18 million. The company 
experienced its greatest growth in the late 1960fs and early 1970's by 
expanding its market during an industry growth period. Since then, its market 
share has remained fairly stable and its profits have grown steadily, if 
unspectacularly. This is in accordance with management's current plans, 
which are to solidify its market position and seek additional profits through 
increased efficiency in production and distribution. 
All of Craftmate's facilities are located on a single site in central 
New York which has ready access to major trucking and rail routes. All records 
are maintained on the premises. 
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E. OWNERSHIP 
Craftmate went public in 1972, when sales reached $10 million. 
The Frenier family still owns about 45% of the company’s outstanding shares, 
with Charles (now Chairman as well as President) holding 20% himself. Non¬ 
family employees own a total of 20% of the firm. The company's stock is 
sporadically traded over the counter. 
F. SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Due to the "neighborhood" nature of Craftmate, administrative 
personnel tend to associate with each other outside of the office. Further¬ 
more, the atmosphere in each of the offices is decidedly informal, although 
slight social distinctions seem to be made along family and seniority lines. 
Hourly production workers, on the other hand, do not tend to mix beyond their 
own job shop and shift. 
G. ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 
The company has two Philips minicomputers on which it maintains 
payroll and the general ledger accounts. Monthly summaries, reports, billings, 
and financial statements are also prepared on these machines. Until recently, 
all of Craftmate’s accounting system was manual. The transition to automation 
of the above activities has taken place gradually over the last five years. 
Standard operating procedures exist for all daily record keeping 
activities. Each accounting department employee has been issued a copy of 
the manual describing such procedures in his department. Accounting duties 
are not rotated. 
No formal internal auditors position exists at Craftmate. This 
function is performed by the Controller's assistant, who makes spot-checks 
in the various departments at unannounced times. 
In the revenue cycle areas, segregation of duties and restricted 
access exists among sales, accounts receivable, cash receipts, inventory 
records/cost of sales, shipping, and central processing (EDP). Only department 
employees have access to the blank forms used for documents originating in 
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their department. Thus, billing forms are kept in central-processing; invoices 
and dunning forms are kept in accounts receivable; shipping document blanks are 
kept in shipping; customer purchase order forms are kept in sales; and cash 
receipt blanks are kept in the cashier's office. 
H. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE SUBSYSTEM 
Accounts receivable is a five person department which handles this 
function only. Although there is some segregation of duties within the depart¬ 
ment, each employee must perform a variety of jobs. 
Accounts receivable balances have averaged 20% of total assets and 
43% of current assets over the last two years. The proportions on the third 
quarter balance sheet are 21% and 42%. 
A summary flowchart of accounts receivable operations is given on the 
following pages. This flowchart includes interfaces with surrounding revenue 
cycle operations. There are five boxes in the flowchart which refer to an 
item number on the rating situation sheets. One on each page refers to item 4. 
None refers to item 1. 
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Client: Craftmate, Inc. Legend: 
System: Accounts Receivable Double lines indicate restricted access 
Audit: 12/31/79 departmental boundaries. 
Dept. Manager (DM)- 3. 
Cleric A- T. 
Clerk 3- M. 
Clerk C- C. 
Clerk 0- M. 
Frer.ier 
Watson 
0'3rien 
DeLiso 
Xreski 
C?0 = Customer Purchase Order I » Sales Invoice 
SD =» Shipping Document 3 ■ Receipt Voucher 
3 = Customer Billing Statement 
1. Salesman transcribes customer's phone or mail order onto C?0. 
2. Clerk A or 3 (first available) checks customer's credit acceptability against 
list prepared monthly by DM. Initials CPO and notes credit limit on same. 
3. See item 4 on rating situation sheets to find out if DM checks and initials 
credit sales approvals. 
4. Clerk A or 3 (first available) writes order on 4-part, prenumbered sales invoice, 
cross-referenced and attached to CPO. 
5. Documents distributed. CPO, II, 12 to numerical suspense file; 13 to inventory; 
14 to customer as acknowledgement (via salesman). 
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Pace AR-2 
Client: Craitmate, Inc. avstem: .-.ccounts P.eceivaote Audit:12/31/79 
6. Warehouseman writes 3-part shipping document (cross-referenced to I#) as order 
is assembled. 13, 301, and SD2 are returned to the dispatcher, who checks 
and initials them against the merchandise. 3D3 is packed with the merchandise. 
7. Dispatcher checks and distributes documents. 13 to A?.; SCI to his file; SD2 
affixed to outside of shipment as packing slip. 
3. Clerk A or 3 (first available) matches 13 to II, 12, C?0 from suspense file. 
9. See item 4 cn rating situation sheets to find out if formal procedures for 
investigating and correcting mismatches exist. 
10. Same clerk as step 3 prices and extends all invoice espies using standard price 
lists. 
11. Documents distributed. II to numerical file; 12 to alphabetical file; 12 to 
day file ?; C?0 to salesman, indicating shipment en route. 
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Pace AR-3 
Cl lent: . rarcmace, nc. vstan: Accounts P.eceivacie rtuai: 12/31/ 79 
12. See item 3 on ratine situation sheets to find out if invoices are reconciled 
numerically at least once a month with investigation and documentation of 
missing numbers. 
13. Cleric 0 prepares the daily total on invoices, affixes the adding machine 
tape to the day file, and sends the package to central processing. 
14. SEP keypunch operator transcibes invoices to magnetic tape while visually 
verifying input on CPT screen. 
15. 13's are filed in C? documents. Preliminary edit check is run on tape file 
prior to actual input to update routine. Edit checks include verification 
of total from AP. adding machine tape, machine check digits, master file 
comparison, and reasonableness checks. 
IS. If edit check failure not due to keying error, day file returned to AP. with 
note of edit rejection. 
17. See item 4 on rating situation sheets to find out if formal procedures for 
investigating and correcting errors exist. 
18. Clerk C matches billing statements against 12's. 
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1 3 re 
Client: Craftmate, Inc. vstsn: Accounts Receivable Audit: 12/31/79 
20. DM receives aged accounts receivable trial balance monthly from central processing 
and prepares the list of overdue accounts. Cased on this, he prepares the 
credit status/limit list (see step 2 on page AR-1), dunning3, and bad debt 
write-offs (reviewed by controller) 
21. Cash receipts are recorded on 4-part, prenumbered receipt vouchers. Rl is 
sent back to the customer; R2 is placed in the CR file, and R3,4 axe 3ent to 
accounts receivable. 
22. Clerk D matches R3,4 to 33 from the alphabetic billing file, initialing 
reconciling items, marking 33 "paid" and filing the documents. 
23. See item 4 on rating situation sheets to find out if formal procedures 
for investigating and correcting mismatches exist. 
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-LlSi 1 0-5 
Client; Craftr.ace, Inc. | S'/sten: Accounts Receivable edit: L2/31/~>9 
24. Clerk C prepares the daily total or. 
tape to the receipts day file (file 
processing. 
receipts, affixes the adding machine 
U), and sends the package to central 
AC/LOUhJTS £cC&\/ABC? 
PA<£rfr 42.-4 
?p^e 
4e-3 
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IV Evaluation Situations 
On each of the next twenty pages is a set of four questions and answers 
which, in association with the information in the previous section, complete 
the description of the accounts receivable subsystem by supplying the infor¬ 
mation to fill the "empty boxes" in the subsystem’s flowchart. Recall that 
each of these situations is to be considered a separate and independent case. 
Your task is to rate the reliability of the accounts receivable subsystem 
against three stated objectives based on the procedures and techniques employed 
in that subsystem only. Assume that reliabilities for other subsystems are 
determined separately. 
For each situation, then, you should: 
a. Examine the yes-no answers to the questions at the top of the page; 
b. Mentally "fill in" the empty boxes in the flowchart with the appropriate 
information, and; 
c. Once you have evaluated the resulting subsystem configuration, 
indicate your ratings by placing an "X" in the appropriate space 
on each scale at the bottom of the page. 
You may refer back to Section III as often as you wish, but please do not 
re-examine or change a rating once you have moved to a new rating situation. 
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SITUATION 01 
The following four items complete the description of the accounts 
receivable subsystem at Craftmate, Inc. 
ITEM 
1. Have the client’s personnel been in¬ 
formed of their employer’s ethical 
standards and are formal statements 
of these standards posted in visible 
locations? 
YES NO 
2. Are credit sales approvals checked and 
initialed by the department manager? 
3. Are invoices reconciled numerically 
at least once a month and are missing 
numbers investigated and their dis¬ 
position documented as a part of each 
reconciliation? 
4. Do formalized procedures exist for 
handling the non-routine activities 
of investigating and correcting 
mismatching pairs of sales invoices, 
shipping documents, billing amounts, 
and payment receipts? 
_z _ 
/ 
Please rate the accounts receivable subsystem described in 
this situation on its reliability in assuring appropriate: 
Authorization- 
Unreliable Reliable 
Accounting- 
Unreliable Reliable 
Safeguarding- 
Unreliable 123456739 10 Reliable 
NOTE: TWENTY "CASE'1 DESCRIPTIONS SIMILAR TO THIS 
ONE WERE INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL BOOKLET, 
OCCUPYING PAGES 13 THROUGH 37. 
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V. Debriefing Questions 
This section exists to allow you to give us some feedback on your 
experience in this experiment. Please feel free to add any comments at 
the end of this section. 
1. Please rate the following aspects of the experimental task you have 
just completed: 
The rating task, itself: 
DULL —L-1-1-1-1-1-1-1_I_I_I_ INTERESTING 
123456789 10 
The clarity of the instructions: 
obscure —i—i—i—i—i—i—i—:—i—i—1_ clear 
123456789 10 
The realism of the situations described: 
UNREAL -I-1_I_I_I-1-1-1-1-1-1— REAL 
123456739 10 
Your feel for performing the ratings: 
UNCOMFORTABLE —t-1-1-1-?-±-1-1-=-i-1— COMFORTABLE 
123456789 10 
2. Rave you ever participated in an auditing research study before? 
( ] Yes { ] No 
3. What is your opinion of such activity, in general? 
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4. How much time has elapsed since you started reading this booklet? 
How much time did you spend on the rating task, itself? 
5. Please use the space below to elaborate on your answers above, add any 
comments on your experience with the experiment, or discuss any of your 
thought processes during the rating task. 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. 
A copy of the results of this experiment will be 
made available to your firm through: 
APPENDIX B 
A Note on Cascaded Inference 
In Categorical Judgment 
Most of the cascaded inference literature deals with the 
assessment of probaoilities (cf. Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1977). This study and its immediate predecessors, however, 
dealt with categorical judgment. The following simple 
example is intended to demonstrate some possible effects of 
cascading in such a situation. This example is not a mathe¬ 
matical proof. It is only intended to be an illustration. 
Assume the following: 
1) The judges are experts. Any errors in their judg¬ 
ments are due solely to random error. Thus, the 
judgments given by the hypothetical panel will be 
distributed about the 'true' classification in 
approximately random-normal fashion. 
2) The judges employ a 'best-guess' strategy of the 
kind identified in the literature when they are 
making cascaded judgments. That is, the judges 
behave as if they assume that any intermediate 
judgment made during a related series correctly 
reflects the truth. Thus that judgment can be 
fed directly into the next decision step. 
3) Some 'true' isomorphic relationship exists 
between the intermediate and final steps in the 
judgment task. Our expert judges know this rela¬ 
tionship intuitively (hence the judgment aspect 
of the task) and the only error they make in 
going from one step to the next is random. In 
terms of the audit plan, the relationship of 
importance is the one between control system 
reliability and audit man-hours. 
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100 judges are asked to derive a time budget for the 
audit of a particular accounting subsystem. The 'true' 
quality of internal accounting control in the situation is 
70 percent reliability. In the first judgment step, how¬ 
ever, some of the judges are affected by random error. 
Thus, the following frequency distribution is obtained for 
reliability judgments: 
Rating— Frequency— 
90 percent 
80 
70 (true) 
60 
50 
<50 
2 judges 
16 
65 
16 
1 
0 
Assume the following relationship is appropriate for the 
audit being planned: 
Rating— Man-hours— 
100 percent 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
40 hours 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
130 
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Each judge is aware of only his own evaluation. He 
also affected by random disturbance in translating his 
ability judgment into a time budget figure. Thus, the 
resulting distribution of t'imes would be: 
Man-hour plan— Frequency— 
>100 hours 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
0 judges 
1 
4 
22 
46 
22 
3 
2 
is 
rel i- 
Despite the fact that the differences at each stage in 
the decision process were due only to random error, there is 
less apparent consensus in the plan decisions than in the 
reliability judgments. This phenomenon is due to the fact 
that the first decision stage had essentially a single set 
f 
of input cues while the second stage had a variety of 
inputs. The lower level of consensus is strictly due to 
entropy, not differences of opinion! 
The implication here is that conclusions about consensus 
under a situation where judgments are cascaded are likely to 
underestimate the agreement between the judges. Thus, in a 
situation where the judges make non-random errors, consensus 
in a multistage decision is likely to be quite low indeed. 


